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THE INTERDEPENDENCE AND
PERMEABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS: TOWARDS A PARTIAL
FUSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS©
By CRAIG SCOTT*

Using the doctrine of interdependence of human rights as a starting
point, the author considers the extent to which international human rights
norms located in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights (ICESCR) "permeate" the parallel InternationalCovenant
on Civil and PoliticalRights (ICCPR), thereby permitting certain social
and economic rights to be subjected to the individual petition procedure
under the ICCPR's Optional Protocol. After elucidating the notion of
interdependence, the author evaluates the salience of the concept in
international human rights discourse, and weighs this against arguments
for the continued normative separation of the Covenants based on
justiciability as well as normative and jurisdictional conflicts. The author
argues that a partial normative unity should be forged between the two
Covenants by means of creative interpretation and by the forging of
institutional linkages between the supervisory organs for the two
Covenants. In light of the permeability presumption thus developed, the
author then concludes with an analysis of decisions taken by the Human
Rights Committee in the areas of equal protection of the law, the right
to a fair hearing, freedom of association, and the right to life.
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Human Rights Norms

I. INTRODUCTION
The interdependence of human rights is a term that is
increasingly prominent in international human rights discourse. In
particular, the notion of interdependence has assumed growing
importance within the political organs of the United Nations (UN). 1
Even so, as with much ritualistic language, our conceptions of the
meaning and implications of the concept are largely inchoate.
The idea of permeability is put forward as one means of
giving practical legal effect to the abstract doctrine of
interdependence which has, thus far in its lifespan, existed as little
more than a rhetorical slogan. By permeability I mean, in broad
outline, the openness of a treaty dealing with one category of
human rights to having its norms used as vehicles for the direct or
indirect protection of norms of another treaty dealing with a
different category of human rights. Norms that overlap, either
implicitly as a product of the interpretative process or explicitly on
the face of the textual provisions, are particularly relevant.2
The specific goal of this article is to consider the extent to
which human rights norms located in the InternationalCovenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IcEscR) can permeate the
norms in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(iCcPR). Such permeability would permit economic rights to be
subjected to the supervisory jurisdiction of the ICCPR'S Human Rights
Committee, specifically its Optional Protocol jurisdiction. Thus,
individuals would be given access to a petition procedure that is not
available under the icEsCR, restricted as it is to a reporting system
of implementation.3
1 See the most recent General Assembly resolution entitled "[I]ndivisibility and
interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights" (Resolution 41/117 of
4 December 1986). This resolution is briefly discussed in Section (hereinafter S.) III.C.2.
See S.III.A.1 for an elaboration of the concept of interdependence.

2 I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Rosalyn Higgins for coining this
term. The definition, elaboration and application of the term remain my responsibility alone.
3 For the ICESCR, ICCPR and Optional Protocol, see Council of Europe, Human Rights
in International Law: Basic Texts (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications, 1985)

[hereinafter Basic Texts] at 14, 26 and 49, respectively. Permeability, therefore, refers in the
present context to the flow of norms from the ICESCR to the ICCPR. A study of the flow
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The doctrine of interdependence can serve as a starting point
for developing a general interpretative presumption for permeability.
The separation of the two Covenants does not mean that the human

rights norms contained therein are separable. Instead, a partial
normative unity can be gradually forged between the Covenants, by
means of creative interpretation and by the forging of institutional
linkages between the Human Rights Committee and the new
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.4 Such a
process is more in keeping with the insights and imperatives of the
interdependence of human rights than is the continued isolation of
the two Covenants from each other.
II. SITUATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
This study attempts to deal with the general issue of
permeability by using the ICCPR and the ICESCR as expository

of norms from the ICCPR to the ICESCR is also desirable, but remains outside the scope
of this article.
It must be emphasized that the terms economic rights and politicalrights are used purely
for convenience. Furthermore, the term economic rights does not include commercial
economic liberty rights or classical property rights; rather, it refers to the very different breed
of economic, social and cultural rights found in the ICESCR. In the Canadian Charter of
Rights context, academic commentators and the judiciary tend to use the term economic rights
indiscriminately. For an article sensitive to the difference, see I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the
Charter and Constitutionally Protected Welfare" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1.
4 The new Committee was established by Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985: see ECOSOC, Selected Resolutions and Decisions of the
Economic and Social Council Relating to the Implementation of the InternationalCovenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1987/1 (17 December 1987) at 11.
See S.III.C.2 and S.IV.A. For an overview of the new Committee, see P. Alston, "Out of
the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 332 [hereinafter Alston, "Out of the Abyss"]. See also
P. Alston & B. Simma, "First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights" (1987) 81 Am. J. Int. L. 747, as well as P. Alston & B. Simma, "Second Session of
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1988) 82 Am. J. Int. L. 603.
For the new Committee's reports, see Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights:
Report on the FirstSession (9-27 March 1987), U.N. ESCOR, 1987, Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc.
E/1987/28 and Report on the Second Session (8-26 February 1988), U.N. ESCOR, 1988, Supp.
(No. 4), U.N. Doc. E/1988/14. The Human Rights Committee was established under Article
28 of the ICCPR (ICCPR 28). By Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, it may consider
communications from individuals alleging violations of rights in the ICCPR by States Parties
to the Protocol.
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vehicles. However, specific attributes of the Covenant system may
render it more or less conducive to permeability than is the case
with other legal systems, whether they be international or domestic.

The analysis must be sensitive to these attributes, although not
slavishly so.5
This issue is as topical as it is important. The Human Rights
Committee has had to deal directly with the permeability question
in a number of views handed down from its 1986 and 1987 sessions,
on issues such as whether economic rights from the ICESCR may be
protected indirectly by the Article 14 fair hearing and the Article 26
equal protection provisions of the ICCPR. 6 Increasingly challenging
and controversial claims may soon follow, such as arguments for
directly incorporating the right to an adequate standard of living,
found in Article 11 of the ICEsCR, into the right to life found in
Article 6 of the ICCPR. 7 Bold as the Committee has been in its most
recent cases on Article 26, the possibility exists that it will draw a
hasty and ultimately arbitrary line: for example, by distinguishing the

5 For example, Article 38, Part III of the European Social Charter, 18 Oct. 1961,
Gr.Brit.T.S. 1965 No. 38, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, contains the following reference: "It is understood
that the Charter contains legal obligations of an international character, the application of
which is submitted solely to the supervision provided for in Part IV thereof." The ICESCR,
on the other hand, contains no comparable article. Clearly the presence of this provision
introduces a factor into the analysis of permeability within the Council of Europe system
which will not apply as regards the UN Covenant system. This is not to suggest that this
factor need be determinative, as will become apparent from my reference to some relevant
.European Convention of Human Rights cases. Also, in a series of Indian Supreme Court
cases, economic rights contained among the Directive Principles of State Policy of Part IV of
the Indian Constitution have been implied into the political rights, or Fundamental Rights, of
Part III despite the presence of an express non-justiciability clause governing the Directive
Principles. The non-justiciability clause of the Indian Constitution is Article 37, which reads:
'The provisions contained in this Part (IV) shall not be enforceable by any court, but the
principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country
and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws."
The "Council of Europe system" refers to the European Convention on Human Rights
[hereinafter ECHR] and the European Social Charter [hereinafter ESC]: see Council of
Europe, Basic Tets, supra, note 3 at 101 and 146, respectively. For the Constitution of the
Republic of India, 1949, see A.P. Blaustein & G. H. Flanz, eds, Constitutions of the Countries
of the World, vol. VII (Dobbs Ferry, New York. Oceana Publications, 1986) at 14 (of insert
issued June 1986).
6 See Ss.V.A and B for discussion of these decisions. The Committee's decisions are
known as views. see Optional Protocol 5(4), supra, note 3.
7 See Ss.III.B.1 and V.D for a discussion of this relationship.

774
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direct protection from the indirect protection of economic rights,
and by seeking refuge in inadequate conceptions of non-justiciability.
This article seeks to forestall such retrenchment and, viewed in more
positive terms, to lay the groundwork for a deeper and more
dynamic interaction between the two Covenants.
Furthermore, the interpretation placed on the ICCPR is of
considerable significance for the law and politics of human rights in
Canada. With regard to the interpretation of rights in the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has
emphasized the persuasive authority of interpretations placed by
international quasi-judicial organs on international human rights
treaties to which Canada is party. Regardless of the evolution of
the Human Rights Committee's own jurisprudence, the theoretical
insights of the notions of interdependence and permeability may be
independently called in aid before the Canadian courts.8 Nor should
it be ignored that Canada can be directly impleaded under the ICCPR
communication procedure. Indeed, two of the recent permeability
cases decided by the Committee involved Canada.9 Also, given that
Canada appears to treat seriously the Committee's technically non-

8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.ll. For a recent overview, see J. Claydon,
"The Use of International Human Rights Law to Interpret Canada's Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1987) 2 Conn. J. Int. L. 349. For the most forceful and articulate exposition to
date of the relevance and role of international human rights law in Charterinterpretation, see
the dissent of Chief Justice Dickson (Wilson, J. concurring) in Reference Re Public Service
Employee RelationsAct (Alta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter the Alberta Reference] at 34859, especially at 349. An argument for interpreting the human right to education into s. 7 of
the Chartermay be found in A.W. MacKay & G. Krinke, "Education as a Basic Human Right:
A Response to Special Education and the Charter" (1987) 2 Can. J. of Leg. Stud. 73.
9 Probably the most well-known case involving Canada is Sandra Lovelace v. Canada
(Communication No. 24/1977) in United Nations, Human Rights Committee: Selected Decisions
Under the Optional Protocol (Second to Sixteenth Sessions) (United Nations, 1985) 83
[hereinafter Lovelace]. The only statistics available to me reveal that, as of 31 July 1982,
there were 35 communications involving Canada, a figure only surpassed by Uruguay (55):
United Nations, HRC: Selected Decisions, ibid at 158. It is my understanding that Canada
remains the second most impleaded country under the Optional Protocol. The two
permeability cases involving Canada are YL v. Canada (Communication No. 112/1981) HRC
1986 Report, and JB. et at v. Canada, HRC 1986 Report 151. LB. et at v. Canada is the
ICCPR version of the Alberta Reference, supra, note 8. The Human Rights Committee
handed down its admissibility decision in that case prior to the release of the Supreme Court
of Canada decision.
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binding views, Canadian lawyers should be aware of the possibilities
of international human rights law 0
The following inquiry may appear to take for granted a
relevance and authority of international human rights law that, taken
in isolation, would be suspect. Isolation could take two forms: first,
the isolation of law and legal action from broader social and political
processes; and second, the isolation of international law from
municipal legal and socio-political activity.
On the first count, consider the experience of social-action
or public-interest lawyers who have sought to use the legal process
to vindicate claims for welfare rights. The primary value of the socalled legalization of welfare is that it allows marginalized and
relatively powerless persons in society to use litigation as a strategic
tool in the social struggle for their right to be human 1 There can
be no doubt that "in the field of social welfare, the courts alone are
most unlikely to be a useful vehicle for achieving social change....
The most important potential role for legal challenge can be that it
can politicize issues by forcing them into the arena of political
debate. 12 One facet of this approach is that rights can be used as
banners in the assertion of political claims. It has been suggested
that welfare rights that are enshrined in constitutional and statutory
instruments in Latin America, but that have remained underenforced
10

It appears that An Act to Amend the Indian Act (1985) S.C. 1984-85-86, c. 27, was

enacted in response to the Human Rights Committee's finding of a violation of the ICCPR

in Lovelace, ibid.
11 See U. Baxi, "From Human Rights to the Right to be Human: Some Heresies" (1986)
13 Ind. Int'l Q. 185 [hereinafter "From Human Rights"] and E. Sparer, "Fundamental Human
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal

Studies Movement" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509 [hereinafter "Fundamental Human Rights"].
Both Baxi and Sparer have been active in constitutional litigation seeking vindication of the

rights of the poor. See also, E.Sparer, 'The Right to Welfare" in N. Dorsen, ed., The Rights
of Americans (New York-

Seriously.

Pantheon Books, 1971) at 65, and U. Baxi, 'Taking Suffering

Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India" in R. Dhavan, R.

Sudarshan & S.Khurishid, eds, Judges andthe JudicialPower (Essays in Honour of JusticeVR

Krishna Iyer) (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985) at 289 [hereinafter Baxi, 'TSS"]. In
footnote 65, Baxi says: "Ve here modify Professor Dworkin's felicitous title Taking Rights
Seriously (1977). Perhaps, in a context like India's, one may not take rights seriously if one
is unable to take suffering seriously."
12 T. Prosser, Test Cases for the Poor: Legal Techniques in the Politics of Social Welfare

(London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1983) at 83, 85. See also R. Hayes, "Litigating on
Behalf of Shelter for the Poor" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 79.
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for decades, have been seized upon in precisely this instrumental
13
fashion to assist in empowering persons deprived of those rights.
And in what has been termed an "establishment revolution, '1 4 the
Indian Supreme Court has actively endorsed the creative
interpretation of constitutional rights as part of the broader struggle
of poverty-stricken Indian citizens to improve their living
conditions.15 However, it is debatable whether international treaty
norms, and the interpretations placed on them, have sufficient social
rootedness for this instrumental16use of human rights to transcend
mere manipulation of the poor.
With this caveat in mind, the second type of isolation takes
on importance. The ultimate test of the efficacy of international
human rights law is its link-up with municipal courts and other social
and political fora. Philip Alston has emphasized the domestic
context in discussing the report-monitoring system of the new
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 17 It is no less
crucial for the Human Rights Committee to be perceived, and to
18
perceive itself, as playing a similar "secondary or supportive role."
13 See R. Plant, "The Right to Food and Agrarian Systems: Law and Practice in Latin
America" in P. Alston & K. Tomasevski, eds, The Right to Food (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1984) at 187.

Martinus

14 U. Baxi, '"ss,"supra, note 11 at 306. This is Rajeev Dhavan's term. Whether the
Supreme Court's activism is penetrating downwards and having any kind of empowering effect
is impossible to say at this stage. What is worthy of note is the conscious attempt to identify
with the poor.
15 See Bhagwati, "Public Interest Litigation" (1986) 2 The Commonwealth Law 61;
Bhagwati, "Human Rights as evolved by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India"
(1987) 13 Commonwealth L. Bull. 236. In "Human Rights," Bhagwati refers (at 244) to the
public interest litigation strategy of "making basic human rights meaningful and effective for
the deprived and exploited sections of humanity."
16 One may note the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter
UDHR] has served as moral authority for the introduction of new constitutional provisions
in various countries: see Commission on Human Rights, PreliminaryStudy of Issues Relating
to the Realization of Economic and Social Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/988 (20 January 1969) at
144. Indeed, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra, note 8, must be viewed in
this light. As well, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 serves as a banner in certain Eastern
European countries. For the UDHR and the Helsinld FinalAct, see Council of Europe, Basic
Tets, supra, note 3 at 7 and 226, respectively.
17 Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4 at 357.
18 1bid
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Some states will directly apply views decided against them even
though they are under no direct legal obligation to do so, but, for
those that do not or that only partially do,19 progress depends on
domestic courts treating the Committee's views as authoritative or
persuasive, as well as on political campaigners invoking the
Committee's considered opinions. 20 Such effects are unlikely to
occur unless the Committee is scrupulously conscious that its
authority will derive not only from the increasing sophistication of
its decisions, but also from the extent to which its interpretations
appeal to the needs of those most deprived of the means of being
human and tap into more modern understandings of certain
rights
21
that have evolved since the drafting of the Covenants.
Alston suggests that governments may be encouraged by the
non-adversarial approach of the new Committee to apply traditional
judicial implementation techniques to economic rights.22 But this
essay proceeds on the premise that, so great is the shibboleth of
the non-justiciability of these rights, many governments will not
move in such a direction unless shown the way by force of judicial
example (the Human Rights Committee and domestic courts) or
political pressure. The Committee's views are indeed structured so
that appropriately disposed governments may see them as nonadversarial, constructive suggestions that help elucidate human rights
obligations. But for those governments less inclined towards such a
good faith, co-operative approach, a conceptualization of the

19 See C. Tomuschat, "Human Rights in a World-Wide Framework:

Some Current

Issues" (1985) 45 Z. ausl. off. R. u. VR. 547 at 578, where he discusses how some

governments faithfully heed the Committee's views while others choose to insist on their nonbinding character.
20 Ibid- See also A. Brudner, "The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants
on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework" (1985) 35 U. Toronto LI. 219, in which
Brudner argues for reliance on Committee decisions because of the Committee's objectivity,
impartiality and expertise. While Brudner seems to see authority as stemming from distance
or abstraction from the social context, I take the opposite view that authority derives primarily

from proximity to social context: see S.IIIA2. The latter perspective exhibits scepticism in
its recognition that major obstacles to the efficacy and relevance of international human rights
law are created by the very detached nature of that body of law.
21 See the discussion in S.V.D on the modern concept of the right to life, and citations

in note 386.
22 Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4 at 357.
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municipal link-up must permit the government to be seen as an
adversary in a broader social and political struggle. As will be
discussed in later sections, the Committee can be seen both as a
catalyst, as described above, and as an elaborator of the content of
those obligations derived from economic rights
that judicial or quasi23
judicial bodies are competent to supervise.
A final observation: this article proceeds from the premises
that we all perceive the light of reason through different prisms of
value, and that legal interpretation, especially in the human rights
arena, is a value-laden activity that should not be cloaked by the
pretence of value neutrality. If we are to take human suffering
seriously,24 we must also consider seriously the fact that the poorest
and most vulnerable members of all societies suffer most from
deprivations of both political and economic rights. It is therefore
the marginalized among us who would benefit most from concrete
legal action premised on the notion of the interdependence of
human rights. A first step at the international level would be to
begin to break down the artificial separation of the two leading
universal human rights instruments by means of a permeability
presumption.
III. THE INTERDEPENDENCE AND PERMEABILITY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
In this section, I will first examine the possible analytical
meanings of the concept of interdependence and corresponding
kinds of permeability, and will then speculate on the purchase in
social experience and meaning that the interdependence notion
might have. I will undertake a detailed analysis of the UN General
Assembly's decision to separate the Covenants, in order to
determine whether this decision meant that the norms in the two
23 bid at 351. Alston points out that the content of the ICESCR was not based upon
any significant bodies of domestic jurisprudence as was the case with civil and political rights
found in the ICCPR. In such a situation, elaboration at the international level will have a far
greater role to play. See the discussion in Ss.IVA and IV.B on the respective roles of the
two committees in elaborating obligations attaching to economic rights.
24 Recall Baxi, '"SS,"supra, note 11 at n. 65.
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instruments were separable. Finally, I will look at the recent and
current status of the principle of interdependence.

A. The Concept of Interdependence
1. Related and organic interdependence
The standard expression of the interrelationship among

human rights in UN parlance takes the following form: "[A]ll human
rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and
interdependent."25 While it might appear that "indivisible" and
"interdependent" must have distinct meanings, an overview of the
relevant General
Assembly resolutions warns against tying too much
26
to semantics.
Even so, interdependence may be understood as having two
senses: organic and related interdependence. In the organic lights
sense (organic interdependence), one right forms a part of another
right and may therefore be incorporated into that latter right. From
the organic rights perspective, interdependent rights are inseparable
or indissoluble in the sense that one right (the core right) justifies

25 See Article 1(a) of UN General Assembly Resolution 32/130, "Alternative approaches
and ways and means within the UN system for improving the effective enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms" (16 December 1977); Preamble to Resolution 41/117, supra,
note 1; and Preamble and Article 6(2) of UNGA Resolution 41/128, Declarationon the Right
to Development (December 1986).
26 In the Preamble to Resolution 32/130, ibid., the phrase is "interrelated and indivisible,"
while in Article 13 of The Proclamation of Tehrar 1968, Final Act of the International
Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41, "indivisible" is used by
itself. In the earliest resolutions invoking the concept - those dealing with the question of
whether to have one or two covenants - the wording is "interconnected and interdependent":
see UNGA Resolution 421(V), "Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures
of Implementation: Future Work of the Commission on Human Rights" (4 December 1950)
and UNGA Resolution 543 (VI), "Preparation of two Draft International Covenants on
Human Rights" (5 February 1952). These resolutions will be discussed in Ss.III.B.1 and 2.
Commentators invariably use the two terms interchangeably, with a preference for
"interdependence," although this observation is only impressionistic: see T. Van Boven,
"Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights" in K. Vasak & P. Alston, eds, The International
Dimensions of Human Rights, vol. I (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983) at 43; Van
Boven only uses "indivisibility."
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the other (the derivative right).2 7

directly protecting right y.
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To protect right x will mean

Organic or direct permeability may

accordingly be seen as the direct protection of an ICESCR right

because that right is incorporated into, or is part of, a particular
right in the ICCPR.
To take a central example, that of the relationship between
ICCPR

6(1) and

ICEsCR

11(1), the question is whether the "right to

life" can be interpreted to include a "right to an adequate standard
'2 various aspects of the latter right thus falling to be
of living,"
adjudicated in the name of the former. If sustainable, such an
interpretation generates an implicit overlap between the two articles,
raising issues of normative and jurisdictional conflict which must be
addressed before a presumption for permeability can be
established. 29 A second example of organic permeability, involving
some degree of explicit overlap, is the relationship between ICCPR 22
on freedom of association and ICESCR 8 on various trade union
rights.3 0

27 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 1985-1986
OAS/Ser.LIV/I.68, Doc 8 rev. 1, 26 September 1986, 197-98. The Commission uses language
that takes interdependence to a holistic extreme: "[Tlhe two categories of rights constitute
an indissoluble whole."
For a discussion of the notions of core and derivative rights, see J.Raz, "On the
Nature of Rights" (1984) 93 Mind 194 at 197-99. Raz notes at 197:
Just as rights are grounds for duties and powers so they can be for other rights. I
shall call a right which is grounded in another right a derivative right. Non-derivative
rights are core rights. The relation between a derivative right and the core right (or
any other right) from which it derives is a justificatory one.
It should be noted that I have used "core right" more broadly than Raz. I have used the term
in the sense of a grounding right, which may itself be a derivative of another right.
28 ICCPR 6(1), supra, note 3, reads: "Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
ICESCR 11(1), supra; note 3, reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right,
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based
on free consent.
29 See S.IV.B where these issues are discussed.
30 See S.V.C.
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Furthermore, two kinds of organic interdependence might be
distinguished in theory. First, the logical or semantic entailment
conception argues, for example, that for the right to an adequate
standard of living (ICEsCR 11(1)) to form part of the right to life
(IccPR 6(1)), the former derivative right must be a more specific
form of the latter general core right. The relationship is one of
logical entailment3 l
Second, the effectivist or foundational
conception asserts, for example, that the right to an adequate
standard of living is part of or is justified by the right to life because
the effectiveness of the latter right depends on it. The goal is to
render rights meaningful and non-illusory. The relationship is
justificatory in nature3 2
That the two senses of organic interdependence are
watertight is doubtful. The logically necessary sense retains its
integrity only as part of an internally consistent view of the nature
of the interpretative enterprise. In other words, it is only by virtue
of a highly restrained and historicist view of interpretation that the
right to an adequate standard of living in ICESCR 11(1) cannot be
incorporated into the right to life in ICCPR 6(1). If, as a first step,
the right to life is narrowly defined (for instance, as a right not to
be violently deprived of one's life by state agents), then what can be
31 Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has, in several dissents in cases before the European
Court of Human Rights, advanced what I call logical or semantic entailment as the test for
implying a right. In the Golder Case (1975), 1 E.H.R.R. 524, (sub nor. Golder v. United
Kingdom) Ser. A, No. 18 thereinafter Golder, cited to E.H.R.R.], he said:
[Aln interpretation ...
needs to have a positive foundation in the convention that alone

represents what the parties have agreed to - a positive foundation either in the actual
terms of the convention or in inferences necessarily to be drawn from these - and the

word "necessarily' is the decisive one [at 563, para. 32]....
The ejusdem generis rule ...
requires that, if any implications are to be drawn from the text for the purpose of
importing into it, or supplementing it by, something that is not expressed there, ...
these implications should be, or should relate to, something of the same order, or be

in the same category of concept, as figures in the text itself.... As has already been
pointed out, the concept of the incidents of a trial has only one necessary implication,
viz that a trial is taking place - that proceedings are in progress. It implies nothing
in itself about the right to initiate them, which belongs to a different order of concept
[at 573-74, para. 47].
32 Raz specifically denies that the analytical core/derivative notion means the logical
entailment of rights: 'The relation of core and derivative rights is not that of entailment, but

of the order of justification." Supra, note 27 at 198. It will readily be apparent that what is
primarily at issue is a different understanding of what form of necessity is required in order

that one right be implied or incorporated into another.
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semantically derived form this core right is limited by that narrow
definition.33 A different view of the interpretative task would
produce a different starting point. A wider range of derivative
rights would semantically flow from the right to life if that right
were more purposively or teleologically defined in the first place.
For instance, if the core right to life is interpreted according to an
arguably more modem conception,34 so as to be understood as the
right to live or the right to a quality life, the right to an adequate
standard of living can logically be entailed by the core right. Thus,
value choices can submerge the distinction between the logical
entailment conception and the effectivist conception of
interdependence.
Interdependence may also be understood in its related rights
sense (related interdependence), according to which the rights in
question are mutually reinforcing or mutually dependent, but

33 See the exchange between (Sir) James Fawcett and Judge Fitzmaurice mentioned in
the pleadings of the National Union of Belgian Police Case (1975), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. B,
No. 17 at 238-42, for a clash between an effectivist and a semanticist.
Such semantic arguments are related not only to certain theories of legal interpretation
but also to certain philosophical theories. Jack Donnelly has argued that implication of rights
may run up against the insumentalfallacy: "Simply because A requires X to enjoy R does
not entail that A has a right to X ... [The instrumental necessity of X for the enjoyment of
A's right R does not establish that A has a right to X." See J. Donnelly, "In Search of the
Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development" (1985) 15 Cal. W. Int.
LJ. 473 at 485. Donnelly was arguing against deriving the right to development from the
right to self-determination. However, while logically true, it is historically inaccurate in the
international human rights field. Economic rights were articulated, in part, because the
significance of other more classical human rights depended on them. Instrumental necessity,
then, has been treated as a good reason to recognize rights and can equally be treated as a
good reason for implying a right. Logical entailment falls outside the terms of debate. I owe
these points to Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic's comments at a conference entitled "Development,
Environment and Peace as Human Rights: Is Calling Them Rights a Useful Strategy Toward
Their Achievement?" (Oxford, 29 May-31 May, 1987) [unpublished]. It should further be
noted that the instrumental fallacy appears to argue against mandatory entailment of rights by
virtue of instrumental necessity. This also falls outside the terms of debate because of the
value-laden nature of the interpretative arguments being advanced in this article. A
fundamental premise is that choices are involved. My argument is not that the Human Rights
Committee must adopt certain interpretations, but that the Committee should do so.
34 See infra, notes 386 and 387.
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distinct.3 5 With related interdependence, rights are treated as
equally important and complementary, yet separate. To protect right
x will indirectly protect right y. Related or indirectpermeability may
be viewed as distinct from organic permeability because it involves
the question of whether a right in the ICCPR applies to a right in the
ICESCR, and not whether this latter right is part of the former right.
The political right is an autonomous right that can beneficially affect
economic rights, but, in invoking the political right, no determination
is made about the level of provision or adequacy of respect for the
economic right as such. Two examples will clarify the point.
First, ICCPR 14(1) entitles a person to a fair and public
hearing "in the determination ... of his rights and obligations in a
suit at law.... 3 6 The topical question is whether "suit at law" can
include public law proceedings involving social welfare rights and, if
so, which proceedings and which rights 3 7 The application of
procedural due process, or principles of fundamental (procedural)
justice in the Canadian context, is a complex and vast topic. The
only point in this article is that a presumption for permeability
should be a weighty but rebuttable consideration. For the purpose
at hand, any protection of economic rights offered by ICCPR 14(1)
would be indirect.
Second, there is the ICCPR 26 equal protection clause. It will
be examined in some detail later.3 8 For present expository purposes,
the question is whether "equal protection of the law" applies to
rights in the ICESCR. The Human Rights Committee has recently
answered this question in the affirmative,3 9 with the result that these
rights will now receive the indirect protection of the autonomous

35Interdependence suggests a mutual reinforcement of rights, so that they are more
valuable together, as a complete package, than a simple summation of individual rights
would suggest; for example, having civil and political rights but not economic and
social rights is not "half a loaf but substantially less.
J. Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights (New York. St. Martin's Press, 1985) at 96.
36 See S.VI.B for citation and discussion.
37 See discussion in S.V.B.
38 See S.V.A.
39
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26.40 There is, furthermore, an implicit overlap with ICESCR

2(2); this might be viewed as an organic overlap in that ICCPR 26
arguably has incorporated and is directly protecting ICESCR 2(2).41
The terms related and organic rights have not been randomly
chosen. They emerged from a concrete permeability situation before

the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights, involving
the issue of whether elements of Article 6 of the European Social
Charter, including the right to strike, could be incorporated into
Article 11(1) of the Convention. 42 In the National Union of Belgian
Police Case,43 the European Commission of Human Rights
interpreted ECHR 11(1) as a "hybrid" right, containing elements of "a

traditional liberal right or civil liberty, and an economic right."44
This fact meant that ECHR 11(1)'s language did "not exclude a
construction to the effect that certain obligations with respect to
trade union freedom may be incumbent upon the State, even in its
capacity as an employer."45 In implying a right to consultation into
ECHR 11(1), the Commission had this to say:

40 "Autonomous" in the sense that it is not tied to other articles as is ECHR 14(1).
41 For the text of ICESCR 2(2), see infra, note 299.
42 ECHR 11(1), in Basic Tets, supra, note 3, provides: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests:'
ESC 6, in Basic Texts, supra, note 3, lays down:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively,
the Contracting Parties undertake:
1) to promote joint consultation between workers and employers;
2) to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary
negotiations between employers or employer's organisations and
workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements;
3) to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for
conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour
disputes; and recognise:
4) the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of
conflict of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations
that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into.
43

National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (1975), 1 E.H.R.R. 578.

44 Report of the European Commission of Human Rights on Application No. 4464170,
Eur. Court H.R. Ser. B, No. 17, National Union of Belgian Police Case at 48, para. 59.
45 lbid at 48, para. 60.
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[I]t cannot be denied that one of the fundamental elements of the right to take
trade union action is the trade union's right to protect the economic and social rights
of its members. Is it not by means of consultation machinery and, in a more general
context, collective bargaining, that the union will be able to do so? 46

However, a dissenting minority took issue with this approach:
[W]hat may be called neighbouringor related rights, such as the right to collective
bargaining, voluntary/compulsory conciliation and arbitration or the right to strike,
do not come within the scope of the concept [of trade union freedom of
association].... Without freedom of association these rights would not exist or at
least [would] be of no practical value. They may be exercised and utilised
effectively only where freedom of association is properly safeguarded but they do
not ... form part of the very concept of4 freedom
of association but are rather to be
7
seen as an extension of such freedom.

To complete the development of our conceptual framework, we

must finally refer to the subsequent arguments before the European
Court (by the Commission's Principal Delegate, James Fawcett),
which were designed to counter the minority's invocation of the idea
of related rights:
[I]n the exercise of Convention rights and freedoms, we may often find other rights
involved which may on the one hand be called neighbouring or related rights yet
separate. Or, on the other hand, they are organic or necessary to the exercise of
the Convention rights and freedoms, so that even if they are not stated expressly
in the Convention they [are] to be understood as being there. Now this distinction
between what I would call neighbouringrights or relatedrights and organic or essential
rights again must be carefully kept. The fact that rights in either group may 8be
dealt with separately in various instruments is not decisive for their character.

Fawcett and the Commission majority thus saw Esc 6 rights
as essential to making ECHR 11(1) non-illusory - that is, as organic
to ECHR 11(1) - and at the same time saw ECHR 11(1) not only as
46 Ibid. at 53, para. 72 [emphasis added].
47 Separate Opinion of Mr. Kellberg with which Messrs Sperduti, Welter, Mangan and
Polak concurred, ibid at 61, para. 4 [emphasis added].
48 Verbatim Report of the public hearings of the National Union of Belgian Police Case,
supra, note 33 at 229 [emphasis added]. Fawcett, at 236, added:
... I believe it to be there, because we may either say that it is necessary to the
protection of the interests of the individual members; in other words, it is what I
have tried to describe as an organic or essential right and not merely an incidental
one; or it can be regarded as necessary in general to secure the objects of freedom
of association. I believe it would be possible to approach it in either way. The
majority opinion in the Commission ... takes perhaps the second course. But I believe
both courses are open.
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an end in itself but as related to the indirect protection of other
economic rights apart from Esc 6 - that is, as a related right.49
2. Interdependence and social meaning
Upendra Baxi has forcefully argued:
"[There is an
immeasurable distance between what we call 'human rights' and the
right of all [to be] human.... This distance can begin to be traversed
only if we claim the audacity to look at the human rights models
from the standpoint of the historically oppressed groups."5 From
the vantage point of the underside of history,51 the intimate
relationship between all human rights has a potential grounding in
social experience and a resultant meaning that may be far ahead of
understandings generated in less oppressive conditions.
Two points cannot be over-emphasized. First of all, the
point of reference, in this discussion as well as in international
human rights law, should be the promotion of being human or of
the capacity to be human. The term human rights tends to push
rights to the foreground, suggesting they are somehow tangible and
objective entities that interact (for instance, interdependently), are
violated, are promoted and so forth. The term interdependence
attempts to capture the idea that values seen as directly related to
the full development of personhood cannot be protected and
nurtured in isolation. It is not meant to create the impression of
relationships between rights as entities with some kind of objective
existence that goes beyond intersubjective understandings.
Admittedly, the ideas of related and organic rights are in danger of
creating just this impression. It is important to remember that the
idea of interdependence has been developed not for the sake of
rights but for the sake of persons.

49 Thus, the organic permeability of ECHR 11(1) to ESC 6 rights is in part motivated
by ECHR 11(1)'s permeability in relation to other economic rights, which the exercise of trade
union freedoms help protect.
50 Baxi, "From Human Rights," supra, note 11 at 199.
51 As opposed to the mainstream: see G. Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in Histoty
(SCM Press, 1983) at 20-21.
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Second, to say that the situation of the poor and oppressed
in all societies is paradigmatic to the idea of interdependence is only
to say that from the social reality of the poor and oppressed emerge
dimensions of human need and personhood that other sectors of
society ignore or deny.52 Whether human rights language is the
best vehicle to express these deeper human dimensions is a separate
and controversial story, but, once rights do find a place in
mainstream vocabulary, the notion of interdependence is bound to
be imbued with an intensity of experienced meaning that outstrips
any purely intellectual understanding 3 This is especially so if

52 Alston has captured the essence of this:
The situation in Central America today, for example, cannot be adequately or
productively analysed without taking full account of both sides of the human rights
equation. In this sense, the much vaunted interdependence of the two sets of rights
is not simply a hollow United Nations slogan designed to conceal an ideological split
but an accurate reflection of the realities of the situation.
"Out of the Abyss," supra note 4 at 52.
It is well worth noting the views of non-governmental organizations (NOOs) which are
active within the UN. A glance at the NGO contributions to the 1987 session of the
Commission on Human Rights under the agenda item dealing with economic rights reveals
a striking emphasis on the interdependence of human rights, and of human rights deprivations
as fundamental to the experience of the poor in all societies.
ATD Fourth World, known for its involvement with the marginalized in developed as
well as developing countries, offers the view of extreme poverty as "a violation of human rights
as a whole." Extreme poverty can set off a chain reaction which has a lasting effect in
preventing the persons concerned from exercising the rights and responsibilities that are
normally attributed in their society. After giving many examples to support this contention,
ATD Fourth World's representative made the following appeal:
IT]he situation of families living in extreme poverty shows that the lack of economic,
social and cultural rights compromises the civil and political rights which are
considered a priori as the easiest to guarantee. Their situation forces us to make a
closer study of the question of the indivisibility of human rights.... How does it
happen that human rights to which, in principle, all human beings are entitled, become
in reality rights that cannot be exercised without a minimum of means?... The
Commission on Human Rights should have access to the experience of the most
underprivileged populations, not only because this is standard democratic procedure
but also because the most poverty-stricken eTeriencesituationsand draw conclusions that
are beyond the conception ofpersons in a different situation.
See Father Wresinski, '"xtreme Poverty: A Human Rights Challenge of our Time," Written
Statement submitted by the InternationalMovement ATD Fourth World to Forty-thirdSession of
the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/NGO/2 (8 January 1987) at 2-4
[emphasis added]; see also statements by Pax Romana, International Fellowship of
Reconciliation, and the Four Directions Council in Commission on Human Rights, Forty.
third Session, Summary Records of the 30th meeting, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR.30 at 12, 9
and 14, respectively.
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human rights are thought of as a collection of socially and
historically generated claims designed
to recognize or secure deeply
54
interests.
perceived
or
values
held
The Human Rights Committee should be concerned that its
perspectives on human rights be linked to the social reality of those
whose human existence is most threatened. Such linkages might
perhaps be thought of in terms of upwards and downwards
penetration of meaning. The upwards, experiential penetration of
meaning roots human rights and the interpretation of legal norms in
social experience. Peter Gabel has said that notions of human rights
persist in a culture or in a societal setting as "something like an
ethical memory,"55 even after sight is lost of the historical and social
circumstances that first generated the rights. He notes how our
tendency to reify rights creates
the illusion that the right to an experience can create the experience itself, and
[reverses] the true relationship between the meaning of verbal concepts and the
qualitative or lived milieu out of which they arise. From my point of view, the
critique of rights is a critique of that reversal; it is aimed at clarifying the possible
existential meanings that rihts
can acquire once their true relationship to existence
5
itself has been understood.

On the other hand, downwards, informational penetration of
meaning is similar to what Gabel is concerned about. On this view,
information about human rights and the interpretations placed on
them can funnel into an empowerment process, when intended
beneficiaries of human rights guarantees compare formal, legal
reality to their own experience of life.5 7 Some critics of the idea of
rights tend to understate the value (if only instrumental) of the
54 This dynamic generation of human rights might be seen as a kind of social labelling
process. Rights, in formal terms, may be viewed as intermediate conclusions between
statements of a right-holder's interests and others' duties: see . Raz, "Legal Rights" 4 Oxford
3. Leg. Studies 5. But, when we look to the content of human rights, those statements must
be the product of human experience, not abstract from it, if the human rights argued for are
to be meaningful to the right-holder.

55 P. Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights - Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves" (1984) 62 Tex. L Rev. 1563 at 1597.
56

1bid at 1598.

57 Ibis gap can also be disempowering when people cannot see how they might make use

of it, or when it is so wide that using legal norms as a point of reference or goal is of limited
utility. Symbolic utility might remain: recall the discussion of rights as banners in S.1I.
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presence of theoretical concepts which, although they may not
resonate in a particular society or sector of society, are open to
appropriation, transformation, and, ultimately, enrichment. One
function of the critique of so-called "bourgeois" rights, for instance,
should be to broaden their applicability and significance by bringing
to bear the experience and viewpoint of the socially and
economically disadvantaged upon the original meaning 58 Thus, one
can envisage a dialectic of sorts between the interpretations placed
on rights by the Human Rights Committee, the members of which
attempt to adjust their interpretations to the perspective of
disadvantaged persons, and the interpretations by disadvantaged

persons themselves.
Let this not be taken as a hidden argument for the priority,
in value or time, of economic rights. The interdependence concept
rests on a very real insight into the need for the promotion in
tandem of key rights from both traditional categories. As Alan
Gewirth has put it, "[tlhe effective distribution of civil liberties, far
from being a passive effect of the proper distribution of food,
housing, and health care, can strongly facilitate the latter
distribution."59 We have already touched on the indirect defence of
positive legal entitlements by way of the right to a fair and public
hearing and the right to equal protection of the law. Further, much
has been made of the key role of the partic!ation of the poor in
the improvement of their own quality of life.69 Intimately linked to
58 See Sparer, "Fundamental Human Rights," supra, note 11, and Baxi, "From Human
Rights" and 'qSS," both supra, note 11. Gabel has recently put more emphasis on this idea:
"[A]ppropriation would involve a kind of 'hermeneutic redemption' in which indeterminate
abstractions are reinterpreted in accord with their true existential-ontological significance,
and I think this is exactly what social movements should do when advancing new constitutional
interpretations." See P. Gabel, "P. G. to M. Horwitz: A Letter" (July 1988) CLS, Newsletter
of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies 44. See also M. Horwitz, "Rights" (1988) 23
Harv. C.R. - C.L.L. Rev. 393 at 406.
59 A. Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justifications and Applications (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982) at 66.
60 See, for example, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1987/21, "Popular
participation in its various forms as an important factor in development and in the full
realization of all human rights" (10 March 1987) in UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/L.11/Add.5; P.
Alston, "Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy" in International Commission
of Jurists, Developmen Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1981)
at 55ff.; Commission on Human Rights, The International Dimensions of the Right to
Development as a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (2 Jan. 1979), at 118-30.
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participation, which does not find explicit entrenchment in either
Covenant in relation to economic and cultural decision-making and
institutions, 61 are the rights to freedom of association, 62 to peaceful

assembly,63 to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 6 and to
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and

impart information and ideas of all kinds. 65 It is noteworthy that at
least one member of the new Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, at the March 1987 inaugural session, asserted (in

the examination of the Federal Republic of Germany's state report)
that the notion of interdependence confers authority on the
Committee to ask questions about freedom of speech, to the extent
66
that that freedom affects economic rights.

61 Although, see ICCPR 25, supra, note 3: "Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity ... (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives...." This article could be interpreted broadly to include economic
decision-making.
62 Iib,

ICCPR 22(1).

63 lbit, ICCPR 21.
64 Ibid., ICCPR 25(a).
65 Ibid, ICCPR 19(2). The instrumental linkage is made clear in the following statement:
[P]erhaps the strongest influence in preventing the occurrence of famine in India has
come from a relatively free press.... A number of threatened famines have failed to
materialise precisely because of this "political early warning system".... If ... it is correct
to think that information is both politically and morally extremely important, then the
need to give publicity to less dramatic but more widespread misery must be seen as
crucial. The politicisation of the issue may be essential for a rapid solution and may
well be deeply dependent on the media.
A. Sen, "Famine and Fraternity" London Rev. Books (3 July 1986) 6 at 6-7.
66 See CESCR.- Report on the First Session, supra, note 4 at para. 227. There were
several other examples of questions which overlapped with the ICCPR articles at the new
Committee's first session. For example, questions about family reunification were asked under
ICESCR 10 (on protection of the family), which clearly raises freedom-of-movement issues
found in ICCPR 12 as well as a direct overlap with ICCPR 17 and 23. Questions were put
to state representatives about popular participation. Consent, or choice, elements that are
explicitly part of certain ICESCR articles, like Art. 6(1) on the right to work or Art. 10(1)
on the right to marry, were carried over to articles where the choice element is not explicit:
for example, Art. 11(1) and the right to housing. One member of the new Committee
suggested that it should address whether it or the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women should focus on the question of discrimination against
women as regards rights in the ICESCR. The above account is from my observation of the
session.
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B. Interdependence and the Two Covenants: Did Separation Imply
Separability?
This section examines why there are two Covenants rather
than one, and evaluates the significance of this division for the role
of interdependence as the linchpin of the permeability presumption.
The division of the Covenants was accompanied by a strong
endorsement both of the interdependence of the human rights
distributed between them, and of the unity of purpose of the
treaties. Since the decision to draft two Covenants, the concept of
interdependence has been gaining strength. It will be argued that
the way has been cleared for a legal principle that derives from the
idea of interdependence, and that also respects the reasons for the
separation of the Covenants to the extent that those reasons remain
valid.
1. The reasons for separate instruments
The formal history of how there came to be two Covenants
has been dealt with in some detail elsewhere, and will only be
briefly recounted here in order to set the scene for an analysis of
the substantive debates. 67 It was decided early on, at the second
(1947) session of the Commission on Human Rights, that three
working groups would simultaneously draft a declaration, a single
treaty, and measures of implementation for that treaty, all of which
would constitute an International Bill of Human Rights.6 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted and adopted by
1948, and contained essentially the entire range of human rights
being championed at the time. At its sixth (1950) session, the
Commission decided that the Draft Covenant that they had been
working on, which contained only so-called civil and political rights,

67 In particular, see the accounts in General Assembly, Annotations on the Text of the
Draft InternationalCovenants on Hunan Rights, 10 UN GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 28,

Pt.II), UN DocAN2929 (1955) [hereinafterAnnotations] at 2-5; and F. Jhabvala, "On Human
Rights and the Socio-Economic Context" (1984) Neth. Int. L Rev. 149 at 153-60.
68

Annotations, Wibt at 2.
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would be the first in a series, and that the so-called economic, social
and cultural rights would therefore not be included. 69 But despite
the fact that in Resolution 303 C (XI) the Economic and Social
Council (ECosoc) had just approved the Commission's decision not
to include economic rights, 70 ECOSOC also, in Resolution 303 I (XI),
requested the General Assembly to make "policy decisions"
regarding, among other matters, the desirability of including
economic rights in the Draft Covenant.71 This was apparently the
result of a push by the Soviet bloc and some developing states. The
General Assembly then adopted Resolution 421 E (V) (1950),72 which
provided that the Covenant would include economic rights.
However, in the following year some Western states, along
with some developing states, went on the offensive. At the
Commission's seventh (1951) session, India proposed that the
Assembly be asked to reconsider the Unity Resolution because
"economic, social and cultural rights, though equally fundamental
and therefore important, formed a separate category of rights from
that of civil and political rights, in that they were not justiciable
rights, and that the method of their implementation was, therefore,
different."73 This was voted down and the Commission went on to
draft fourteen articles on economic rights, but left the decision
hanging as to which measures of implementation would apply to
which parts of the Covenant. 74 Subsequently, in ECOSOC, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, India and Uruguay seized on
this implementation quandary and succeeded in having Resolution
384 C (XIII) adopted. That Resolution requested the Assembly to
reconsider the Unity Resolution because of the problems of placing

69

Ibid. at 3.

70

1bid; ECOSOC Res. 303 C (XI) (9 August 1950).

71 Annotations, ibid at 6; ECOSOC Res. 303 I (XI) (9 August 1950).

72 Res. 421 E (V), supra, note 26 [hereinafter the Unity Resolution].
73 See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Seventh Session, 13 UN ESCOR,

Supplement 9 at 15, para. 67, UN DOC.E/1992 (1951). See Jhabvala, supra, note 67 at 155,
n. 24.

74 See Jhabvala, ibid at 155.
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rights and obligations of "different kinds" in a single instrument. 75
In the Assembly, despite a pre-emptive attempt by Chile to have the
Unity Resolution reaffirmed, Resolution 543 (VI) (1951) was
adopted stating that two Covenants, for
the two supposed categories
76
of human rights, would be drawn up.
The subsequent treaties, which opened for signature in 1966
and went into force in 1976, contained differently worded obligations
and different implementation machinery. The ICESCR provides in
Article 2(1) for an obligation based on a principle of progressive
realization. 7 7 Part IV lays down provisions for ECOSOC to supervise
state reports, a function only recently taken on by the new
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.78 On the
other hand, the ICCPR provides for a so-called immediate obligation
in Article 2(1) "to respect and to ensure" the rights in that
Covenant. 79 A report procedure is also laid down in its Part IV
and a special treaty body, the Human Rights Committee, is charged
with supervision of that procedure. Of central importance, however,
is the vesting of jurisdiction in the Committee, under the Optional
Protocol, to consider communications from individualsY0 Ultimately,
it is the lack of a similar petition procedure in the ICESCR that is the
concern of this study.

75 Ibid
76 Annotations, supra, note 67 at 5; Res. 543 (VI), supra, note 26 [hereinafter the
Separation Resolution].
77 ICESCR 2(1), supra, note 3, reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical,
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
78 ICESCR 16-22, supra, note 3. See supra, note 4 and Ss.IV.A and B for a discussion
of the new Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
79 ICCPR 2(1), supra,note 3, reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.
80 See Optional Protocol 5(1) and 5(4), supra, note 3.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VCOL. 27 No. 4

A survey of various UN debates leading up to the decision of
the General Assembly to allocate human rights between two
instruments reveals three broad categories of reasons for the
separation.81
(1) Implementation-based reasons:
Human rights, it was consistently contended, could be
classified into two categories according to their different
natures. It was carefully stated that no hierarchy of
importance or priority of attention resulted from this
division. But the series of differentiating features or
dichotomies82 which were said to flow from these
different natures was argued to render one category
(those rights that appear in the ICnsCR) non-justiciable,

and therefore susceptible to different procedures of
implementation from those rights which appear in the
83

ICCPR.

81 The main travaux prparatoiressurveyed were General Assembly, Third Committee,
Fifth Session, Summary Records of the 297th to 299th, 306th, 312th, 313th Meetings UN
Docs.A/C.3/SR.297-99, 306,312,313 (1950); Economic and Social Council, Thirteenth Session,
Summary Records of the 522nd to 525th Meetings, UN Docs. E/SR.522-525 (1951); General
Assembly, Third Committee, Sixth Session, Summary Records of the 387th to 396th Meetings,
UN Doc.A/C.3/SR.387-396 (1952); General Assembly, Sixth Session, 374th and 375th Plenary
Meetings, A/PV.374-375 (1952). Hereinafter, citations will be by the state whose delegate has
spoken, followed by page number/paragraph number. For a generally complementary view of
the reasons for separation of the Covenants, see Jhabvala, supra, note 67 at 153-69. Less
detailed treatments are to be found in T. Van Boven, supra, note 26 at 49-52; V. Pechota,
'The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" in L. Henkin, ed., The
InternationalBill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981) at 41-43; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom), 'he
Balance Between Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights: Origins of the
Human Rights Declaration and Covenants and Subsequent Developments" (Foreign Policy
Document No. 127, 1978) at paras. 26-29; A.G. Mower, InternationalCooperationfor Social
Justice: Global and Regional Protection of Economic/Social Rights (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1985) at 15-18.
82 For a discussion of these dichotomies, see S.IV.A.
83 See A/C. 3/SR.297 (1950) (Canada), 175/42-6; A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (France), 177/67; A/C.3/SR.299 (1950) (India), 186/12-15; E/SR.523 (1951) (India) 400/28-35; E/SR.524
(1951) (US) 406/13-18; E/SR.524 (1951) (Egypt) 407/28; E/SR.524 (1951) (Uruguay) 408/43;
E/SR.524 (1951) (Canada) 409/55-7; A/C.3/SR.388 (1952) (US) 244/41; A/PV.374 (1952) (US)
504/80-87; A/PV.374 (1952) (India) 506/106-7; A/PV.375 (1952) (Mexico) 514/19, 21.
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(2) Ideological or political reasons:
It is significant that the period following the Second
World War saw international politics and ideology join
hands as never before, and that the Cold War, as well as
the Korean conflict,8 4 were well under way at the time
of the separation debates. One writer refers to the
"conventional wisdom" that the division of the Covenants
occurred because of the East-West split in international
politics and the accompanying ideological disagreement
over the value of economic rights.85 While delegations
did not expressly invoke such political grounds as an
explanation for their own positions for or against a single
covenant, they often asserted that such reasons were
behind the positions of other states. A survey of the
pattern of these attacks suggests a general East-West axis
(mostly East to West),8 6 although

some developing

countries' representatives targeted either East
or West as
87
pursuing scarcely veiled ideological agendas.
(3) Pragmaticreasons:
A rather eclectic collection of arguments was advanced,
amounting to practical considerations in favour of two
covenants. Sometimes the caveat was added that "in
principle" the delegation in question would be in favour
of including all human rights in a single treaty.88

84 FCO (UK), supra, note 81 at 29; Pechota, supra, note 81 at 42.
85 D. Forsythe, Book Review of InternationalCooperationfor Social Justice: Global and

Regional Protectionof EconomiclSocialRights, by A.G. Mower (supra, note 81) (1986) 8 Hum.
Rts. Q. 540.
86 See A/C.3ISR. 297 (1950) (Poland) 174/39; A/C.3/SR.258 (1950) (Ukraine.S.S.R.)
182/56; A/C3ISR.313 (1950) (Czech.) 59/45; A/C.3ISR.293 (1952) (Byel.SSR); A/C.3/SR.394
(1952) (Ukraine.SSR) 280/14; A/C3/SR.395 (1952) (USSR) 285[3; A/PV.374 (1952) (USSR)

509/136; A/PV375 (1952) (USSR) 515[35.
87 See A/C.3/SR.299

(1950)

(Saudi Arabia

against "colonial powers")

187/28;

A/C.3/SR.299 (1950) (Syria against "colonial powers") 55/6; A/C.3/SR.312 (1950) (Lebanon
against Soviet bloc) 255/62; A/PV.374 (1952) (Chile against "industrial countries") 502/58;

A/PV.374 (1952) (Philippines against political motives in general) 511151.
88 For example, A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (Brazil) 171/5.
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Some of the main arguments were:
(i) the concern that the world community was expecting
quick results and that devoting the requisite
attention to 8economic
rights would produce too
9
great a delay;
(ii) the related concern that the articles on economic
rights drafted to that point needed considerable
reworking, whereas the political rights were, for the
most part, already expressed satisfactorily; 90
(iii) the reminder that any covenant had to be generally
acceptable to the large majority of UN members, so
91
that it could be ratified and enter into force;
(iv) the concern that the work of specialized agencies,
notably the International Labour Organisation, might
be overlapped and duplicated if economic rights
were included;92 and
(v) the view that two instruments were desirable
because virtually
all states would be willing to sign
93
one.
at least
It should be noted that the practical concern with delay was
also invoked by proponents of a single covenant, to express concern

89 See A/C.3/SR.297

(1950) (US) 172/17; A/C.3/SR.297 (1950)

(UK) 174/34;

A/C.3/SR.299 (1950) (India) 186/10; A/C.3/SR.299 (1950) (Israel) 187/24; A/C.3/SR.299 (1950)
(UNESCO) 188/37-38; A/C.3/SR.312 (1950) (Lebanon) 255/65; A/C.3/SR.388 (1952) (US)
244/41.
90 See A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (New Zealand) 172/12; A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (France) 177/2;
E/SR.523 (1951) (Belgium) 399/21.

91 See A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (Brazil) 171/9; A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (Greece) 179/27;
A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (I.L.O.) 181/45; A/C.3/SR. 312 (1950) (Lebanon) 255/65; E/SR. 524
(1951) (Uruguay) 408/46; A/C3/SR.395 (1952) (China) 286/10.
92 See A/C.31SR.298 (1950) (Greece) 179/24; A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (I.L.O., appealing to

need for general acceptability) 181/42,45; A/C.31SR.298 (1950) (Belgium); 181/47; E/SR.523
(1951) (Belgium) 398/15-17. On the role of the I.L.O., see P. Alston, "The United Nations'
Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights" (1979) 18 Colum. J. Transnat'l. L. 79. Mr. Cassin of France said that'
he "did not believe that a unilateral warning against encroaching on the sphere of action of

the I.L.O. was enough".

A/C.3iSR.299 (1950) 189/46.

93 See A/C3/SR.393 (1952) (Philippines) 274/31-33; A/C.3/SR.396 (1952) (Sweden)

294/17.
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that separation could result in the postponement or even the
cancellation of plans for a second instrument on economic rights.9 4
One notable feature of the three categories of reasons for

separation 95 is that they are not watertight.9 6 Political motives can
easily be dressed up in different language and, in any case, are
intimately related to other sincere stances.
Debates on
implementation measures belie ideological predispositions, for
instance. The focal point of debate was the implementation
question, but, as Farrokh Jhabvala puts it:
[I]t is clear from the record that all Soviet-bloc states backed the idea of one
comprehensive covenant, while all Western-bloc states supported the separation of
the sets of rights into different treaties, thus making clear the ideological and
political importance the decision was perceived as having. 9 7

In addition, the acceptability concern is not necessarily
pragmatic at all. It was linked to the idea that political rights were
somehow more universal than economic rights. 98 It was also
transparently related to the warnings by some states, notably the
United States, that they would not sign or ratify an instrument

94 See A/C.3/R.298 (1950) (Mexico); E/SR.525 (1951) (USSR) 414/8 which was directly
replied to at E/SR.525 (1951) (US) 417/41. Rejoinder at E/SR.525 (1951) 418/48 (USSR).
95 It should be said that the categories are compatible with those of Farrokh Jhabvala
who has conducted the only other detailed analysis of the separation issue: Jhabvala, supra,
note 67 at 157-58. My description of the implementation-based reasons for separation was
deliberately cursory, as this will be discussed in detail in the section on the justiciability of
economic rights: see S.IV.A. The only point to note at the moment is that state delegations
at times treated the justiciable/non-justiciable distinction as simply one of several differences
between the two sets of rights, but, in fact, justiciability is an umbrella concept that sums up
the effect of the various dichotomies which are thought to differentiate the rights. Thus,
justiciable/non-justiciable is an umbrella or meta-dichotomy which is directly tied to different
systems of implementation. The above-quoted proposal by India in the Commission on
Human Rights in 1951 clearly shows the link. see supra, note 73.
96 The best example of this is the fact that they were often invoked at the same time,
as when Lebanon referred to all three at A/C.3/SR.312 (1950) 255/60-66.
97 Jhabvala, supra, note 67 at 159.
98 A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (New Zealand) 172/13.
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containing economic rights. 99 The irony remains, of course, that the
United States has yet to ratify either Covenant.
As well, language used by some states when linking the
different natures of human rights to implementation called into
question the relative value of economic rights, and even their status
as human rights.100 Partly as a result, certain other states openly
expressed a suspicion that some Western states were deliberately
using separation to prevent the adoption of any covenant dealing
with economic rights.101 On the other side of the coin, Soviet-bloc
states took the position that no special treaty regime of
implementation was doctrinally acceptable, least of all one involving
individual petitions and a quasi-judicial role. As a result, the
credibility of their arguments for a single covenant was seriously
compromised 02
2. The place of the principle of interdependence
I turn from the reasons for the separation to examine how
the idea of interdependence emerged from the debates. There is
no doubt that the concept was very frequently invoked across the
spectrum. The proponents of a single covenant °3 tended early on
in the debate to emphasize one side of the equation: that political

99 See A/C.3/SR.393 (1952) (Philippines referring to India, Belgium, the US, and

Lebanon serving notice that they would only sign a covenant with only civil and political
rights) 274/32. See also FCO(UK), supra, note 81 at 29; Pechota, supra, note 81 at 41, 42;
J.Humphrey, The United Nations and Human Rights (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, 1963) at 10 (cited in FCO (UK), ibid).
100 See A/C3.SR.297 (1950) (Canada: economic rights were "advantages," "social aims,"

not "human rights in the narrow sense') 174/5/45-47; E/SR.524 (1951) (US: "objectives to be
attained", "rights") 406113-18; E/SR.524 (1951) (Canada) 409/55-57.
101 See supra, note 86.
102 See AJC.3/SR.299 (1951) (China) 185/6 and A/C.3/SR.394 (1951) (Ukraine S.S.R.)
280/13 for examples of this position. See E/SR.525 (1951) (India) 415/16 and A/C.3/SR.394
(1951) (Lebanon) 280/18 for criticisms.
103 Among the most forceful and eloquent of whom were Third World delegations such
as Chile, and not only Soviet-bloc states.
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104
rights were meaningless or ineffective without economic rights.
This is not surprising, given the context of a concerted push to have
economic rights included in a draft covenant that already assured
the place of political rights. There were some very one-sided
ripostes by proponents of two instruments, amounting to claims that
1 05
economic rights would naturally follow respect for political rights.
When the separation debate intensified during the campaign
to overturn the Unity Resolution, states favouring separation
increasingly invoked a more balanced view of interdependence.1 0 6
States favouring a unified instrument exhibited a corresponding, if
not greater, tendency to claim a less one-sided version of
interdependence. 107
Most crucially, there were some eloquent
attempts to sever the link found in Unity Resolution 421 (V)
between the interdependence of human rights and the requirement
that there be a single covenant containing all those rights, in the

104 Jhabvala, supra, note 67 at 158.

See A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (Chile) 176/1;

A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (Mexico) 178/12, 13; A/C.31SR.298 (1950) (Ukraine SSR) 182/64;
A/C.3/SR (1950) (Iraq) 182/64; A/C.3/SR.299 (1950) (Czech.) 187/31; A/C.3/SR.312 (1950)
(Mexico) 255/58.
105 See A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (Brazil) 171/9; A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (Greece) 179/20. But
see A/C.3/SR.297 (1950) (UK) 174/34 and A/C.3/SR.299 (1950) (Israel) 187/25 carefully
asserting a two-way view of interdependence. However, the next year, the UK asserted a more
one-dimensional view of interdependence, thus showing the vicissitudes of relying on travaux
pr6paratoires: AIC.3/SR.390 (1952) 251/3. Israel was notable for its consistently held views
on the fluid divisions between the two sets of rights: see especially Memorandum submitted
by Israel, 6 UN GAOR, Annexes (Agenda item 29), UN Doc.A/C.3/565 (1952).
106 See A/C.3/SR.388 (1952) (US) 244/41; A/C.3/SR.389

(1952) (India) 247/23;

A/C.3/SR.389 (1952) (Uruguay) 248/35; A/C.3/SR.393 (1952) (Philippines) 274/38;
A/C.3/SR.394 (1952) (Lebanon) 280/20; A/C.3/SR.395 (1952) (France) 286/6; A/PV.375 (1952)
(Mexico) 514/19. Note Mexico's switch on the separation issue: see supra, note 104.
107 See E/SR.523

(1951)

(Pakistan)

403145; E/SR.524

(1951)

(USSR) 408/36;

A/C.3/SR.388 (1952) (Burma) 244/36; A/C.3/SR.390 (1952) (Pakistan) 252/12,16; A/C.3/SR.390
(1951) (Ethiopia) 53/25; A/C.3/SR.390 (1952) (Czech.) 254/32; A/C.3/SR. 393 (1952) (Philip.)
273/31; A/C.3/SR.394 (1952) (Iraq) 281/25; A/C.3/SR. (1952) (Ecuador) 282/39; A/C.3/SR.394
(1952) (Afghan) 284/56; A/PV.374 (1952) (Yugo.) 508/121; A/PV.375 (1952) (Saudi Arabia).
Note a few lapses towards the very end of the debate in the General Assembly Third
Committee and Plenary Session when delegations from the Soviet bloc were less careful to use
the balanced formulation: see A/C.3/SR.393 (1952) (Byel.SSR) 277/10 and A/PV.375 (1952)
(USSR) 516/36, 37. When one compares the United States' incantation of interdependence
at one point (supra,note 106) with its thinly veiled downgrading of economic rights at another
point (supra,note 100), the superficiality of the commitment to interdependence of delegations
on either side of the Cold War becomes apparent.
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manner of the Universal Declaration.s08 The terms of the Unity
Resolution dictated that the concept of interdependence would be
a battleground in the lead-up to Separation Resolution 543 (VI),
which ended up asserting the notion of interdependence as forcefully
as, and perhaps more prominently than, the Unity Resolution did.
In two preambular paragraphs of the Unity Resolution, the
following assertions may be found:
Whereas the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of economic, social and
cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent
Whereas when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not
represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal
of the free man..../09

This preambular statement of principle provided the framework for
Article 7 of the Unity Resolution, by which the General Assembly:
(a) Decides to include in the Covenant on Human Rights economic, social and
cultural rights and an explicit recognition of equality of men and women in
related rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations
(b) Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commission on
Human Rights, in accordance with the spirit of the Universal Declaration, to
include in the draft Covenant a clear expression of economic, social and cultural
rights in a manner which relates them to the civil and political freedoms
proclaimed by the draft Covenant.... 110

The above two preambular paragraphs of the Unity
Resolution are quoted verbatim in the second preambular paragraph
of the Separation Resolution to which was added: "Whereas the
General Assembly, after a thorough and all round discussion,
confirmed in the aforementioned resolution the principle that
economic, social and cultural rights should be included in the
Covenant on Human Rights..... l This reference to a "principle"
appears to be the means by which the General Assembly
distinguished its earlier Resolution, thereby dealing with the concern
expressed by some delegations that overturning the Unity Resolution

108 A/C.3/SR.394 (1952) (Lebanon) 280/20; A/C.3/SR.394 (1952) (France) 286/6:
A/PV.375 (1952) (Mexico) 514/19. See S.III.B.3 for discussion.
109 Res. 421 (V), Part E, supra, note 26 at preambular paragraphs 3 and 4.
110

IbidL

111 Res. 543 (VI), supra, note 26.
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would set a bad precedent.
At the same time, the General
Assembly left scope for more practical concerns with implementation
which would justify departure from the "principle." There would
also seem to be a close relationship between the reference to a
"principle" in Separation Resolution 543 (VI) and the earlier
reference in Unity Resolution 421 (V) to "the spirit of the Universal
Declaration."112 It was frequently argued in the debates that the
principle of the Universal Declaration was that human rights were
inseparable, and thus that separation into two covenants would
breach this principle 1 3s
Article 1 of the Separation Resolution then went on to read:
The GeneralAssembly
1. Requests the Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission on Human

Rights to draft two Covenants on Human Rights to be submitted simultaneously
for the consideration of the General Assembly at its seventh session, one to
contain civil and political rights and the other to contain economic, social and

cultural rights in order that the General Assembly may approve the two
Covenants simultaneously and open them at the same time for signature, the two
Covenants to contain, in order to emphasise the unity of the aim in view and to
ensure respect for and observance of human rights, as many similar provisions
as possible, particularly in so far as the reports to
be submitted by States on the
14
implementation of these rights are concerned.

So, in addition to repetition of the preambular statements, there was
a clear attempt, constantly surfacing in the debates, to underscore
the interdependence point by creating temporal and material
linkages between the proposed Covenants. There was, first of all,
the threefold simultaneity of General Assembly consideration,
approval and opening for signature. Second, there was the call for
the overlapping of provisions between the two Covenants. This
explicit call for duplication, related to unity of purpose ("the aim in
view") and the concern with "respect for and observance of human
rights," is of considerable significance to the permeability thesis.

112 See supra, note 109.

113 For example, see A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) (Yugo.) 178/16-17 and A/C.3/SR.299 (1950)
(UNESCO) 18838. Note, however, that one recent study of the UDHR concludes that
economic rights did "not quite have the same status as the civil and political rights" within the
UDHR's structure: 3. Morsink, "I'he Philosophy of the Universal Declaration" (1984) 6 Hum.

Rts. Q.309 at 331.
114 Res. 543 (VI), supra, note 26.
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While emphasis was placed in Article 1 of the Separation Resolution
on the overlap of procedural provisions ("particularly in so far as ...
reports ...are concerned"), considerable explicit overlap
of
115
substantive rights provisions exists between the Covenants.
This is crucial for several reasons. First, the reasons for the
duplication directive can inform the purposes attributed to the
ICCPR, if only to confirm them. Second, the strength with which the
interdependence principle emerged from the decision to separate,
combined with duplication as a concrete embodiment of that
principle, augurs well for further arguments hinging on the
competition between the principle of interdependence and the
current validity of the implementation-based reasons for separation
of the Covenants. Third, if it is clear that the separation decision
expressly envisaged material overlap of provisions, any argument for
a presumption to the contrary is weakened. 6 One result is that
the generation of overlap by means of interpretative implication
becomes less problematic, and may even be enhanced. 1 7
115 Explicit overlaps, to varying degrees of formulation and scope, exist between the
Preambles (see infra, note 131); Article 1 in each Covenant on the right to self-determination;
ICESCR 2(2) and 3 and ICCPR 26 on the rights to non-discrimination and equal protection
of the law, respectively; ICESCR 8 and ICCPR 22 on trade union rights; ICESCR 2(3) and
ICCPR 27 on the rights of vulnerable groups; and ICESCR 10 and ICCPR 24(1) and (2) on
protection of the family, the mother and children (all supra, note 3). See "List of articles
dealing with related rights under the five human rights conventions containing reporting
obligations" in General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, Reporting obligations of
States partiesto United Nations conventions on human rights, UN Doc.A/40/600 (1985) at 16
(Annex).
116 See Swedish Engine Drivers' Union Case (1975), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. B, No. 18 at
163-65; (sub nom. Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden) (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. 617 Ser. A,
No. 20 [hereinafter Swedish Engine Divers, cited to Eur. Court H.R.]. Hans Danelius,
Counsel for Sweden, refers to an assumption of no overlap as a "guiding principle for the
interpretation" of Article 11(1) of the ECHR (at 165).
117 See L Henkin, "Introduction" in Henkin, ed., The InternationalBill of Rights, supra,
note 81 at 27:
Historically, spiritually, and conceptually the Covenant - like its sibling the Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights - is a child of the [Universal] Declaration
and that ancestry is not irrelevant to the Covenant's meaning.... The transformation
of the Declaration into two covenants has significance for the meaning of both of
them. While each Covenant rests on its own bottom, the existence of an obligation
in one Covenant may suggest that it was not intended to be implied also in the
other.
Contrast this to Pechota, supra, note 81 at 43, who draws a completely opposite conclusion,
stating simply that questions of interpretation raised by overlaps are not problematic because
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Apart from the repeated reference to the enjoyment of the
two categories of human rights as "interconnected and
interdependent," the Separation Resolution also insists that economic
rights are required if the human person is to be the Universal
Declaration's "ideal of the free man." This suggests a fruitful path
towards understanding fully the foundations of the idea of
interdependence. I have already warned against reifying rights
themselves as interdependent, and suggested that the focus should
be on nurturing the capacity to be human.
The mention of the Declaration's ideal of the free person
may be directed in part at the second preambular paragraph of the
Declaration, stating: "the advent of a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people."118 However, it is also tied to articles 1, 22 and 29:
(Art. 1)

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one

another in a spirit of brotherhood.
(Art. 22)

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and

is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of the
State, of the economic rights indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality.
(Art. 29)

Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.

Johannes Morsink has suggested that Articles 1 and 22 are
indicative of a "double status theory of rights" for the Declaration,
each article being a "lead" or "covering" article for a subsequent list
of human rights of a particular type 1 9 In broad terms, the political
rights in Articles 1 to 21 and the economic rights in Articles 22 to
27 are said to be based on two different philosophical
"the common ground and the identity of purpose, as well as the similarity of many provisions
in the final drafts, make the covenants complementary and mutually reinforcing. The two
covenants attained a normative unity." It is submitted that each of these contrasting views is
both far too cursory, and overstated. This study contends that the proper position lies
somewhere in between.
118 UDHR, Basic Terts, supra, note 3 at preambular paragraph 2.
119 Morsink, supra, note 113 at 331, 332.
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anthropologies: humans as rational or natural agents, and humans

as social beings. The Declaration's "ideal of the free man," referred
to in both of the Resolutions, must therefore be taken to stem from
a full conception of human freedom and a full and integrated

conception of the self.
The Declaration juxtaposes two primary views120 of human
nature, human freedom and human rights. It tells us that we are
both natural and social beings, who value both natural (or negative)
freedom and social (or positive) freedom. The rights labels that we
attach to these values - civil and political rights, on the one hand,
and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other - follow the
same lines. Yet this is hardly an integrated, much less a universally
experienced, vision- if one takes note of the essentially political
compromise that ensured room for two rival primary views in the
1 21
Declaration.
Still, it could be said that the texts of Articles 1, 22 and 29
contain the kernel of a more integrated vision, an "ideal" that the
Separation Resolution's preamble tried to rescue despite the
separation of the Covenants.1 22 First of all, it is an over120 A "primary view" will be taken to mean the dominant human rights conception in a
given culture or ideology.
121 Indeed, UDHR 29 is the only article to have explicitly given any credence to a third,
more traditional conception of rights and the person, although it is compatible with some
socialist views. Further, UDHR 28 foretells the recent wave of new human rights claims, such
as the right to development: "Everyone is entitled to a social and economic order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." Basic Texts, supra,
note 3.
122 The word "kernel" should be emphasized in this context. The claim is not that the
UDHR constituted or came close to constituting either an internally consistent abstract
philosophical theory or universally shared values. The text is rooted everywhere and nowhere
at the same time. It seems likely that most delegations were most concerned to have included
the essence of their respective "primary views," and were only prepared to see rights central
to other traditions included, or even to give lip service to those alien conceptions, as long as
their own rights found a place. The UDHR's content reflected political compromise more
than any plausible universal shared understanding. Philip Alston sees this as endemic to
international human rights discourse and texts, and warns of the dangers of imposing
philosophical coherence on human rights texts: see P. Alston, "Making Space for New Human
Rights: The Case of the Right to Development" (1988) 1 Harv. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3 at 24-33,
esp. at 32. When Alston warns against seeking philosophical coherence or compatibility, he
is referring to a comprehensive and airtight consistency whereby all principles are derivable
from some foundational principles. I wholeheartedly agree that no human rights text (whether
it be the Universal Declaration or the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms), let alone an
ethical life, can be coherent in this way.
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However, this is an overly restrictive version of philosophical coherence, as Alston
recognizes in his appeal to the idea of a pluralistic set of justifications for international human
rights law (at 32) and to John Rawls's recent invocation of the notion of an "overlapping
consensus" capable of being affirmed by opposing philosophical doctrines (see J. Rawls, 'The
Idea Of An Overlapping Consensus" (1987) 7 Oxford J. Leg. Studies 1). It is possible to
understand coherence as requiring a structure of mutually supporting claims which do not have
to flow logically from a common foundation. While the Universal Declaration was
indisputably a hodge-podge document when viewed historically and from the perspective of
its implied claim to represent a universal value consensus, there is nothing in the text to
suggest that the values embodied in the Declaration rights are innately incompatible, as long
as all the rights are not treated as absolute and as long as the idea of mutual adjustment and
accommodation is accepted. It becomes possible to conceive of a kind of dialectical and
hermeneutical coherence that does not interpret the text divorced from the context to which
it is supposed to apply (the global community), but uses the text as a starting point for a
broad international human rights discourse out of which more universally rooted agreement
as to the importance and compatibility of the entire spectrum of rights emerges.
If one views the global community as a dialogical community of the sort envisaged
in various views on the progressive deepening and widening of social-moral understanding, it
is possible that the notion of the interdependence of human rights is (if only marginally) a
more forceful and universal idea now than it was in 1952. See C. Taylor, "Understanding and
Ethnocentricity" in Human Agency and Language: PhilosophicalPapers, vol. 1 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985) at 116 and esp. at 130; and R. Bernstein, Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983). See also C. Tomuschat, "Human Rights in a World-Wide
Framework: Some Current Ideas," supra, note 19 at 567-68 in which he notes the increased
emphasis on the whole spectrum of human rights in Western Europe which has "generally
become an area of social democracy" with the US "defacto at least ... also ... moving in that
direction." The latter claim is rather optimistic, to say the least. For musings on the Human
Rights Committee as a forum of discourse, see B.G. Ramcharan, '"The Emerging Jurisprudence
of the Human Rights Committee" (1980) 6 Dal. L.J. 7 at 39 C'[Ihe East-West encounter of
ideas in the Committee could lead to cross-fertilization and enrichment of the human rights
concept') and M. Nowak, "he Effectiveness of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights - Stocktaking After the First Eleven Sessions of the UN-Human Rights
Committee" (1980) 1 Hum. Rts. LJ. 136 at 165 C'Perhaps the Committee is, thanks to its
conciliatory attitude, on the way to developing new East-West approaches of [sic] an integrative
understanding of human rights" [emphasis in original]).
This is not meant to endorse over-dichotomization of the dialogue. In the first place,
there are various shades and middle grounds even within the two schematized competing
conceptions that we are concerned with. Second, in recent years new dimensions have been
injected into international human rights discourse in the form of collectivist rights notions,
organized around both the modern sovereign state or the notion of peoples (see the discussion
of the right to development in S.IIl.C.2) and more traditional (for example, aboriginal and
customary) societies. Such notions find their historical precursors in the post-World War I
minorities treaties and in the right to self-determination that is found in Article 1 of each
Covenant. See John Vincent's discussion of the function of human rights discourse in EastWest and North-South relations: J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 50-53, 66, 74-75, 101. The only point
being made is that the evolution of human rights discourse can be partially understood
through the notion of interdependence. It is likely that interdependence, related as it is to
a more holistic conception of the individual, is compatible with and can be enriched by the
newer collectivist notions mentioned above.
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simplification to say that economic rights derive solely from our
membership as citizens in a particular society. It is true that
community membership provides one very powerful justification for
economic rights. If we can freely develop our personality only in
community with others, then economic rights serve to ensure that
we are not socially marginalized, and that we can instead participate
and grow as persons in the mainstream of community life.
Economic rights create a framework of conditions enabling pursuit
of the good life in a given society.123
However, the same kinds of arguments that derive political
rights from ideas of abstract individual dignity or worth have also
been used to justify economic rights.12 4 I have already provided
one justificatory argument for economic rights in the notion of
making political rights effective by laying a foundation of economic
rights. And some of the more convincing analytical arguments for
positive freedom directly relate its value to the value of negative
freedom by showing that to value one without valuing the other
would be inconsistent 25 Indeed, Article 22 relates economic rights
not only to the "free development of [the] personality," which is
connected to Article 29's reference to community, but also to
"dignity," which is a term that appears in Article 1. Economic rights
are said to be "indispensable" for dignity; the connotation may be
that of an effectivist conception of organic interdependence.
Second, Article 1 itself cannot be said to totally or even
primarily relate civil and political rights to a natural-rights

123 This formulation owes much to the communitarian vision of rights advanced in D.
Harris, Justifying State Welfare (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

124 See for example G. Vlastos, "Justice and Equality" and A. Gewirth, "Are There Any
Absolute Rights?" both in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1984) at 41 and 91, respectively.
125 In particular, I refer the reader to two leading articles in political and moral
philosophy. A. Sen, "Rights and Capabilities" in T. Honderich, ed., Morality and Objectivity
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); and C. Taylor, "What's Wrong with Negative
Liberty?" in C. Taylor, ed., Philosophyand the Human Sciences: PhilosophicalPapers 2 (New
York Cambridge University Press, 1985). Each makes a powerful analytical argument that
if we attribute value to negative freedom, we cannot consistently deny value to positive
freedom. In Sen's formulation, we must not merely be concerned with negative constraints
on functioning (negative freedoms), but also with the capability to function (that is, positive
freedoms).
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conception of agents as rational, unsituated beings.

It contains a

very prominent reference to action "towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood," which is perhaps an idealistic reference to the
broadest kind of community: that of humankind. Perhaps the most
obvious, but least appreciated, obstacle to a truly universal corpus of
human rights is the embryonic state of the global community.
Consider the following thoughts of Michael Ignatieff:
[M]ho has ever met a pure and natural human being? We are always social beings,
clothed in our skin, our class, income, our history,
and as such, our obligations to
126
each other are always based on difference....
To bring justice to the heath, to protect the Tom O'Bedlams hurled into no-man'sland by war and persecution, there has arisen the doctrine of universal human
rights and the struggle to make murderers and torturers respect the inviolability of
human subjects. If we all have the same needs, we all have the same rights. Yet
... [t]here is no identity we can recognize in our universality.... These abstract
subjects created by our century of tyranny and terror cannot be protected by
abstract doctrines of universal human needs and universal human rights, and not
merely because these doctrines are words, and whips are things. The problem is
not to defend universality, but to give these abstract individuals the chance to
become real, historical individuals again, with the social relations and the power to
protect themselves.... Woe betide any man
who depends on the abstract humanity
127
of another for his food and protection....
[But a] century of total war has taught us where belonging can take us when its
object is the nation. Out of that experience, it is just possible that our need is
taking a new form, finding a new object: the fragile green and blue earth itself, the
floating disk we are the first generation to see from space. No generation has ever
understood the common nature of our fate more deeply, and out of that
understanding may be born a real identification, not with this country or that, but
with the earth itself.... Modernity is changing the locus of belonging: our language
of attachment limps suspiciously behind, doubting that our needs could ever find
larger attachments.... Political languages which appeal to us only as citizens of a
nation, and never as common inhabitants of the earth, may find themselves
abandoned by those in search of a truer expression of their ultimate attachments....
We need words to keep us human. Being human is an accomplishment like playing
an instrument. It takes practice.128

The reason for this extensive quotation is to try to convey how ideas
of the natural must be rooted in the social in order to have human
meaning, and to suggest how the natural and the social may

126 M. Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (New York: Viking, 1985) at 28.
127 ]bid at 52-53.
128 bid at 139-41.
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gradually coalesce. Indeed, elements of the competing conceptions
within the Declaration may have assumed or be assuming a greater
universality as, by means of international intercourse and discourse,
their appeal becomes rooted in a larger community, thus nurturing
the link between the natural and the social.1 29
Thus, we can see the rich potential for interaction between
the initially dichotomous but progressively more integrated
conceptions of the self embedded in the Universal Declaration. We
may therefore be inclined to found interdependence on a full
conception of personhood. Discourse may take place at the level of
rights, but the rights are stand-ins for competing conceptions of what
it means to be fully human.130 This interpretation of the reference
in the Separation Resolution to the Universal Declaration's "ideal of
the free man" is confirmed by the presence of the following
acknowledgement in the ICCPR'S preamble:
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom
from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone
may eno his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights.! - '

This vision of the ideal of free humans, and the link that has been
argued to exist between this ideal and interdependence, cannot be

129 See the speculative excursion on international human rights discourse, supra, note 98.
130 See E/SR.523 (1951) 403/45 where the Pakistani delegate said: "If there were two
...
covenants, there would be two bases and two edifices, and consequently ...
no unity in
regard to human rights. Such unity was essential. Man's personality could not be divided...."
See also A/C.3/SR.298 (1950) 178, 16-17 where the Yugoslavian delegate said: 'The (UDHR)
...
did not merely list economic and social rights; it included those because it conceived of man
as an integrated personality.... It would be absurd if ...
those two documents [the Covenants]
should present diametrically opposed conceptions of the human being and his rights." T. Van
Boven, supra, note 26 at 49, suggests that "indivisibility" should be founded on "the unity of
the human person."
131 ICCPR, supra, note 3 at preambular para. 3. The parallel paragraph in ICESCR,
supra, note 3, is subtly but importantly different: "Recognizing that, in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom
from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may
enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights." See the
discussion of the relevance of this difference at note 140, infra.
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ignored for purposes of interpreting the ICCPR, given that the
preamble of a treaty forms part of its interpretative context 32
It is commonly accepted that a human rights treaty is
different from a traditional treaty because the former's purpose is
not "to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual
benefit of ... contracting states" but rather "to make binding
unilateral commitments not to violate the human rights of individuals
within their jurisdiction."1 33 This produces at least two differences
in interpretative emphasis. One is that the subjective or interstate
element is played down in favour of attention to what the text
"objectively" means, particularly in light of the purposes of the
treaty.134 The other is that the general purpose of human rights
treaties generates a presumption that the treaty be interpreted in
favour of the individual. 135
The Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights
seem to have adopted such a teleological approach. The central
lesson to draw from the Golder Case, heard by the European Court,
is its vigorous use of the Preamble of the European Convention to
determine the Convention's object and purpose.1 36 This use was
notable on two grounds. First, the Court selected a reference to
the rule of law in the Preamble as "the most significant passage in
the Preamble," more by way of judicial fiat than by way of any

132 Article 31 in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT] in
I. Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents in InternationalLaw, 3rd ed. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press,

n.d.) at 349. VCLT 31(1) reads: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light
of its object and purpose."
VCLT 31(2) states that the context in VCLT 31(1) includes the treaty's preamble.
133 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory
Jurisdiction (Art.64 ACHR), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of 24 Sept. 1982, Series A-

Judgements and Opinions, No. 1 (1982).
134 The Court in Golder, supra, note 31, declined to even look at the travaux

pr6paratoires.
135 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Government of CostaRica (In the Matter
of Vivian Gallardo, et aL), Decision of 13 Nov. 1981, No. G101/81 (1981) at para. 16.

136 See Golder, supra, note 31 at para. 34.
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justificatory argument.137 Second, the Court had the following to
say:
The Court ... considers, like the Commission, that it would be a mistake to see in
this reference a merely "more or less rhetorical reference," devoid of relevance for

those interpreting the Convention.... It seems both natural and in conformity with
the principle of good faith to bear in mind this widely proclaimed consideration

when interpreting the terms of Article 6(1) according
13 8 to their context and in the
light of the object and purpose of the Convention.

This is an exceedingly important passage, for it provides some
authority for the notion of binding rhetoric which we will come to
later.1 39 It is also the leading authority on the active invocation of
a treaty's preamble in support of a broad interpretation of a human

rights norm.
In deciding what the purpose of the ICCPR is, one must
consider deeper views of the purpose of both the human rights
concept and international human rights law. The arguments until
now therefore justify focusing on the above-quoted preambular
paragraph from the ICCPR. The underlying purpose of the ICCPR is
to contribute to the realization of "the ideal of free human beings,"
which is recognized in the Preamble to depend upon enjoyment of
the whole spectrum of human rights. This choice is reinforced by

the fact that the

ICESCR

virtually duplicates the entire

ICCPR

Preamble, with the passage in question appearing only in slightly
altered form. This duplication is evidence of the emphasis placed in
the Separation Resolution on the Covenants' unity of purpose, and
of that Resolution's linkage of the creation of explicit overlap
between the Covenants to the concern to "ensure respect for and
observance of human rights." Thus, the promotion of the ICESCR

rights must be interpreted in the light of the

ICCPR's

and ICESCR'S

shared purpose. The rights in the ICCPR should therefore be
rendered as effective as possible, out of recognition of the principle
of interdependence that underlies and informs this unity of

137 Ibid

13 8 ]bid
139 See S.III.C.3.
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purpose 40 In line with the Golder Case, the reference to "the ideal
of free human beings" cannot be ignored as mere rhetoric, especially
in view of the drafting history leading to the separation of the
Covenants. It becomes impossible to maintain that the Covenants
can both have a unified purpose and have their provisions kept
scrupulously separate when an interdependence-based interpretation
of a given article suggests otherwise.
3. The balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces
To recapitulate, the three main reasons for separation can
be categorized under the rubrics of implementation concerns, politics
and ideology, and pragmatism or expedience. I have examined how
intertwined these reasons are and, in particular, how politics has
played a fundamental, if masked, role. The pragmatic considerations
can be factored out because, for the most part, those reasons were
subordinated to the implementation argument and were coloured by
politics. I shall take the debate at face value and focus on the
implementation reason which, in any case, largely coincided with
ideological posturing, as has been seen. This is not to say that the
discussion of political motivations up to this point has now been
rendered superfluous. On the contrary, it provides part of the
conceptual framework and the historical starting point for
understanding the development and growing salience of the
interdependence notion. As for the continuing relevance of
ideological tensions, political polarization may, in rough terms, be

140 Of course, it is the rights in the ICCPR which are the vehicles to promote this wider
purpose. This broad purpose is not licence to enforce the ICESCR as such. In this regard,
the reverse order in the listing of the rights in preambular paragraph 3 of the ICESCR, as
compared to preambular paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, suggests that the specific focus must be
on the rights in the instrument to which the preamble is attached. In Annotations, supra, note
67, Ch. III at para. 8, a different conclusion is drawn from the fact that "in the third

paragraph of the two preambles ... a difference in emphasis and hence in wording exists....
These paragraphs were intended to underline the unity of the two covenants while at the same
time maintaining the distinctive character of each." See the citations in support of this view
in M. Bossuyt, Guide to the "Travaux Preparatoires"of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and

PoliticalRights (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 9. The only point to be made in response
is that unity and distinctiveness can only be mediated by means of an elaboration of the
principle of interdependence. Thus this article argues for a partial fusion of the Covenants.
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inversely related to the strength of the interdependence concept.
Hence, I can also factor out the ideological reasons for separation
and concentrate on the interplay between the implementation-based
reason for separation and the principle of interdependence.
The immediate purpose is not to examine the reasons for
which it was assumed that implementation procedures necessarily
had to be different for the two sets of rights, except to say that the
key concept is that of justiciability. The commonly held view was
that political rights could be invoked in judicial or related
proceedings while economic rights could not. By and large, the
separation proponents viewed this distinction as inherent, with only
France and Israel occasionally questioning it.141 But this is an
unsubtle approach generated by overly monolithic views of each
category and an overly dichotomized notion of the differences
between the categories of rights.1 42
I will look briefly at the arguments mounted by the advocates
of two covenants, which explain their perspective on the relationship
between interdependence and legal implementation. I will then
contend that, to the extent that the implementation-based reason
fails in a given context for a given right, the philosophical and
historical grounding for the principle of interdependence yields a
permeability presumption. The precise strength of that presumption
will depend on the current status of the interdependence principle
in international human rights discourse 43
The contention of the separation proponents was that all
human rights were interdependent as a matter of philosophical
principle, but were separable in practice for purposes of their legal
enforcement. The most forceful and cogent expression of this view
came from the Lebanese delegate, Mr. Azkoul, in the Third
Committee:

141 A/PV.375 (1951) (France) 514/19.
142 As stated earlier, only Israel saw justiciable (legal)/non-justiciable (programmatic) as
relative to time and place. Note, however, that Israel did not view programmatic obligations

as justiciable: see S.IV.A.
143 See Ss.III.C.2 and 3.
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[S]ome delegations had confused the unity of the rights themselves with uniform
enforcement.... There was ...
a distinction between the unity of human rights in
principle and their separability in practice... [A]s regards implementation they are
not inseparable. If the concept of unity in principle were followed to its logical
conclusion, the violation of one right would be tantamount to the violation of all,
and respect for one would be tantamount to respect for all. Certainly, the civic
and political freedoms and economic, social and cultural rights were interconnected
and interdependent, as stated in the preamble to section E of General Assembly
resolution 421 (V); but they were only partially interdependent, and one of those
types of rights could be enjoyed without enjoying the other... The principle (of
resolution 421 (V)) remained valid as that underlying the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. It simply implied that the United Nations, conscious that both
categories of rights were interconnected, should promulgate them simultaneously,
1 44
but, for practical reasons, embody them in separate instruments.

Other delegations also emphasized that the Universal
Declaration could not simply be used as a direct analogy because it
was legally non-binding and devoid of implementation machinery.
Mr. Cassin of France took the following view in the Plenary of the

General Assembly:
My country would have been more favourable to a single covenant if that had been
shown to be more practical.... It was found that there are two different forms of
obligation in the single covenant, namely, immediate juridical obligations and others
which require the preparation and adoption of long-term programmes. We could
undoubtedly have both kinds of obligation in each of the two covenants in question,
but no one can deny that in general, there are more economic and cultural rights
in the second category than in the first....
I must say to my colleagues who are in
perfect good faith about the question of the single covenant that they would have
been right if there had been any intention of splitting up and drafting piecemeal a
document called a declaration. But it is not the Declaration we are dealing with,
but the enforcement of the Declaration. In each of your national Constitutions you
have a single document, but the laws enforcing the4 Constitution
are always different
5
laws enacted successively, even if they converge./

Cassin's initial gesture to the complexity of the obligation question
(the third sentence) was echoed by Israel alone. But his subsequent
analogy to national laws would appear to be flawed. First,
constitutional rights provisions are, paradigmatically, legally
enforceable - a fact that the Universal Declaration analogy obscures.
Second, it was the Covenant itself that deserved the "constitutional"
label, as a binding treaty and as hierarchically superior to municipal
law, given its status as public international law. The analogy to the
144 A/C.3/SR.354 (1952) (Lebanon) 280/20.
145 A/Pv.375(1952) (France) 514/19, 21.
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Declaration plays down the importance of the decision being taken
on allocation of the Covenant rights, akin to a constitutional
entrenchment that would be nearly impossible to strengthen by
subsequent amendment, unlike with statutory laws. Indeed, the
proper analogy (that of the Covenants as a constitution) suggests
that the strong unlikelihood of a constitution being amended helps
to justify and reinforce the purposive interpretation of the ICCPR
being advocated in this article.
It is, in effect, the role of the Human Rights Committee
through the permeability process to unravel - if only partially - this
state of affairs in order to enhance the protection of economic
rights and, thereby, the protection of political rights. The actual
separation of the Covenants does not preclude this. On the one
hand, separation clearly did not mean that human rights norms were
separable as a matter of principle. On the other hand, it did mean
that legal norms were separable to the extent that their means of
enforcement diverged. If that rationale for separation ceases to be
valid over time (or was never completely valid in the first place) and
inseparability as a principle continues to be valid or even increases
in strength, then any borrowing of economic rights norms by means
of interpretation must not only be possible but must also be
positively desirable. In this sense, separation of the Covenants did
mean legal normative separability, but only contingently so.
Interdependence was left as a principle: a vibrant one with considerable potential for practical effect. Such practical effect through
the permeability presumption can be conceptualized as a vector
which emerges from the contest between two forces: interdependence as a centripetal force drawing the Covenants together;
and divergent methods, procedures and organs of implementation,
forming a centrifugal force tending to keep the Covenants apart.
C. The Recent History and Present Context of the Principle of
Interdependence
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the current place
of the interdependence principle in international human rights
discourse. This evaluation is the final step in establishing the
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strength of the centripetal force between the Covenants before I
examine the centrifugal forces at work, in Part IV.
1. The 1968 Proclamationof Tehran and Resolution 32/130 of 1977
Following the simultaneous consideration, approval and
opening for signature of the two Covenants in 1966146 - a concrete
manifestation of interdependence - the next significant event was
the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran! 4 7 The Proclamation emerged
from a wide-ranging UN conference on the state of the art in the
human rights field. Article 13 is of present interest:
Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of
civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights, is impossible. The achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of
human rights is dependent upon sound and effective
national and international
48
policies of economic and social development....1

Taken in isolation, Article 13 seems to express a unidirectional
notion of interdependence of the sort previously encountered during
the early separation debates. I will argue that this is a misreading,
but first, the significance of Article 13 should be put into
perspective. The almost verbatim transcription of Article 13 in
Article 1(b) of General Assembly Resolution 32/130 of 16 December
1977149 has produced considerable controversy.1 50 Article 1(b) of
Resolution 32/130 was preceded by Article 1(a), reading:

146 UNGA Res.2200A(XXI) of 16 December 1966.
147 Proclamationof Tehran, 1968, supra, note 26.

148 Ibid
149 Res.32/130, supra, note 25.

The phrase "almost verbatim" is important because

Article 1(b) of Res.32/130 drops the first clause of Article 13 of the Proclamationof Tehran,

1968, supra, note 26 C'Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible...") and
begins directly with "The full realization...."
150 This refers to both academic and internal UN controversy: see J. Donnelly, "Recent
trends in UN human rights activity. description and polemic" (1981) 35 Int. Org. 633; P.
Alston, "'he alleged demise of political rights at the UN: a reply to Donnelly" (1983) 37 Int.
Org. 537; and 3. Donnelly, 'The human rights priorities of the UN: a rejoinder to Alston"

(1983) 37 Int. Org. 547. Note Alston's point that Donnelly's article has been considerably
influential: Alston, ibid at 537.
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All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent;
equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation,

promotion and protection of both civil and political, and economic, social and
cultural rights.

Little would be served by rehearsing the interpretations and
counter-interpretations placed on Article 1(b) of Resolution 32/130.
However, one key contention is relevant. Jack Donnelly goes to
great lengths to argue that:
With few exceptions, the phrase "interdependence of human rights" in the UN will
be followed by a statement of the importance of economic and social rights. Only
the dependence of civil and political rights on economic and social rights receives
attention....
[qn resolution 32/130[,] [t]he statement of the interdependence,
indivisibility, and equality of all human rights is immediately followed by
subparagraph b's reference to the Proclamation of Tehran and the dependence of
civil and political rights on economic, social and cultural rights.5 1 This amounts to
the authoritativeinterpretation of the key term "interdependence."'

Two general replies can be made to this view, the ultimate aim
being to suggest that Donnelly's still influential position is illfounded, and to argue that the principle of interdependence emerges
intact from Resolution 32/130 for purposes of interpretative utility.
The first and most important reply is that Donnelly tends to
ignore the text of both the 1968 Proclamation and the 1977
Resolution. He briefly relates Article 1(b) of Resolution 32/130 to
Article 1(a) and then abandons the text in order to discuss the
preponderance of state delegations' support for unidirectional
interdependence, as if that debate were the text itself.15 2 The text
is, in fact, much more balanced, perhaps reflecting a more subtle
political process than any travaux pr6paratoirescan reveal. This is
not to say that the texts necessarily represent a consensus, but at
least they constitute textual rhetoric with which to justify legal
151 Donnelly, "Recent trends," ibid at 643 [emphasis added]. The meaning of Res.32/130
is not a marginal issue because it is generally seen as perhaps the most important single
statement of UN human rights \octrine (there were 8 principles in all listed in Article 1) in
the past decade and because of the above-mentioned backlash.
152 The central downfall of Donnelly's approach is that he conducts an incomplete
political analysis of trends in the UN, gives the impression that these trends are directly
replicated in Resolution 32/130 and then, in his reply two years after the original article,
suggests that all he was doing was making an observation that civil and political rights were
being played down by most states: see Donnelly, 'Rejoinder to Alston," supra, note 150 at
550.
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interpretations and political stances truly based on interdependence 5 3
If one considers the text of Resolution 32/130 more carefully,
the picture is not nearly so bleak. To begin with, Article 1(b) on its
own refers to the "full" realization of political rights and to "lasting
progress" in the implementation of human rights. It does not say
that economic rights are required for any realization or any progress
or even much realization or much progress.
Furthermore, as already mentioned, Article 1(b) is a direct
quotation of Article 13 of the Proclamationof Tehran. Article 1(b)
should therefore reflect the textual context of Article 13. An
appraisal of the context would reveal numerous indications
elsewhere in the Proclamationof concern with political rights.154
Attention should also be paid to the linkage between
subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Resolution 32/130. There are two
central points. First, 1(b) can easily be interpreted as premised on
the truth of 1(a)'s assertion of a balanced concept of
interdependence, rather than being a refutation of it. On the one
hand, Donnelly would argue that 1(b) means 1(a). If this is so,
what is the purpose of 1(a)? On the other hand, he would argue
that 1(b) means something that a plain reading of 1(a) would
suggest is only one side of the coin. If that is so, why not view the
partial dependence of political rights on economic rights as premised
on the interdependence of these rights; in other words, why not
view 1(b) as premised on 1(a)'s truth?
It will be recalled that Resolution 32/130 subparagraph 1(b)
dropped the first subordinate clause of Article 13 of the
Proclamation.15 5 The structure of the first sentence of Article 13
suggests that dependence follows from interdependence, not that
dependence is interdependence.
What is the significance of
dropping this clause? If the clause had been left, there would have

153 See the notion of "binding rhetoric" advanced in S.III.C.3.

154 Notably in Articles 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15 and 16 of the Proclamationof Tehran, supra,
note 26. Furthermore, read in context, Article 13 would also be seen not as an isolated
interpretation of interdependence, but as related to the preceding Article 12 dealing with the

widening North-South gap and failure of the UN Development Decade.
155 See supra, note 149.
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been an overlap with 1(a), rendering it partially redundant. If the
principal clause of Article 13 is cited with approval in 1(b), can it so
easily be divorced from its justifying subordinate clause? To view
1(a) as fulfilling this subordinate clause's role would be more
consistent with the preceding arguments.
A second point about the linkage between 1(a) and 1(b) is
that, in 1977, as in 1968, 1(b) was a particularly pressing aspect of
1(a), not its authoritative interpretation. This observation leads
directly to a second general reply to Donnelly, which is that he
misperceives the broader context. He feels that political rights are
under pressure in the UN and that somehow the legitimate concern
in 1968 with the other side of the interdependence coin had lost its
legitimacy by 1977.156

As Alston aptly demonstrated, Donnelly's

assertion (retracted two years later 57 ) that the UN gives little
attention to any rights58other than economic ones "is hopelessly at
1
odds with the reality."
The concern should have been that the pendulum might
have begun to swing too far to one side, not that it had already
done so. However, the" fact is that up to then the relationship
between political and economic rights had rarely been considered.1 59
Even so, delegates who used economic rights to camouflage totally
statist concerns with a New International Economic Order (NIEO),lO°
with no 'new internal economic order' complement, must be
reminded that the text of Resolution 32/130 does not sanction this
exclusive agenda; rather, it includes a concern with economic human

156 Donnelly, 'Recent trends," supra, note 150 at 645.
157 Donnelly, "Rejoinder to Alston," supra, note 150 at 547.
158 Alston, "Reply to Donnelly," supra, note 150 at 543.
159 Donnelly perhaps falls prey to the (Western) complacency to which Res. 32/130 is
partly a response. In "Recent trends," supra, note 150 at 639, he asserts that "the
implementation of civil and political rights does not depend on a country's level of
development.... Rather, it is a matter of political will." Apart from obvious objections, see
Jhabvala, supra, note 67; and F. Jhabvala, "The Practice of the Covenant's Human Rights
Committee, 1976-82: Review of State Party Reports" (1984) 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 81 for a cogent
argument on the progressive nature of some obligations stemming from political rights.
160 See Article 1(f) of Res. 32/130, supra, note 25, for mention of the NIEO.
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rights (in 1(b)) and with their interdependent relationship to political
rights (in 1(a)).
2. The current context: 1986 and 1987
In the decade since 1977 and the passing of Resolution
32/130, the revisionist concern in that Resolution with matters of
social and economic development, in both their individual and their
collective dimensions, has begun to bear fruit; but the
interdependence idea has not suffered. 61
In fact, the
interdependence principle may have been defensively invoked by
states wishing to forestall an over-swing of the pendulum away from
concern with political rights. It may also have been offensively
invoked by states who see it as legitimizing a focus on economic
rights. Whatever the middle-ground political support may be for a
balanced notion of interdependence, the crucial point here is the
principle's continuing presence and increased salience in UN
resolutions, as well as its greater correspondence to current UN
human rights programmes. Three pieces of evidence for this thesis
will be briefly noted: the establishment of the new Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the current focus on and
formulation of the principle of interdependence, and the 1986
General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development. 162
First, in May 1985 ECOSOC decided to take seriously its
supervisory responsibilities under the ICESCR by replacing its
ineffectual Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights with a Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, to consist of eighteen experts serving in their

161 See Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4 at 17 for a description of the increased
attention to economic rights.
162 A fourth piece of evidence would be the contributions of NGOs to UN debates as
well as their behind-the-scenes lobbying: see the discussion in S.III1.A2 above, esp. at note
53.
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personal capacities. 163 Thus, the Human Rights Committee now has
a parallel organ under its sibling Covenant which could potentially
make a major contribution to the elucidation of obligations under
the much neglected Economic Covenant.1 ' 4 The point is not that
the formation of the new Committee constitutes support for
balanced interdependence as such, but that it is an essential enabling
factor because it seeks to rectify the imbalance in institutional
supervisory arrangements between the two Covenants. As long as
such an imbalance remained, interdependence as a textual doctrine
would continue to fall between two realities: the reality of a skewed
institutional focus in the UN on political rights, and the reality 165
of
rights.
economic
to
attention
greater
for
pushing
polemic
intense
Early on in the debates prior to the Unity Resolution of 1950, onesided notions of interdependence were frequently voiced precisely
because economic rights were felt to have been marginalized at the
Sixth Session of the Commission on Human Rights.1 66 Resolution
32/130's debates indicate that the two separate Covenants certainly
had not banished concerns about the marginalization of economic
rights.
Two points should be emphasized. On the one hand,
superficial equality and interdependence between the Covenants
belied the poor-cousin status of the ICESCR. 16 7 On the other hand,
163 ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, supra, note 4. For criticisms of the ineffectiveness to the
point of irrelevance of the Working Group, see P. Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4
at 10-12; Commentary, "Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights:

ECOSOC Working Group" (1981) 27 ICJ Rev. 26; G. Westerveen,

'Towards a System for Supervising States' Compliance with the Right to Food" in Alston &
Tomasevski, The Right to Food,supra, note 13 at 119, 124-26.
164 Technically, 1985/17 only "renames" the Working Group, but the changes are not
merely formal: see Alston, "Out of the Abyss," ibiL at 18-22. For discussions of the nature

and content of ICESCR obligations, see 'The Limburg Principles" (1986) 37 ICJ Rev. 43
(also, UN Doc.E/CN.41987/17 (1987)); P. Alston & G. Ouinn, 'The Nature and Scope of
States Parties' Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights" (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 156 (background paper to the conference which produced
the Limburg Principles); D. Trubek, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Third
World: Human Rights Law and Human Needs Programs" in T. Meron, ed., Human Rights
in InternationalLaw: Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at 205.

165 See the discussion on Res. 32/130 in S.III.C.1.
166 See S.III.B.1.

167 See Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4 at 17.
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whatever elements of equal attention and normative and
jurisdictional unity are created between the Covenants, blinkered
focus on them alone constitutes a certain legalistic reductionism. It
must be recognized that greater balance within the Covenant system
is only one element, and perhaps a minor one, in a broader
response to competing concerns.1 68 However, one must not
underestimate the practical importance of the Covenants. If both
the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights give practical effect to the principle of
interdependence through the device of permeability, and thereby
work in tandem to transcend the current compartmentalized
conceptions of human rights, this might provide a point of purchase
for building practical and conceptual bridges in the broader human
rights arena.1 69
The second piece of evidence on the status of the
interdependence principle is the current attention being paid to
interdependence in its own right. In this regard, attention should
be drawn to General Assembly Resolution 41/117 of 4 December
1986 entitled "Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social
and cultural, civil and political rights."170 Without dwelling for the
moment on questions of legal status, this Resolution can be said to
constitute an important statement that provides an undiluted
formulation of the interdependence principle, and makes the
principle central to current UN thinking on human rights.
As regards formulation, the fifth and sixth preambular
paragraphs of Resolution 41/117 read as follows:
Reaffirming the provisions of its resolution 32/130 of 16 December 1977 that all
human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent and that
the promotion and protection of one category of rights can never exempt or excuse
States from the promotion and protection of the other rights,
Convinced that equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the
implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and political and economic,
social and cultural rights....

168 'bis appears to be the central point in M. Moskowitz, "Implementing Human Rights:
Present Status and Future Prospects" in B.G. Ramcharan, ed., Hwnan Rights: Thirty Years
After the Universal Declaration(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).
169 The new Committee at its first session has already invoked interdependence in
examining state reports: supra, note 66.
170 Res.41/117, supra, note 1.
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These passages need only be read to reveal that, in 1986, the
essence of Resolution 32/130 is understood to be (at least formally)
its subparagraph 1(a) and not 1(b). A balanced interdependence is
unreservedly asserted.171
The third piece of evidence is the right to development as a
"synthesis" human right: that is, a synthesis that goes beyond a mere
aggregation of existing human rights. This is not the occasion to
answer in any detail the controversial question of the coherence,
value, and utility of giving human-right status to the collective good
of development 7 2 Rather, my purpose is to exploit the potential
of what is close to a fait accompli 73 in international human rights
discourse. At a time when the right to development was often
suspiciously perceived as cloaking a collective, totally state-oriented
push for a New International Economic Order, Philip Alston
proposed that the inevitable formal elaboration of the right to
development be channelled so as to make the existing catalogue of
human rights the justification for the right or, at least, a constant
point of reference.1 74 In this respect, it is worth quoting part of his
arguments on the value of the notion of synthesis:
171 In the context of the previous discussion about institutional imbalance, it is worth
noting the twelfth preambular paragraph: "RecallingCommission on Human Rights resolutions
1985/42 of 14 March 1985 and 1986/15 of 10 March 1986, in which the Commission stated
that the implementation, promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights have
not received sufficient attention within the framework of the United Nations system."
Article 4 of Resolution 41/117 (supra,note 1) welcomes the establishment of the new
Committee. There are three other aspects of the resolution that are significant for the
interdependence principle. First, preambular paragraph 3 recalls the statement in the
preambles of both Covenants about "the ideal of free human beings" enjoying the whole
spectrum of human rights. Second, the final article of the Resolution, Article 7, decides that
the topic of "indivisibility and interdependence" will be a specific topic of discussion at the
General Assembly's forty-second (1987) session under the agenda item "International
Covenants on Human Rights." Third, the eleventh preambular paragraph states: "Recognizing
that the realization of the right to development could help to promote the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights." (On this third point, see note 176, infra).
172 An excellent inquiry into these questions can be found in J.Waldron, "Can communal
goods be human rights?" (1987) 28 Eur. J.Sociology 296.
173 See Alston, "Prevention versus Cure," supra, note 60 at 106. With the Declaration
on the Right to Development, the fait accompli is almost complete.
174

Ibid at 104, 106-08. He was writing just after the Commission on Human Rights had
established its Working Group on the Right to Development. For the Working Group's most
recent report, see UN Doc. E/CN.4198710.
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It has been argued that the demonstration of a "synthesis" right adds nothing to
that which is already contained in existing human rights instruments. However, this
objection overlooks three factors.... The third factor is that a synthesis of rights,
such as the right to development, assumes dimensions which are greater than the
mere sum of its constituent parts. Through a process of175cross-fertilization the sum
of the various component parts forms a holistic entity.

Alston convincingly argued that the idea of development permits a
focus on the entire spectrum of human rights as an integrated,
interdependent whole; the idea transcends the tendency to
compartmentalize human rights at the conceptual and practical
levels.1 76 To say that this only replicates the principle of
interdependence is no objection, precisely because of this
compartmentalization. In light of the fact that the generation of
claims to "new" human rights proceeds largely from perceived gaps
in the existing approaches, 177 to co-opt the right to development is
justifiable in order not only to enhance the conceptual salience of
the principle of interdependence, but also to generate practical
implementation of that concept. Thus, to the extent that the right
to development is an intensified claim to take interdependence
seriously (generated in part by increasing awareness of poverty and
oppression as the comprehensive deprivation of the means to be
human), the centripetal force of the interdependence principle is
strengthened. 178

175 Alston, ibid, at 104. See also A. Pellet, 'The Functions of the Right to Development:
A Right to Self-Realization" in Human Rights and Development (New York: Third World
Legal Studies, 1984) at 130-31 for a discussion of the idea of synthesis.
176 It is for this reason that Res.41/117's focus on the right to development as "helping"
to promote economic rights, with no mention of political rights, is unfortunate and ignores the
balance in the text of the Declaration, adopted on the same day. Indeed, a more recent
Commission on Human Rights resolution states that the right to development will help
promote both categories of rights: see Commission Res. 1987/19 (10 March 1987) in UN
Doc.E/CN.41987/L.11/Add.5 (1987).
177 For instance, see Alston's threefold list of why the right to development has arisen
in P. Alston, "The Shortcomings of a 'Garfield the Cat' Approach to the Right to
Development" (1985) 15 Cal. W. Int. LJ.510.
178 See Alston's diagram of a similar idea in P. Alston, "Peace as a Human Right" (1980)
11 Bull. Peace Proposals 319 at 323.
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The General Assembly's 1986 Declaration on the Right to
Development1 79 places considerable importance upon these synthetic
dimensions.180 In the Declaration, the two standard categories of
human rights are treated as equal and interdependent. They are
also treated as central to the very concept of development, blurred
and largely undefined as that concept remains in the Declaration.
The individual dimension is emphasized, as can be seen, for example,
in Article 2(1). Further, the conception is of the individual as an
active participant, not as a passive beneficiary. Participation, which
entails the active exercise of a whole cluster of civil and political
rights, is practically a leitmotif of the Declaration.
It is clearly common ground to view the right to
development as, at least in part, a synthetic right premised on the
interdependence of existing human rights, if only because the text
makes this patently clear. Even the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG), one of eight states to abstain in the vote, stated before the
Commission on Human Rights:
[The Federal Republic of Germany] has abstained from voting in the General
Assembly on the Declaration..., not because it rejected the right but because it
believed that the right to development was a comprehensive concept of the
individual rights contained in the [Covenants].... The Declaration did not define

179 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra, note 25. Note that it was drafted
by the Working Group on the Right to Development. There was only one vote against (the
United States) and eight abstentions.
180 Some of the more important provisions are as follows:
Article 1
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute
to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all
human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized....
Article 2
1. The human person is the central subject of development and should be the
active participant and beneficiary of the right to development....
Article 6
2. All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent;
equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights.
3. States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from
failure to observe civil and political rights as well as economic, social and
cultural rights....
See also preambular paragraphs 2, 4, 10, 13, 14 and 17, and articles 2(3), 8 and 9.
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sufficiently the fact that the right to development could only be a right of the
individual pursuant to the general interpretation of human rights as 1specified in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two Covenants8.

Italy, on the other hand, was able to vote in favour despite the same
misgivings as the FRG about the collective or NIEO dimensions of the
right and the resultant obligations on developed states:
[O]ne school was in favour of assigning the essential role to the individual as
beneficiary of the right to development; the other was in favour of linking the right
to development of the individual to that of the State, thereby stressing the abolition

of economic inequalities among the various countries. [The Government of Italy]
reaffirmed [its] view that the concept of the right
to development was centred on
r8 2

the individual, either alone or in association....

The Yugoslavian delegation to the Commission defended the right
as a human right:
Any interpretation should proceed from the fundamental premise that the right to
development was a human right and that one of its basic purposes was a
comprehensive realization of all human rights.
The indivisibility
and
2 83
interdependence of all human rights was underscored in that context.

These statements, selective as they must be, suggest a
minimalist interpretation of the right to development as a synthetic
right, having as its "fundamental feature" the interdependence of
existing human rights in the individual's relationship with the state.
Northern states wary of NIEO obligations and Southern states
fundamentally and legitimately concerned that such obligations be
acted on all have an interest in converging on this minimalist
common ground. The former states will want to invoke it either as
the only valid interpretation, or as a precondition for NIEO claims, in
order to forestall the maximalist interpretation. The latter states
must pay homage to it if they hope to attain their maximalist goal,
for the moral force of the right to development must derive from its
claim to be a human right. Both sides may also be interested in
taking concrete steps to show that they take interdependence
seriously, to the extent that credibility becomes useful or even
182 E/CNA/1987/SR.26 (1987) at 10 [emphasis added].
182 E/CN.4/1987/SR.30 (1987) at 3.
183 E/CN.4/1987/SR.26 (1987) at 5. Article 5 does not refer to interdependence, directly
or indirectly.
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essential in the future debate on the Declaration. The principle of
interdependence seems destined to develop an even higher profile
18 4
in international human rights discourse.
The above schematization is crude. It is not meant to deny
that there are governments on either side of the divide that are
dedicated, to varying degrees, to the whole spectrum of human
rights.
Nor is it meant to imply that the principle of
interdependence is only grounded in cynicism or reciprocal state
interest. Rather, the suggestion is that even within a bad-faith
scenario, the principle will be sustained by considerable rhetoric,
textual and otherwise. This may even lead to a bandwagon effect.
Apart from General Assembly Resolution 41/117, which was passed
on the same day as the Declaration (4 December 1986), two
resolutions were passed at the last session of the Commission on
Human Rights where the principle was invoked in a balanced
fashion 8 5
3. The interpretative relevance of the extra-covenant context
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (vcLT) provides that "[tihere shall be taken into account,
together with the context ...
any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties."' 86 My present
purpose is to enquire whether the Human Rights Committee must,
or at least may, take into account the principle of interdependence
as part of an extrinsic legal context. In particular, are the recent
resolutions and declarations, in both the General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights, a source of legal obligations on
184 Other invocations of the principle at the latest (43rd) session of the Commission on
Human Rights were: E/CN.4/1987/SR.25(1987) 10 (Mr. Herndl, Under Secretary-General for
Human Rights in opening address): SR.25 at 6 (USSR); SR.25 at 19 (Australia); SR.26 at
6 (Algeria); SR.26 at 8-9 (Ireland); SR.26 at 11 (Iraq); SR.28 Add.1 at 9 (Byel.SSR); SR.28
Add.1 at 10 (Rwanda); SR.30 at 5 (Obs'r for Hungary); SR.31 at 3 (Obs'r for Poland); SR.31
at 5 (Obs'r for Czech.); SR.31 at 6 (Obs'r for Afghan.).
185 See Res. 1987/19 and 1987120 in E/CN.4/1987/L11/Add.5 (1987) at 11 and 19.
186 VCLT 31(3) (in I. Brownlie, supra, note 132) also refers to the effect of subsequent
explicit agreement and any subsequent practice showing agreement of the parties on the
interpretation or application of the treaty.
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states, authorizing the Committee to give the principle of
interdependence practical legal effect?187 Simply to pose the
question is to invite caution: the issue goes to the heart of much
that is controversial in the present theory and practice of
international law.188
Denying some degree of legal weight to the principle of
interdependence would ignore the inextricability of and interaction
between law and social process. I have shown how the difference
between human rights treaties and traditional treaties justifies a
focus on the purposive aspects of interpretation.! 89 The differences
in the nature of the beast should extend as well to perceptions of
what the relevant social process is in the human rights context.
Even in traditional areas, conceptions of international law as
a purely legal system regulating interstate relations ultimately
obscure the underlying human relations, both domestic and transnational? 90 This is especially the case in the area of human rights.
The interpretative arguments I will make are based on the following
three premises.1 91
187 It is interesting to note that Theodor Meron makes the following observation:
[Tihe UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights have
stressed the principle that human rights are indivisible and interdependent and have

emphasized that civil and political rights should receive the same level of attention
as economic, social and cultural rights. This guidance should be legally significant

despite its generalit, not only to States but also to control organs which in the course
of their work must often balance the different normative provisions and the
community values underlying them [emphasis added].
T. Meron, Human Rights Law Making in the United Nations: a Critique of Instruments and
Processes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 134 [hereinafter Meron, HRI.

The permeability presumption is precisely such an attempt to make the general
principle of interdependence legally significant.
188 See R. Higgins, "Contending Systems of World Public Order and International Law:
An OvervieW' (1987) Atlantic Community Quarterly 145.
189 See S.IILB.2.
190 For a subtle overview of the complex character of international law, see 0. Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public InternationalLaw, 178
Hague Recueil (1982-V) at 21-40; and C. de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public

InternationalLaw, trans. P. Corbett (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), esp.
at 71-133.
191 The following arguments will be broadly consonant with some insights of the New
Haven interpretative approach to human rights treaties. See M. McDougal, "Human Rights
and World Public Order Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General
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First, final authority in law is not positivistically hierarchical
but "comes from the members of a community and with demands for
the wide sharing of power.''192 Community is a notoriously elusive
concept, but in international law it tends to be perceived as a
community of nation-states or perhaps of the established elites
controlling those states and the conduct of foreign affairs. But a
more democratic notion of community must be adhered to when
discussing human rights if international human rights law is to have
any real meaning and legitimacy for its beneficiaries.
Second, and directly related to the preceding premise, the
interpretation of legal documents must appeal to shared expectations
if the documents are to be effective. The relevant expectations for
human rights treaties are the "working expectations of the peoples
of the world."19 3 Expectations based on interstate perceptions and
calculations of interest ignore my earlier observations that people
collectively constitute human rights through intersubjective
experience 9 4
Third, in the best of all possible worlds, the interpreter
would strive to make herself or himself "as conscious as possible of
all the different communities, from global to local, of which he [or
she] is a member and upon which his [or her] choices must have
This observational and interpretative
unavoidable impacts."' 9 5
standpoint would try to approximate some kind of objective view
from nowhere by means of a view from everywhere.1 96 Laudable as
this may seem, one may be forgiven for wondering whether it is
humanly possible, or merely an unrealistic Herculean approach to
interpretation. I do not believe we can avoid taking incomplete and

Community Policies" (1974) 14 Virg. 3. Int. L. 387. However, I cannot accept the advocacy

by that school of a scientific sociological jurisprudence approach. For a powerful criticism of
"the ambition to model the study of man [humankind) on the natural sciences," see C. Taylor,
"Introduction" in PhilosophicalPapers,supra, note 125 at 1-13.
192 McDougal, ibid. at 354.
193 Ibid at 390.

194 See S.11 and S.III.A.2; see also Gabel, supra, note 55 at 1576.
195 McDougal, supra, note 191 at 396.
196

See B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy (London: Fontana Press/Collins,

1985) at 110, 111.
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somewhat impressionistic stabs at viewing human rights questions
from the perspective of those upon whom the impact of choices is
most immediately and intensely felt. Thus I earlier proposed that
the Human Rights Committee should attempt to view
interdependence from the perspective of the poorest and most
oppressed members of global society.
With these premises in mind, two arguments may be pressed
upon the Committee. The first is that the Committee may
legitimately integrate the wider social context into their view of
"ordinary meaning" in VCLT 31(1), for there can be no real meaning
divorced from such a context. In essence, this approach is similar to
that adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v.
United Kingdom, in which it was stated that the Convention must be
viewed "as a living instrument which ...
must be interpreted in the

light of present-day conditions. '197 If the totality of evidence
suggests that interdependence is a more meaningful concept now
than it was in the early 1950s, the Committee may take this into
account. To do otherwise would be to treat the ICCPR as a
fossilized, not a living, instrument. It would also solidify a
dichotomy between rights categories and a separation of Covenants
that one writer has termed "a purely unfortunate historical
phenomenon."198 There would be a danger of severing the link
between legal interpretation, and prevailing social understandings
and discourse.
The second, less orthodox argument is that the textual
rhetoric of the UN resolutions and declarations invoking the concept
of interdependence must be taken at face value. A notion of
binding rhetoric or rhetorical law may be a particularly appropriate
response, on several levels, to the peculiarities of international
human rights law. It would recognize an important feature of that
branch of international law: the tension between theory and
practice, and the need to exploit the former in order to influence
the latter.1 99 Where state reciprocity is a minimal consideration,
197 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 1, Ser. A, No. 26 at para. 31.

198 F. Menghistu, "The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements" in B.G. Ramcharan, ed.,
The Right to Life in InternationalLaw (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) at 78.

199 For a discussion of such tensions in international law generally, see S.Sur, "Systtme
juridique international et utopie" (1987) 32 Arch. Phil. Dr. 35.
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human rights talk can be hypocritical and cynical. The process of
customary international law formulation in this area must pay
significantly
more attention to what states say than to what they
2
00
do.

If legitimate expectations among states can crystallize UN
20 2
resolutions into customary law201 or general principles of law,
then the relevant expectations in this context are not merely
interstate expectations but also, if not primarily, the working
expectations of states' citizens. One may reasonably presume that
the network of textual rhetoric that emerges from the UN is sensitive
to and plays to domestic populations - directly, or indirectly through
NGOS - as well as partly to the elites of other state delegations.
Thus, VCLT 31(3)(c), applying as it does to rules "between parties,"
is most relevant to us as an analogy. If the "parties" in question
are in fact individuals and states, a rhetorical law may be analogous
to traditional customary international law as envisaged by VCLT
31(3)(c). 20 3 The term rhetoric is appropriate because it helps
capture the idea of law feeding into parallel social, political and
ethical discourse. At the very least, the Human Rights Committee
would be justified in taking the textual rhetoric seriously as part of
the broader social context.
The Golder Case lends some support to this approach.
Albeit dealing with a preamble and not extrinsic texts, the European
Court essentially said that a state is precluded from pleading mere
rhetoric, and the principle of good faith found in VCLT 31(1) was
specifically cited as one reason. 204 In Golder, the court also found
200 For some support for this position, see Schachter, supra, note 190 at 334-36.
201 See the discussion of the effect of majority resolutions on non-concurring states in
Schachter, ibid at 118-23.
202 See M. Mendelson, "The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some
Considerations of Principle" in K. Hossain, ed., Legal Aspects of the New International
Economic Order (London: Pinter, 1980) at 95, 103.
203 See Schachter, supra, note 190 at 333 for a discussion of what human rights may be
said to be customary law and therefore to fall squarely within VCLT 31(3)(c). For one view
that the Universal Declaration has become customary law, see J.Humphrey, "The International
Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation" (1976) 17 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 527. See also
T. Meron, "On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights" (1986) 80 Am. J.Int. L. 1.
204 Supra, notes 136-39.
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it significant that the "rule of law" reference was widely proclaimed
by states. Surely states could not in good faith plead mere rhetoric
if the Human Rights Committee invoked the widely proclaimed
principle of interdependence to justify either a general presumption
for permeability or a particular result? It is important to note that
good faith is thought to be one reason that UN resolutions have
some degree of legal force 2 05
Finally, the notion of binding rhetoric taps into the
democratic potential of international human rights supervision.
Courts should move away from the tendency to follow the opinion
of established elites and try to approximate a more democratic
consensus. Adjudication should self-consciously introduce "the
adjustment of the laws to the values of those persons to whom they
apply."20 6 The Commission on Human Rights, out of which General
Assembly human rights resolutions emerge, is a forum with
considerable popular input, if only through the medium of NGOS.
The Human Rights Committee could consciously be sensitive to that
input, as well as to the unofficial NGO input into their own
deliberations and to the NGO input that will, in all probability, 2go
07
into the new Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
IV. BARRIERS TO PERMEABILITY
I have already alluded to some of the potential barriers to
permeability. In this part, I first look at the argument that the
norms in question cannot permeate the ICCPR because they are not
justiciable (that is, susceptible to judicial determination). I secondly
examine the argument that there are normative and jurisdictional
conflicts keeping the two treaty regimes at arm's length. I will
conclude that neither barrier is insurmountable.
205 Higgins, "Contending Systems," supra, note 188.
206 H. Collins, 'Democracy and Adjudication" in N. MacCormick & P. Birks, eds, The
Legal Min& Essays in Honour of AM. Honore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
207 See Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4 at 367-74; Principle 101, "'he Limburg
Principles," supra, note 164; Y. Tyagi, "Cooperation Between the Human Rights Committee
and Nongovernmental Organizations: Permissibility and Propositions" (1983) 18 Tex. Int. LJ.
273; see also S.III.A.2.
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A. The JusticiabilityMisconception
In this section, I return to the reasons for separation of the
Covenants, to argue that the blanket categorization of ICESCR rights
as non-justiciable is misconceived. The centrifugal force of the
implementation-based reason for separation is much weaker now
that it was in 1951. The points at which it is at its weakest are the
potential points of permeability into the ICCPR. The following
discussion must, regrettably, be limited to indicating some general
considerations about the justiciability of economic rights; a more indepth study is necessary in order to make permeability a significant
process. This, of course, will be part of the function of the new
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Perhaps the best-known indication that economic rights are
no longer considered to be as inherently non-justiciable as the
proponents of separation contended is the ongoing study by the
Council of Europe into whether to add an economic rights protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights. 208 Francis Jacobs
succinctly goes to the heart of the issue of justiciability:
[The distinction between the two categories of rights is not as clear-cut as it may
at first sight appear. Some rights of an economic, social and cultural character are
already guaranteed by the Convention system: see for example Article 11 of the
Convention (which includes the right to form and join trade unions), Article 1 of
the First Protocol (the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions) and Article
2 of the First Protocol (the right to education). The crucial test in this respect for
the inclusion of a particular right in the Convention system does not lie in the
subject-matter of that right, but rather in whether it is capable of protection by the
Convention machinery, that is by the system of adjudication ....

He later gives what may be referred to as a working definition of
justiciable: "[1] whether it would be suited to determination in
judicial proceedings; [2] whether it vests an enforceable right in the

208 See A. Berenstein, "Economic and Social Rights: Their Inclusion in the European
Convention on Human Rights - Problems of Formulation and Interpretation" (1981) 2 Hum.
Rts. L.J. 257 at 258-60 for a description of the simultaneous studies on adding a Protocol to
the ECHR and to the ESC.
209 F. Jacobs, 'The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to Include
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1978) III Hum. Rts. Rev. 166 at 168-69. Note that
I do not feel that property rights, at least as classically conceived, fall within the scope of the
interdependence and permeability theses. Neither Covenant entrenches such rights.
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individual; [3] and whether it lends
itself to sufficiently specific
21 0
States.
of
part
the
on
obligations
This analysis may be a convenient place to start, but it does
not fully capture what is at issue in determining whether a right is
justiciable or not. The word justiciable is often either the conclusion
of an argument or series of arguments, or a self-evident conclusion
with no real preceding argument. In discussing the implementationbased reason for separation, I argued that the justiciability/nonjusticiability dichotomy was in fact an umbrella dichotomy.21 1 By
this, I meant that the various distinctions taken for granted between
the two categories of human rights flowed into a general conclusion:
that economic rights were not justiciable, while political rights were.
However, this relationship is rarely, if ever, remarked upon. Instead,
both proponents and opponents of the distinctions tend to recite the
distinctions as if they were of the same 212
order of significance. An
this:
like
look
might
list
undifferentiated
Economic, Social and
CulturalRights

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Positive
Resource-Intensive
Progressive
Vague
Unmanageably Complex
Ideologically Divisive/
Political
7. Non-Justiciable
8. Aspirations or Goals

Civil and Political

Rights
Negative
Cost-Free
Immediate
Precise
Manageable
Non-Ideological/
Non-Political
Justiciable
"Real" or "Legal" Rights

210 Aid at 172.
211 See supra, note 95.
212 See Annotations, supra, note 67 at 8; Alston, "Prevention Versus Cure," supra, note
60 at 47-54; Alston & Quinn, supra, note 164 at 159-60.
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Yet category 7 (justiciability) says nothing on its own. Rather, the
relationship might be stated as follows: if ESC rights are 1 through
6, then they are 7 (and, possibly, 8). To some extent, category 5
and category 6 may each be sub-conclusions drawn from any or all
of categories 1 through 4. As well, category 8 may be a further
conclusion based on category 7, especially2 1 for
those who tie legal
3
enforcement.
of
forms
traditional
to
status
It is almost trite of late to acknowledge the oversimplification
of these blanket dichotomies,21 4 and it is not my intention to discuss
standard examples21 5 of where they break down. Instead, my goal
is briefly to draw the reader's attention to some of the factors that
indicate how economic rights falling outside the standard concessions
to justiciability are now, or potentially could be, open to judicial
protection.
It has been found that focusing on the obligations side of
economic rights is a more fruitful way to render those rights
justiciable. One framework now being used to study the right to
food is made up of the following four duties, which attach to any
human right: (1) the obligation to respect; (2) the obligation to
protect; (3) the obligation to ensure; and (4) the obligation to
promote.2 1 6 The obligation to respect is the classic negative
obligation of non-interference, forbidding a state to directly encroach
upon a right. The other three require varying degrees of positive
action or state policy. The obligation to protect means a state must
prohibit non-state third parties, whether through enforced legislation
or otherwise, from encroaching on a right. The obligations to

213 See, for example, E.W. Vierdag, 'The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1978) 9 Neth. Y.B. int. L.
69.
214 For a rebuttal of two recalcitrants, see GJ.H. van Hoof, "The Legal Nature of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views" in Alston &
Tomasevski, The Right to Food,supra, note 13 at 97.
215 For example, due process is costly; positive action is required to protect persons (for
example, a police force); the right to strike may be recognized immediately, et cetera.
216 See van Hoof, supra, note 214 at 106. This fourfold structure of analysis is based

on, and largely compatible with, that evolved by Henry Shue: see H. Shue, 'The
Interdependence of Duties" in Alston & Tomasevski, The Right to Food,supra, note 13 at 83.
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ensure and promote correspond
to positive obligations commonly
' 21 7
referred to as "programmatic. 1
The focus on obligations reveals the following possible

argument:

in relation to an economic right such as the right to

food, states can violate obligations to respect and protect that are

traditionally associated with political rights. Once one crosses the
conceptual threshold of maintaining that for every human right there
is only one correlative obligation 218 and sees instead that all human
rights entail a complex, multilayered obligations structure,2 1 9 the
differences between the categories of human rights appear less stark.
It becomes possible to consider a judicial function in cases such as
G.J.H. van Hoof describes:
[r]he obligation to respect and protect the right to adequate housing, as laid down
in Article 11 of the [ICESCR], would in my view be violated, if the government's
policy, even in the least developed countries, allowed the hovels of poor people to
be torn down and replaced by luxury housing which the original inhabitants could
not afford and without
providing them with access to alternative housing on
2 20
reasonable terms

The obligation to respect can be viewed as a negative,
221
immediate obligation that is relatively easy to adjudicate.
However, it must not be assumed that the so-called programmatic

obligations are inherently non-justiciable. While one philosopher,
Henry Shue, first advanced the obligation structure outlined above,
a philosopher-economist, Amartya Sen, has fashioned a conceptual

217 Van Hoof, ibid. at 106.

"Programmatic" can be seen as composed of a positive

(action) element and a progressive (temporal) element.
218 See Raz, supra, note 27, for the view that a right is a ground for different duties and
also that a right is dynamic in that the duties that it generates may change over time.
219 Van Hoof, supra, note 214 at 106. Note'Jhabvala, supra, note 67, on the progressive
side to the obligations attaching to political rights.
220 Van Hoof, ibid. at 107.
221 On this, see Alston's argument that in equal protection or due process cases, courts
often act on the basis of "knowing an abuse when they see it." This could no less be the case
with the right to food, for instance: P. Alston, "International Law and the Human Right to
Food" in Alston & Tomasevski, The Right to Food, supra, note 13 at 57. Judicial
interpretations of vaguely worded rights need to be seen as practical ethical choices made in
light of the judges' engagement with the social context.
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framework for the relationship between a right and programmatic
obligations. He has this to say:
A metaright to something x can be defined as the right to have policies p(x) that
genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to x realisable. As an example,
consider the following "Directive Principle of State Policy" inserted in the
Constitution of India when it was adopted in 1950: 'The state shall, in particular,
direct its policy toward securing ... that the citizens, men and women equally, have
the right to an adequate means of livelihood." ... There are, of course, ambiguities
as to ways of checking whether the measures taken by the government amount to
a policy p(x) aimed at securing a right x.... But such ambiguities of specification
are not unusual in dealing with rights in general.... Indeed, sometimes it is patently
clear that the policies are not thus directed.... There is ... no difficulty in conceiving
of the same right being made institutional and concrete, permitting any individual
to sue the government for not pursuing, with the required amount of urgency,
a
2
policy that is genuinely aimed at achieving the right to adequate means.

The work of the Committee of Independent Experts (CIE) overseeing
the European Social Charter demonstrates that it is indeed possible
to evaluate whether a progressive obligation is being met at a given
point in time.223 In the recently enunciated Limburg Principles, a
similar capability seems to be envisaged in relation to the ICESCR,
and the new Committee may conceivably be able to determine
whether a State's policy, practice or legislation reveals a breach of
a "metaright. 224 In particular, the emphasis in the Limburg
Principles on states making a priority commitment "to improve the
standard of living of the poor and disadvantaged groups 225 and
being "obligated, regardless of the level of economic development,
to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all"226 suggests
that potential institutional linkages between the two Committees
could eventually lead to permeability claims challenging the adequacy

222 A. Sen, 'The Right Not to Be Hungry" in Alston & Tomasevski, ibid at 70-71.
223 D.J. Harris, The European Social Charter (Charlottesville:

University Press of

Virginia, 1984) at 269 [hereinafter Harris, ESC).
224 See, in particular, Principles 16, 17, 18 and 25, 'The Limburg Principles," supra, note
164.
225 Principle 14, ibid
226 Principle 25, ibid
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of government measures taken on behalf of the most marginalized
2
in society. 7
Philip Alston, one member of the new Committee, has
indicated that one of that body's priorities must be to begin
identifying "the minimum core entitlement" that flows from a given
right.228 Once the new Committee begins to evolve a jurisprudence
based on state reports and studies of ICESCR articles, a close working
relationship with the Human Rights Committee could enable the
latter to hear communications under a permeable ICCPR article that
would complement prior evaluations of a state's laws on a given
ICESCR right. The Human Rights Committee could even evaluate a
law for the first time in the light of the facts of a particular case.
An example might be in order. Under ICCPR 23(1), "[t]he
family ... is entitled to protection by society ... and the State" while
under ICCPR 24(1), "every child shall have ... the right to such

measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on
the part of his family, society and the State." Under ICESCR 10(1),
"[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded
to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible
for the care and education of dependent children." A state provides
lump-sum benefits to families under a certain income level, but fails
to adjust the quantum according to the number of children in the
family. A child of a large family petitions the Human Rights
Committee, claiming breaches of ICCPR 23(1) and 24(1). The Human
Rights Committee refers to general recommendations of the new
Committee under ICESCR 21 on the subject of ICESCR 10(1), and finds
that protection of the family requires adequate benefits for each
child and that this requirement has a particularly high priority. The
Committee finds that state benefits are the only present means of
income for the family and (with the collaboration of the new
Committee) determines that the state has sufficient resources to be
under a current obligation under ICESCR 10(1). The state is found
227 Note that Jacobs recommends that any new ECHR Protocol include rights of
everyone to an adequate standard of living and to social and medical assistance (or,
alternatively, a social security scheme which provides the same guarantees): Jacobs, supra,
note 209 at 165.
228 Alston, "Out of the Abyss," supra, note 4 at 24-26.
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to have breached ICCPR 23(1) and 24(1), and the Committee
recommends that the state pay appropriate benefits to the petitioner.
A presumption for permeability is relied on. The state complies and,
after domestic political pressure and some domestic litigation, it
changes its legislation.
It cannot be objected that such indirect challenging of
legislation is impossible under a petition procedure designed to
protect individual rights. First, such an objection ignores the
fundamental fact that the "true effectiveness" of the European
Convention on Human Rights, to take the best case, "has been to
remedy defects in national laws and practices rather than229to provide
the individual with a cure for his particular complaint."
Second, the objection raises the locus standi question of
whether individuals can be given rights enforceable by petition. In
his study of the European Social Charter, David Harris cogently
argues that the necessary focus in the Charter,or in the ICESCR for
that matter, on the obligations aspect of the issue yields "no
overriding reason why individuals should not be given the locus
standi to call attention to the possible breach of these obligations in
circumstances in which they are directly and specifically affected." 230
The Human Rights Committee would simply have to make its notion
of victim sensitive to the kinds of obligations a state has with regard
to rights found in the ICESCR that also permeate the ICCPR.
Third, the objection is probably based on scepticism that a
supervisory organ could pin-point what is required under a
programmatic obligation at any point in time; Sen's suggestion that
it could do so would be dismissed as the naive supposition of a nonlawyer. As already stated, Harris's excellent survey of the European
Social Charter jurisprudence belies this fear.231 Instead, he makes
229 Jacobs, supra, note 209 at 177-78; Harris, ESC, supra, note 223 at 270, n. 315.
230 Harris, ibia at 270.
231 A finding of a breach of the Charter under its report system, which is juridically no
different from any such finding as might result from the operation of a system of
petitions, has presented no inherent difficulties. In particular, it has proved possible
to set appropriate levels of achievement for states and to take sufficient account
where necessary of the economic circumstances of individual states or of states
generally at a given time when doing so.
Ibid at 269.
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an extremely persuasive case for the benefits of a system of petitions
leading to adjudication of economic and social rights. 232 In
particular, he emphasizes the role that petitions play in prompting
discovery of how a law or practice actually works. Both the
particular facts of an individual's case and the sharpness of
adversarial exchange (even if only in written form, as for the Human
Rights Committee) encourage a focus that examination of legislation
in the abstract does not permit.233 Further advantages of a petition
system include clarifications of laws and remedies, which emerge
through the process of seeking local remedies; greater impact on
public opinion than abstract rulings23would
have; and the direct
4
availability of remedies to individuals.
Harris is correct in the following observation on the
justiciability of economic rights: "It seems likely that the argument
that obligations concerning economic and social rights cannot by
their nature be properly made the subject of a system of petitions
stems more from tradition than from a thorough assessment of the
practical situation.235

Thus, the above survey suggests that justiciability is a fluid
concept. Indeed, the experience of modern public law ( whether it
be administrative law or complex European Economic Community
law) appears to be one of constantly expanding justiciability. I
suggest that there are two essential elements in the determination
of whether a right or rule is justiciable: the value or normative
component, and the expertise or empirical component. By the
former, it is argued that a matter should not be subjected to
adjudication and, by the latter, that it cannot be.
232 See his excellent discussion: ibid at 226-32.
233 Ibid at 267. Harris adds:
In a report system, a lot turns upon the way in which an answer to a questionnaire
is put and whether the expertise of the supervisory organ is such to allow it to know
when and how to probe further. The national reports that have been presented so
far under the Charter system contain, for example, many short, comprehensive
statements which, in some cases, have been questioned further as the result of the
presence on the CIE of a member with specialist knowledge.
bid. at n. 303.
234 Ibid. at 267-68.
235 Ibid. at 271.
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Prevailing judicial dispositions and political ideologies (the
former often factoring in the latter) may be hostile to viewing a

political or economic matter as justiciable. 23 6 Often, this attitude
stems from particular conceptions of the judicial function and the
nature of law and the state, but it may also be influenced by the
expertise component and by views of the limited competence of the

courts. Yet expertise is not a constant. If a full conception of
human rights makes permeability desirable in the Covenant context,
the Human Rights Committee should tap into the expertise of the
23 7
new Committee just as domestic courts rely on outside experts,
and should seek to improve its own capabilities.
This study does not advocate de facto or de jure replacement
of the report system for economic rights, or wholesale promotion of
the

ICESCR via the ICCPR.

Rather, it advocates

a limited

complementary relationship.238 While ideally it would be the new

236 See category 6 in the list of dichotomies earlier in this section. See Jhabvala, supra,
note 67 at 150 for the view that the Covenants' separation "is based on classical Western
liberal philosophy with its separation of politics and economics....' And see R. Higgins, "Policy
Considerations and the International Judicial Process" (1968) 17 I.C.L.Q. 58 at 76, 80, 82 for
the view that "policy" being intrinsic to law, courts must develop expertise to deal with policy
issues, rather than seeking to skirt those issues.
For a discussion of justiciability that identifies both a normative and an empirical
dimension, see T. Cromwell, Locus StandL A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 192-96. Cromwell distinguishes between the legitimacy and the
adequacy of using the courts. See also L Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed.
(Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988) at 67. The Canadian reader will note that I do not
totally agree with Wilson J's rejection of institutional incapacity or lack of expertise as an
element of non-justiciability: OperationDismantle v. R, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 466-67. Our
approaches converge, however, in their underlying concern that the courts not easily abdicate
responsibility for protecting human rights.
It will have become obvious that my primary concern in this discussion is to surmount
the institutional incapacity hurdle. The question of normative justiciability has been implicitly
dealt with in terms of the strength of the principle of interdependence and will be touched
upon again in the upcoming discussion of whether normative and jurisdictional barriers
constitute barriers to permeability: see S.IV.B.
237 See Higgins, ibid, for a similar view against using lack of expertise as a perpetual
barrier to justiciability.
238 Harris's book bears witness to the considerable potential of a report system. For the
advantages of reports over petitions and for the view that combining petitions and reports
together is desirable, see Harris, ESC, supra, note 223 at 268.
It must further be emphasized that the focus in this article on adjudicatory
dimensions of protecting economic rights is meant to be complementary to other avenues of
activity, such as international co-operation and reform of the international economic order.
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Committee that would bring its expertise to bear on individual
petitions, the likelihood of a treaty amendment empowering it do
so is small. Thus, the Human Rights Committee must fulfil that role
to the extent allowed by permeability. In so doing, it should pay
particular (and perhaps exclusive) attention both to the obligations
to respect and protect, and to the basic programmatic obligations of
rights in the ICESCR that are central to the lives of the most
vulnerable and which, in addition, permeate the ICCPR.
B. Normative and JurisdictionalOverlaps and Conflicts
I have defined permeability as the openness of a treaty to
the supervision of human rights norms from a different category of
rights found in another treaty. 239 As such, the term describes either
a general feature of a norm or treaty,240 or a result in a particular
situation. Questions of normative and jurisdictional relations 241
between the two treaties (involving overlaps as well as conflicts of
norms and jurisdictional competence) must be resolved in
determining the extent to which one treaty is permeable in relation
to another and the role of a permeability presumption in interpreting
a given treaty.
C. Wilfred Jenks, in a classic study, views the conflict of
treaty provisions "in the strict sense" as arising where "a party to ...
two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under
both treaties." Only a "divergence," on the other hand, occurs where
two instruments treat the same subject matter from divergent angles

Permeability is but one element of a necessarily multifaceted approach, the utility of which
will vary according to the level of affluence and the role of the courts in the constitutional

structure of particular states.
239 See S.I.
240 This article's title could equally refer to the permeability of human rights treaties, as
opposed to norms.

241 See Meron, HR supra, note 187, especially Ch. IV, "Normative Relations Between
Human Rights Instruments" at 131, and Ch. V, "Jurisdictional Relations Between Human
Rights Instruments and Organs" at 214; see also T. Meron, "Norm Making and Supervision

in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order ' (1982) 76 Am. J.Int. L.
754 [hereinafter Meron, "Norm Making"].
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but where the obligations which arise are not strictly incompatible,
even if one obligation is more onerous than the other.242 Theodor
Meron cogently argues that this conflict/divergence distinction is of
limited utility, because it is next to impossible to determine in the
abstract whether a difference in obligations constitutes one or the
other.243 A more important point is that even divergences are of
concern, simply because uniformity of obligations and a relatively
coherent base for the generation of customary international law are
crucial goals in international human rights law.24 4 For these reasons,
I will use the term conflict in a looser sense than Jenks does, to
apply to all differences flowing from the treatment of the same right
under both Covenants.
From the definition and preceding discussion of permeability,
it will be recalled that normative overlap is central to organic or
direct permeability and relevant to some instances of related or
indirect permeability, as between ICCPR 26 and ICESCR 2(2).245
Conflicts of norms must not be equated with overlap of norms,
because the obligations generated by an overlap may in principle be
not only compatible but also identical. 246 But in practice, overlap
carries with it the potential for conflict, in the broad sense, for
several reasons. As Meron points out, it is UN policy for each
247
normative instrument to create its own system of supervision.

242 W. Jenks, 'The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties" (1953) 30 B.Y.B.I.L. 401 at 426;
see 425-53 for the essence of the article. See the discussion of Jenks's views in Meron, HR,

supra, note 187 at 142-52.
243 Meron, HR,ibid at 143.

244 1bid
245 For text, see infra, note 299.
246 Meron does not explicitly distinguish overlap and conflict. In "Norm Making," supra,
note 241 at 758, he seems to use them interchangeably: "Problems of overlap or conflict of
norms can be avoided...." But in HR,supra, note 187 at 131, he implicitly distinguishes them
by referring to instruments which may be "inconsistent or mutually incompatible" and,
separately, to instruments "which may overlap."
247 Meron, HR,ibid at 132; Meron, "Norm Making," ibid at 764-69. For some of the
literature on the multiplicity of organs and procedures, see M.A. Eissen, "The European
Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Problems of Coexistence" (1972) 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 181; M. Tardu, 'The Protocol to the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-American System: A
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There is an accompanying lack of specific attention by treaty organs
to the interpretations placed on rights in other treaties whose
formulations are broadly similar.248 Compounding the problem is the
fact that, though similar, the definition of rights and the limitation
provisions are usually not exactly the same in separated
instruments. 249 This may provide justification for not taking an
openly comparative approach, particularly if there is an underlying
tendency to emphasize the autonomy of the treaty from other
treaties.250
Finally, the value-laden nature of interpretation
inevitably leads to conflicts in interpretation, not only between
organs but also within an organ over time.251
Thus, overlaps of norms can be seen as prima facie conflicts
of norms. A permeability presumption increases the risk of conflict,
because the permeability thesis encourages overlap that flows from
a sustainable reading of an ICCPR article. However, the theoretical
distinction between overlap and conflict now assumes importance:
it suggests the possibility of co-ordinating the promotion of overlap
and the minimization of conflict, each desirable for different reasons.
The remainder of this section seeks to show how this co-ordination
can be accomplished.
Directly related to these notions of normative overlap and
conflict are duplication (or overlap) and conflict of supervisory
jurisdiction. Meron notes that "[i]nternational human rights law does
not incorporate conflict of laws rules, and in a typical situation each
organ tends to act in isolation."25 2 Because a permeability

Study of Co-existing Petition Procedures" (1976) 70 Am. J.Int. L. 778; G. Cohen-Jonathan,
"Droits de l'Homme et Pluralitd des Syst~mes Europens de Protection Internationale" (1972)
5 Hum. Rts. J.613; H. Lanning, "Human Rights and the Multiplicity of European Systems for
International Protection" (1972) 5 Hum. Rts. J.651.
248 See J.McBride, "Widening Case Law Horizons" (1986) 1 Interights Bull. 8.
249 Meron, "Norm Making," supra, note 241 at 761.
250 we will see in the discussion of recent Human Rights Committee case law that the
Committee views the ICCPR as having "a life of its own":

S.V.A.

251 By way of illustration, see A. Hutchinson, 'qhe Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law
and Scholarship" (1985) 48 Mod. L. Rev. 293 for a discussion of such temporal contradictions
in English public law.
252 Meron, HR supra, note 187 at 139.
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presumption increases the risk of normative and jurisdictional
conflicts by generating normative and jurisdictional overlaps, the
proponent of permeability must address the issue of inter-Covenant
conflicts. Should a permeability presumption be defeated by
jurisdictional conflict? Conflict of jurisdiction may be understood in
at least three senses, each of which will be dealt with in turn.
First, there may be a conflict in the straightforward sense of
two organs claiming jurisdiction over the same matter. Treaties
25 3
contain provisions that attempt to resolve this sort of conflict.
The fact that treaty standards differ shows the fine distinction
between (undesirable) conflict and (desirable) duplication. However,
the Human Rights Committee has held that the "same matter"
requirement of Optional Protocol 5(2)(a) refers to the examination
of individual cases, not of general situations such
as would be the
254
case under the reporting system of the ICESCR.
The second type of jurisdictional conflict can arise if one
organ assumes competence over a matter falling outside its own
mandate, and in the process encroaches on another organ's area of
competence. 255 Incompatibility ratione materiae can occur without
one body necessarily stepping into another body's jurisdiction. But
a claim may create this jurisdictional overlap because governments
in permeability cases have linked the presence of a right in a treaty
dealing with economic rights to the incompatibility ratione materiae
with a treaty on political rights.256 This kind of conflict is directly

related to the objection that a state should not be bound by ICESCR
provisions in the name of interpretation unless it has ratified the
icEsCR. Maurice Mendelson, in a study of the uses of ECHR norms

253

Optional Protocol 5(2), supra, note 3, states: 'The Committee shall not consider any
communication from an individual unless it is ascertained that: ...
(a)[t~he same matter is not
being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement."
[Emphasis added.] ECHR 27(1), supra, note 3, states: 'The Commission shall not deal with
any petition submitted under article 25 which: ...(b)has already been submitted to another
procedure of international investigation or settlement and if it contains no relevant new
information." [Emphasis added.]
254 See S.VA. on the Dutch triad of ICCPR 26 cases.
255 See Meron, HR, supra, note 187 at 215.
256 See the government's arguments in the ICCPR equal protection cases, S.V.A.
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by the European Court of Justice in that court's interpretation of
the EEC'S Treaty of Rome, comments:
It is often overlooked that the European Convention on Human Rights is not a
homogenous body of law uniformly binding on all the Member States of the
Communities.... If this lack of uniformity of obligation is glossed over, there is a
danger that these reservations, declarations
and failures to ratify will be swept out
57
by the back door of EEC membership.

In addition, Meron discusses the Case of Baby Boy, 258 in which
petitioners brought the United States before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The petitioners argued that the
right-to-life provision in the American Declaration on Human
Rights259 should be interpreted to include the notion that life begins
at the moment of conception - a notion found in the American
Convention on Human Rights, which the United States has not
ratified. 26 The Commission refused to accept this interpretation,
saying: "[I]t would be impossible to impose upon the United States
Government ... by means of 'interpretation,'

an international

obligation based upon a treaty that such State has not duly accepted
or ratified. 261
These examples from systems where the borrowing of norms
has been at issue must be taken seriously. But in the latter example,
it is not clear that a treaty interpretation can be tailored to a state's
subjective obligations, unless those obligations have been expressly
entered as reservations to the particular treaty. The issue would also
arise in interpreting a treaty in the light of a customary international
law norm, where a state invokes its status as a persistent objector as
257 M. Mendelson, 'The European Court of Justice and Human Rights' (1981) 1 Y.B.
Eur. L. 125 at 162-63.
258 Meron, HR, supra, note 187 at 138. See the Case of "Baby Boy," Res. No. 23/81,
Case No. 2141, 1 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Annual Report 1980-81, 6
(OEA/SER:L.V./II 54, Doc. 9, rev. 1 (1981)).
259 Article 1, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, in Organization
of American States, Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System, 19 (OEA/SER.I,/V./II.60, Doc. 28, rev. 1 (1983).
260 Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights in Basic Tets, supra, note
3 at 176.
261 Case of Baby Boy, supra, note 258 at 24, quoted in Meron, HR, supra, note 187 at
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reason not to be bound by the interpretation. The better view
would seem to be that a treaty must be interpreted as objectively as
possible, especially in the area of human rights.262 Regarding the
EEC Treaty of Rome, Mendelson seems to be giving a general policy
warning about the appropriateness of the European Court of
Justice's reliance on the ECHR, rather than suggesting that the Treaty
of Rome should be differentially interpreted according to states'
reservations to and failures to ratify the ECHR.
In the Covenant context, the objective interpretation
argument is at least as strong. Because of interdependence, it is
perfectly consistent to imply a norm found in the ICESCR into the
ICCPR, and simultaneously enforce a right in the ICCPR. As a matter
of formal analysis, this must be the approach given the presence of
ICCPR 2(1) by which states undertake "to respect and to ensure ... the
rights recognised in the present Covenant," and of Optional Protocol
2, by which individuals claiming that any "rights enumerated"in the
ICCPR have been violated can submit communications to the Human
Rights Committee. 263 It seems commonsensical that "recognised"
and "enumerated" rights must include their implications, if the ICCPR
is not to be fossilized. Therefore, to argue that an interpretation
would be incompatible ratione materiae, the argument for
permeability based on interdependence must be tackled head-on.
The third type of jurisdictional conflict is analogous to the
forum non conveniens doctrine in private international law. An
organ may decline to take jurisdiction over a matter when it
technically could.264 Now that there is a new Committee to monitor
the ICESCR, one might be inclined to argue for a greatest-technicalcompetence (or expertise) principle, so that the Human Rights
Committee should defer matters in the largely undeveloped area of

262 See discussion on treaty interpretation in S.ILB.2.
263 Supra, note 3 [emphasis added]. Note also the reference to "rights set forth in the
Covenant" in Article 1 of the Optional Protocol.
264 Meron gives an example of such 'Judicial restraint," citing an occasion when the
European Commission of Human Rights declined to examine a claimed breach of ECHR 5
regarding certain P.O.W.s because the State Party in question, Turkey, was party to the
Geneva Convention No. III, which was also applicable and over which the International
Committee of the Red Cross had jurisdiction: Meron, HR, supra, note 187 at 217.
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economic rights to the new Committee. 265 This argument assumes:
that the former Committee is less expert than the latter; that if it is
less expert, it should defer; and that if it does not defer, there will
be normative conflict.
However, these assumptions are not
necessarily valid.
The Human Rights Committee will be dealing with those
obligations attaching to economic rights that are justiciable, 266 and
is thus better situated than the new Committee to develop an
expertise based on practical adjudicative experience. Hence, both
normative and jurisdictional overlap between the Covenants and
Committees are more apparent than real. The Human Rights
Committee would not, by and large, duplicate the new Committee's
function, but would complement and supplement it. Similarly, I have
demonstrated 267 that when human rights are approached from the
obligations perspective, all of them, including economic rights, may
be said to have immediate and negative obligations components.
These are the two factors most commonly thought to make political
rights justiciable. If the Human Rights Committee focused on some
of these obligations through the permeability process (as well as on
core positive obligations for the most basic rights to life), economic
rights would be subjected to the scrutiny of an individual petition
procedure. This would give them a dimension that abstract
examination by the new Committee could not hope to accomplish.
Normative overlap would thus also be minimized.
However, there is room for a residual area of overlap and
potential conflict. In time, the new Committee's collective expertise
will grow as academic interest in economic rights throws more light
upon them,28 and as the Committee profits from domestic examples
and its own studies arising out of state reports. It is too early to tell
what form the new Committee's evaluations will take, but they may
conceivably include statements akin to the Human Rights

265 See Meron, HR, ibid. at 214:

"Supervision of compliance should be entrusted to

those organizations with the greatest technical competence in the field."
266 Recall S.IV.A.

267 Ibi

no

268 See Principles 102 and 103, Mte Limburg Principles," supra, note 164.
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Committee's General Comments, 269 as well as actual evaluations of
states' levels of compliance in the manner of the Committee of
Independent Experts under the European Social Charter.270 On this
optimistic scenario, the new Committee's views may have direct
relevance both to mainstream areas of overlap like freedom of
association 271 and equal protection, 27 2 and to pioneer areas such as
the incorporation of the right to an adequate standard of living into
the right to life.2 73 Likewise, the Human Rights Committee's
materials, not to mention the personal experience of its members,
would be of use to the new Committee, especially if the latter body
also takes an activist approach to the interdependence of human
rights. Thus,
it is clear that institutional 274
and informal personal
27
linkages 5 between the Committees and their members are desirable,
if not imperative. This is due not merely to the negatively cast goal
of avoiding normative conflict, but also to the more positive goal of
fostering creative co-operation based on the interdependence of
human rights and on the unity of purpose of the Covenants
themselves. The new Committee should remember this when
drafting its rules of procedure, 276 and the Human Rights Committee

269 The Human Rights Committee's authority for preparing "general comments" stems
from ICCPR 40(4). ICESCR 21 makes reference to ECOSOC (that is, the new Committee)
preparing reports that include "recommendations of a general nature": supra, note 3.
270 See Harris, ESC, supra, note 223 at 304 for 'Table of Compliance with the Charter
as Determined by the CIE [Committee of Independent Experts] During the First Six Cycles."
271 ICCPR 22 and ICESCR 8, supra, note 3.
272 ICCPR 26 and ICESCR 2(2), ibid.
273 ICCPR 6(1) and ICESCR 11(1), ibid.

274 See Meron, HR, supra, note 187 at 142, 241-42.
275 Note that the NGO Rights and Humanity held a seminar on the new Committee,
March 23, 1987, during the overlap of the two bodies' meetings. Members from both
Committees participated. This was repeated in 1988.
276 At present the ECOSOC Rules of Procedure apply to the new Committee: see UN
Doc.E/5715/Rev. 1. These rules are unsuited to the needs of a specialist body like the new
Committee. The new Committee did not reach agreement at its first session on requesting
authority from ECOSOC to adopt its own rules.
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should scrutinize its own Provisional Rules of Procedure 277 with such
inter-Committee co-ordination in mind. This has already been
foreseen, as is evident from the 1986 Limburg Principles.2 78
Principle 98 reads:
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is related to the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Although most rights can clearly be delineated as
falling within the framework of one or the other Covenant, there are several rights
and provisions referred to in both instruments which are not susceptible to clear
differentiation. Both Covenants moreover share common provisions and articles.
It is important that consultative arrangements be established between the Economic,
2 79
Social and Cultural Rights Committee and the Human Rights Committee.

Inter-Committee "cross-fertilization "28 ° may help create a symbiotic
relationship between the Covenants, and may foster subtler, more
sophisticated and more creative understandings of human rights and
their interrelationships.
In the end, the guiding principle must be to follow the
course most likely to provide the most effective protection for the
individual. Meron has convincingly come down on the side of a
multiplicity of norms 28 1 and procedures. He sees such multiplicity
as desirable because it allows individuals to benefit from the most

277 See the Committee's (Provisional) Rules of Procedure, UN DoC.CCPR/C3/Rev.1 (3
December 1979).
278 Four members of the new Committee were at the conference which drafted the
Limburg Principles.
279 Principle 98, "'he Limburg Principles," supra, note 164. Authority for such
consultative arrangements might be found in ICESCR 22, supra, note 3, which reads:
The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other organs of the
United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with
furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in
this part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each
within its field of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to
contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant.
See for comparison Article 21 of the "Draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights with Regard to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in Annual Report of
IACHR 1985-1986, 209 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, Doe. 8 rev. 1, 26 Sept. 1986) which provides that
the Inter-American Commission should establish relations with experts, organs and agencies
in the Inter-American and UN systems.
280 Meron, HR, supra, note 187 at 242.
281 Ibid- at 62.
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favourable norms and procedures at the present, underdeveloped
stage of international human rights law. He adds:
The prevailing wisdom has been that it is important to improve co-ordination, to
avoid conflict, and to avoid different interpretations.... Nevertheless, over-zealous

efforts to rationalize the existing multiplicity of procedures might cause the most
favourable procedures to be brought into line with the less far-reaching ones. As
an important study by the government of the Netherlands has suggested, there may
be good reason "to allow the new procedures a certain amount of time to develop
and consolidate themselves in practice. In the long run it may then prove possible
to rationalize the numerous procedures, adapting the less effective to bring them
into line with the better ones. 282

Nothing could be more to the point in the context of the
relationship between the Covenants. It is crucial that the use of an
international petition procedure for economic rights be permitted to
show enough promise to indicate the way forward in this largely
unexplored area. 28 3 Hopefully this will occur in a climate of cooperation between the Committees.
The Meron quotation looks to the day when international
human rights supervision will be rationalized. The proponent of
permeability is concerned that when that day arrives, we may still
be compartmentalizing the traditionally conceived sets of human
rights. Practical inroads have to be made soon in order to dislodge
our orthodox conceptions and to ensure a truly comprehensive and
effective normative restructuring, along with a jurisdictional
realignment. Otherwise, we risk passing on to future generations a
truncated legal approach at considerable variance with the growing
consensus on the interdependence of human rights. To insist on
maintaining the separation of the Covenants will only encourage
such a result.
V. PERMEABILITY UNDER THE ICCPR
In this part I will examine views on the merits and
admissibility decisions adopted by the Human Rights Committee

282 Ibid at 243, quoting Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Human Rights
and Foreign Policy 80 (1979).
283 See discussion on justiciability of economic rights in S.IV.A.
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under the Optional Protocol's individual communications procedure.
I will also examine one General Comment. 8 4 The treatment will be
limited to the four provisions under which permeability has been
directly at issue so far: Article 26 on the right to equal protection,
Article 14 (1) on the right to a fair hearing, Article 22(1) on the
right to freedom of association, and Article 6(1) on the right to
28 5
life.
286
A. Article 26: Equal Protection of the Law

Article 26 is one of the more complex and badly drafted
articles in the ICCPR. There are perhaps three central issues. First,
what does equal protection of the law mean in broad terms? Can it
be confined to equality before the law and equal protection in the
application of the law, as several commentators contend? 28 7 Or does
284 The analysis is current up to, but not including, the March-April 1988 session (32nd
session) of the Human Rights Committee.
It should be noted that no views are directly relevant on ICCPR 6(1), but an
important General Comment by the Committee under ICCPR 40(4) is directly on point: see
General Comment 6(16)d, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Seventh Session
Supplement, No. 40, (A137/40(1982)) at 93. Therefore, ICCPR 6(1) will be briefly discussed
as regards its potential for permeability under the communications procedure.
Note that the annual reports of the Human Rights Committee have appeared as
Supplement No. 40 to the General Assembly's Official Records every year from 1979
(A/34/40(1979)) to 1986 (A/41/40(1986)) and are formally cited as above. These reports will
hereafter be cited as: HRC year (for example 1979 to 1986) Report. Decisions appearing
in the HRC 1987 Report will be cited as documents in a special UN document series dealing
with the ICCPR.
285 This section should not be taken as an analysis of all facets of each of the articles
and even where it is argued that a presumption for permeability could have been or could be
invoked, the decisiveness of such invocation can only be postulated in the absence of a
thorough analysis of the article, either in the abstract or in a concrete case.
286 Article 26, supra, note 3, reads as follows:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

287 For those who take this narrow view, see: C. Tomuschat, "Equality and NonDiscrimination under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" in von Munch,
ed., Staatsrecht - Volkerrecht - Europarecht: Festschriftfur Hans-Jurgen Schlochauer (Walter
de Gruyter, 1981) at 691; A. H. Robertson, 'The United Nations Covenant on Civil and
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it go beyond this to mean also that the substantive provisions of the
law must not discriminate, that is, that ICCPR 26 includes equality of
or in law? 28 8 Second, if ICCPR 26 means the latter, does it apply
only to rights in the ICCPR, to civil and political rights in general, or
to all legislation, including legislation dealing with rights found in the
ICESCR? Third, whatever the answers to the first two questions may
be, what constitutes discrimination? The first question may be
considered resolved given that, in the cases I will look at, the
Committee has clearly taken the28 9 broad view.
I will not be
concerned with the third question.

It appears that the second question is also now resolved; in

a recent session,2 9 0 the Committee applied ICCPR 26 to legislation
dealing with social security, the subject of a right found in ICESCR
9.291 There were three cases involved: S.W.M. Broeks v. the

Netherlands, L.G. Danning v. the Netherlands, and F.H. Zwaan-de

Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights" (1969) 43 B.Y.B.I.L. 21 at
39; Lillich, "Civil Rights" in Meron, Human Rights in InternationalLaw: Legal and Policy
Issues, vol. 1, supra, note 164 at 132-33.
288 For this broad view, see B.G. Ramcharan, "Equality and Non-discrimination" in
Henkin, The InternationalBill of Rights, supra, note 81 at 246.
289 It must be recognized that in some ways questions one and two cannot be
disentangled if one takes the view that a broad interpretation of what kind of equality ICCPR
26 deals with necessarily means economic rights fall within its scope. However, it would be
possible to give ICCPR 26 a broad meaning but in relation to a limited range of rights and,
therefore, legislation. In the cases which follow, this is exactly the approach urged upon the
Human Rights Committee by the Netherlands government.
There is a fourth issue with which I will not be concerned, but which is probably
of as much, if not more, significance to marginalized members of society. That is the question
of the meaning of certain enumerated grounds of discrimination in ICCPR 26, such as "social
origin," "property," and "birth," as well as the scope of the grounds which would fall within the
words "or other status." The Canadian reader may wish to use the grounds in ICCPR 26 to
assist the interpretation of the scope of the analogous grounds in s. 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I would note that this fourth issue cannot be divorced from
the third question mentioned above, that of the meaning of "discrimination"; in this regard,
the Human Rights Committee should be urged to focus on remedying disadvantage and
powerlessness rather than formalistically focusing on ensuring the same treatment for "similarly
situated" persons.
290 Its 29th Session was held in March and April of 1987.
291 Article 9 of the ICESCR, supra, note 3, reads: '"he States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance."
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Vries v. The Netherlands 29

The arguments by the Government were

virtually identical in each case, as were the holdings of the
Committee. However, there were some important differences in the
arguments made by the petitioners or "authors" of the
communications 2 93 I will therefore deal with the Committee's views
collectively, 294but make references to individual cases where
appropriate.
292 S.W.M. Broeks v. The Netherlands (Communication No. 172/1984), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/29/D/1721984 (16 April 1987); LG. Danningv.the Netherlands (Communication No.
180/1984), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/180/1984 (16 April 1987); F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the
Netherlands (Communication No. 182/1984), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984 (16 April
1987). All three cases now appear in the HRC 1987 Report.
293 In particular, the arguments of the author in Broeks, ibid, included in the text of the
Committee's decision, were more extensive than in Zwaan-de Vries, ibid The author's
arguments were threadbare in Danning ibid. It must be noted that all three cases came
before the Committee at approximately the same time (Broeks, 1 June 1984; Danning,19 July
1984; Zwaan-de Vries, 28 September 1984). As the general issue raised was identical in each,
it may reasonably be assumed that the Committee did not treat each case in isolation. For
this reason, the Broeks arguments (and the manner in which the Committee integrated those
arguments into the text of its decision) will be focused on.
294 The Dutch cases were the first to decide that ICCPR 26 can apply to rights in the
ICESCR, but there had been five previous communications, all held to be inadmissible, which
raised the issue to one degree or another. A detailed examination is not justified for the
simple reason that the ICCPR 26 issue was never explicitly addressed by the Committee.
These cases are LM.v. Norway (Communication No. 129/1582), HRC 1983 Report at 241;
A Group ofAssociations for the Defense of the Rights of Disabled and HandicappedPersons in
Italy and Others v. Italy (Communication No. 163/1984), HRC 1984 Report at 197; J.H. v.
Canada (Communication No. 187/1985), HRC 1985 Report at 230; J.D.B. v. the Netherlands
(Communication No. 178/1984), HRC 1985 Report at 226; and H.S. v. France
(Communication No. 184/1984), HRC 1986 Report at 169.
Two of the cases, LM.v. Norway and H.S. v. France, do call for brief comment. H.S.,
a thoroughly confusing case, was partly disposed of on grounds of non-exhaustion of local
remedies. H.S. alleged arbitrary deprivation of his French nationality. Both the Government
and the Committee seemed to think this claim raised fair trial issues under ICCPR 14(1)
(paras. 8.4 and 9.3, respectively), an article that H.S. never explicitly pleaded. He did claim
discrimination regarding social security allowances for his family, education for his children,
and his own work prospects. The Committee said (at para. 9.6): "H.S. has introduced other
issues in the case.... These issues are either unsubstantiated or fall outside the scope of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and will, therefore, not be examined by
the Committee."
In the absence of fuller specification by the Committee and given the rather
incoherent allegations by H.S. of ICCPR violations, there is little reason to think that the
Committee was referring directly to ICCPR 26 with its latter point.
LM.v. Norway is not a model of clarity either. A medical doctor claimed racial
discrimination with respect to assistance in filling out tax forms and low-income housing
allocation. The Committee found the communication to be "incompatible with the provisions
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The relevant facts are fairly straightforward. In the cases of
Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries, Broeks (a nurse) and Zwaan-de Vries
(a computer operator) had their unemployment benefits terminated
on the basis of Article 13(1) of the Dutch Unemployment Benefits
Act (wwv). wwv 13(1) stipulated that wwv benefits could not be
claimed by married women who were neither "breadwinners "29s nor
permanently separated from their husbands. No similar provision
applied to married men; so, in separate communications, each
woman claimed a violation of ICCPR 26. In Danning, the applicant
was disabled after an automobile accident and was in receipt of
social insurance benefits. The relevant legislation provided for
higher payments to married beneficiaries than to single persons;
common-law marriages were excluded from the higher payments.
Danning claimed that he was being discriminated against within the
terms of ICCPR 26 because he lived in a common-law marriage. In
all three cases, the Committee disposed of the threshold issue by
of the Covenant" (at para. 5), but had earlier said only that tax and housing allocations are
not governed by the ICCPR and that there was no evidence of racial discrimination. The
Committee could have been referring to tax and housing as distinct rights, or, conceivably, to
the claim of discrimination regarding those matters. The total ambiguity leads me to discount
the case's significance.
The two cases disposed of on grounds of lack of standing, A Group of Associations
v. Italy and J.H. v. Canada, raised potentially interesting questions. In JH., an Englishspeaking Canadian Armed Forces member claimed that promotion policies discriminated
against English-speaking Canadians. J.H.'s claim was that ICCPR 2(1) had been violated, but,
on the facts, the claim should have been that ICCPR 26 had been infringed. ICCPR 2(1)
guarantees non-discrimination, but only in relation to the enjoyment of other ICCPR rights.
J.H. was alleging language-based discrimination in relation to the opportunity for job
promotion (found in ICESCR 7(C)) or, more generally, the right to work (ICESCR 6(1)).
Such discrimination would therefore fall to be dealt with under ICCPR 26. In Group of
Associations, it was claimed that revocation of a legislative provision dealing with the
compulsory hiring of the disabled would violate ICCPR 26 in relation to the right of the
disabled to work.
Since the Dutch triad, one case - F.G.G. v. the Netherlands (Communication No.
209/1986), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/209/1986, Annex at 1-5 -was held inadmissible for failure
to exhaust local remedies. That case dealt with the dismissal of Spanish seamen by a Dutch
company, with the approval of the Dutch government. ICESCR 6 and 7 on the right to work
and on just conditions of work were involved in the seamen's claim of discrimination on the
basis of nationality. The Netherlands advanced similar arguments in F.G.G. to those that
failed in the Dutch triad.
295 The Netherlands explained that whether or not a married woman was deemed to be
a breadwinner depended, in part, on the absolute amount of the family's total income and on
what proportion of it was contributed by the wife: see Zwaan-de Vries, supra, note 292 at
para. 8.2.
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deciding that ICCPR 26 did indeed apply. In both Broeks and Zwaande Vries, a violation was found on the facts; in Danning the
differential treatment was found to be based on objective and
reasonable criteria.2 96 In Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries, the Committee
297
recommended that the Netherlands offer "an appropriate remedy,"
a point to which I will return.
The Committee's opinion may usefully be divided into its
admissibility and merits components.
On the question of
admissibility, the Committee first noted that the report procedure
under the ICESCR does not constitute the "same matter" for purposes
of Optional Protocol 5(2)(a). More importantly, however, the
Committee dismissed arguments that would have found the claims
inadmissible ratione materiae because of overlap with the ICESCR.
A claim of an alleged breach of the ICCPR is "not necessarily
298
incompatible ... because the facts also relate to a right protected"
by the ICESCR or any other international instrument. This approach
is important, for it should allow future permeability claims to be
decided on the merits, rather than being swept under the carpet as
inadmissible. In essence, the Committee's approach nullifies any
presumption that no overlap is dispositive in an across-the-board
manner.
At the merits stage, the Committee enunciated two very
important principles when rebutting the Netherlands' argument that
the existence of the non-discrimination provision in icESCR 2(2)299

296 See Broeks, supra, note 292 at paras. 14 to 16; Zwaan-de Vies, ibid at paras. 14 to
16; Danning supra, note 292 at paras. 14-15.
297 See Broeks, ibid at para. 16; Zwaan-de Vries, ibid at para. 16. Note that the
legislation had been amended retroactively to 1984 by the Dutch Government pursuant to an
EEC directive, but not so as to compensate either woman in the preceding period. In
Danning, ibid, the Government informed the Committee that reform legislation was going
through parliament.
298 Zwaan-de Vries, ibid at para. 6.3; Danning ibid at para. 6.3. In Broeks, ibid, the
language is slightly different. Such claims "cannot be declared inadmissible solely because" the
facts also relate to rights in the ICESCR or another instrument: see para. 6.3.
299 ICESCR 2(2), supra, note 3, reads: 'The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
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26.

The first

The Committee is of the view that the [ICCPR] would still apply even if a particular
subject matter is referred to or covered in other international instruments, eg. the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
or, as in the present case, the [ICESCR]. 3 00

Second, it advanced the principle that: "[n]otwithstanding the
interrelated drafting history of the two Covenants, it remains
necessary for the Committee to apply fully the terms of the
[ICCPR]. 301
Perhaps the most obvious point about the approach of the
Committee is that it legitimizes permeability as a result, without
treating permeability as a desirable phenomenon. The phrasing
seems deliberately non-committal, leaving the door open302 for more
innovative developments but offering no guarantee that the door will
stay open. However, at the very least, states will not be able to
argue that the simple fact of overlap is dispositive.
Several features suggest that the Committee played down the
implications of its interpretation. First, there was emphasis placed
on the Committee "fully"303 applying ICCPR rights. The Committee
did not rely at all on an analysis based on objects and purposes or
broad context. In fact, it implicitly treated the Dutch Government's
position as requiring a restrictive interpretation of the clear and
304
ordinary meaning of ICCPR 26, simply in order to avoid overlap.
Second, after stating the two general principles mentioned above, the
Committee pointed out that "article 26 does not merely duplicate the

300 See para. 12.1 in each of the three Dutch cases, supra, note 292 [emphasis added].
301 Tbid.
302 In particular, the use of "referred to" and "covered in" can be read to apply to both
indirect (related) and direct (organic) permeability, respectively.
303 See text accompanying note 301.
304 Note the Netherlands' phrasing of the issue:

"...

whether the way in which the

Netherlands is fulfilling its obligations under article 9 in conjunction with articles 2 and 3 of

the [ICESCR] can become, by way of article 26 of the [ICCPR, the object of an examination
by the Human Rights Committee." See para. 4.2 in each of the three Dutch cases, supra, note
292. [Emphasis in the original.]

1989]

Human Rights Norms

guarantees already provided for in article 2 [of the ICCPR],''305 and by
implication ICESCR 2(2). Third, the Committee said: "[W]hat is at
issue is not whether or not social security should be progressively
established in the Netherlands but whether the legislation providing
30 6
for social security violates the prohibition against discrimination."
Thus, Article 26 only involves indirect protection of economic rights.
This could be read in the future either as a simple description of
Article 26 or as an implicit restraint on the Committee straying
further into ICESCR terrain. As stated earlier, one goal of this study
is to argue that this latter approach is unwarranted and that the
Committee must keep the door open for a more dynamic interaction
between the Covenants. Fourth, the Committee recommended "an
appropriate remedy," conspicuously avoiding any explicit suggestion
that Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries be compensated for their shortfall
in benefits. 3 7 This must be seen as implicit recognition of the
inroads that their interpretation had made and of the perceived need
to move cautiously in order to keep states on-board. Fifth, there
is the phrase in the second principle: "[n]otwithstanding the
interrelated drafting history of the two Covenants. ' 308
This
formulation is unnecessarily defensive, given the foregoing analysis
which concluded that separation did not mean separability. 3 9 It is,
however, to be welcomed on its own terms for it gives no weight to
the mere historical fact of separation.
The Committee seems to have taken a deliberately low-key
approach in phrasing its decision, almost certainly (and wisely) in
order to present a consensus decision 310 as well as to maintain its
authority among states parties to the ICCPR. It has deliberately

305 See para. 123 in each of the three Dutch cases, ibid The suggestion in the next
two sentences is that Article 26 is much more extensive in its guarantees than either ICCPR
2(1) or ICESCR 2(2).
306 See para. 12.5 in each Dutch case, ibid

307 Para. 16 in Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries, ibid
308 Para. 12.1 in each Dutch case, ibid
309 See S.III.B.
310 It is significant that there was no minority opinion in the case.
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understated the step that it has taken311 and obscured the broader
considerations that allowed it to come down on one side of the line
rather than the other. Of possible significance in this regard is the
fact that the Committee extensively reproduced the arguments of
both the Government 12 and the applicants.31 3 Not only do these
arguments reveal that a very contentious point of law was at stake,
but they may also reveal some of the arguments the Committee
implicitly accepted and rejected. At the very least, reproducing the
authors' written arguments might be considered an invitation for
others to develop some of their points further.
It is therefore of considerable interest that Broeks
emphasized the interdependence of human rights. She first drew
attention to the preambles of both Covenants and argued: "An
explicit connection is made between an individual's exercise of his
civil and political rights and his economic, social and cultural rights.
The fact that these different kinds of rights have been incorporated
into different covenants does not detract from their
interdependence."314 Later, she pointed out that although there are
two instruments for "technical reasons," the rights in the two
Covenants "are highly interdependent,"315 a fact said to emerge not
only from the preambles but also from Separation Resolution 543
311 Suffice it to say that the equal protection tool is a major weapon in making welfare
systems less arbitrary and, in individual cases, of securing benefits that legislation does not
provide for. For an introduction to the experience in the United States, illustrating the
potential and (so far) the limits of equal protection analysis, see G. A. Christenson, "Using
Human Rights Law To Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses" (1983) 52 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 3; M.H. Good, "Freedom from Want: The Failure of United States Courts to Protect
Subsistence Rights" (1984) 6 Hum. Rts. Q.335; E. Sparer, "The Right to Welfare," supra, note
11; S.Krislov, 'The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in
the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process" (1973) 58 Minn. L Rev. 211; J.Tussman & J.
tenBroek, 'qhe Equal Protection of the Laws" (1949) 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341. A central problem
with equal protection rights is that governments often equalize down rather than equalize up
in response to a finding of a violation, especially in the welfare benefits field. Some sort of
ratchet effect is needed, either within the equal protection right itself or as part of the remedy
or by means of independent protection of the economic right elsewhere in the document,
thereby establishing a floor below which provisions cannot fall.
312 See paras. 4.1 and 8.3-8.5 in each Dutch case, supra, note 292.
313 See, in particular, paras. 5.3-5.10 in Broeks, ibid
3 14

Ibid at para. 5.2.

3 15

Ibid at para. 5.9.
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(VI) which affirmed the principle of interdependenceY 6 Further,
she argued: "If the State party is intending to imply that the
subject-matter which is covered by one covenant does not come
under that of the other, this is demonstrably incorrect: even a
summary comparison of the opening
articles of the two covenants
317
bears witness to the contrary....
The arguments made so far for an interpretative presumption
for permeability will bolster and supplement these arguments of
Broeks, which were not developed very far. The arguments in
Broeks amounted to the kind of presumption which may well have
tipped the balance in favour of the Committee's interpretation.
However, those arguments should be seen not as the end of the
story but as its beginning. In particular, too much was conceded in
Broeks's statement that "[t]he level of social security does not come
within the scope of the ICCPR. ' 318 A thorough analysis of the
concept of interdependence would suggest that this, in fact, is an
open question dependent on how the interpretation of various ICCPR
provisions evolvesY 9 Broeks, Zwaan-de Vries and Danning provide
a good, but still weak, foundation for inter-Covenant permeability.

316 Ibid. I have referred
earlier to Res. 543 (VI) as the Separation Resolution. See
S.III.B.1.
317

Broeks, ibid. at para. 5.9.

318 bid at para. 5.7. See as well the arguments by the Government based on (1) the
implementation systems of the Covenants, and the fact of the historical choice of the

contracting parties not to allow a petition procedure under the ICESCR (para. 8.3 in each
case as well as paras. 8.5 in Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries); (2) the view that individual
complaints dealing with discrimination with respect to ICESCR 9 would be "incompatible with
the aims of both ICESCR and ICCPR" (para. 8.3 in each case); and (3) the view that the
obligation under ICCPR 26 could only be that of a "periodic examination" of legislation (para.
8.3 in each case). All supra, note 292.
319 For instance, see the hypothetical example on child welfare benefits in relation to
ICCPR 23 and 24 in S.IV.A
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3 20
B. Article 14(l): The Right to a FairHearing

There are two main questions arising under ICCPR 14(1) that
are of interest from the permeability perspective. First of all, what
is meant by "rights ... in a suit at law,"32 1 and can economic rights

benefit from Article 14(1) guarantees? Second, does ICCPR 14(1)
contain a right of access to courts or tribunals and, if it does, to
what extent must that access be effective?
The first issue cannot be adequately addressed without322a
brief digression into the situation under the European Convention.
To trigger ECHR 6(1), an applicant must show that the "determination
of his civil rights and obligations" is at stake.3 23 By focusing on the
word "determination" in ECHR 6(1), which also appears in ICCPR
14(1), the ECHR organs take the approach that the article is triggered

320 The relevant section of Article 14(1), supra, note 3, reads in part: "All persons shall
be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law...."
321 The French phrase reads: "...
ses droits et obligations de caractre civil." See C.
Newman, "Natural Justice, Due Process and the New International Covenants on Human
Rights: Prospectus" [1967] Pub. L. 274, for a comparative table of the UDHR, ECHR and
ICCPR. Newman's piece shows how strong the arguments are for giving "suit at law" a broad
meaning. To the extent that the rival arguments are similarly strong, a presumption for
permeability, appealing to the indirect protection of economic rights by ICCPR 14(1), would
perhaps make the difference.
322 For greater detail and reference to the leading cases, see D.J. Harris, 'he
Application of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights to Administrative
Law" (1974) 47 B.Y.B.I.L. 157; A. Boyle, "Administrative Justice, Judicial Review and the
Right to a Fair Hearing Under the European Convention on Human Rights" (1984) Pub. L.
89; A.W. Bradley, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Administrative Law First Impressions" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 609; J. Fawcett, The Application of the
European Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) at 130.45; C. Rasenack, "'Civil Rights
and Obligations' or 'Droits et Obligations de Caractire Civil': Two Crucial Legal
Determinations in Art. 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms" (1970) 3 Rev. du Dr. de l'Homme 51; P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van
Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Deventer,
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1984) at 237-43.
323 The relevant part of ECHR 6(1), Basic Texts, supra, note 3, reads: "In the
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law...."
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if proceedings are "decisive' for civil rights and obligations3 24 Thus,
the nature of the forum is not determinative and administrative law
proceedings can be covered by ECHR 6(1). However, the Court has
also narrowly interpreted "civil rights and obligations," all the while
avoiding a comprehensive abstract definition. 25
The phrase "civil rights and obligations" has been interpreted
to have an autonomous Convention meaning and no direct renvoi to
the characterization of a right in a national legal system.3 2 6 By and
large this phrase has been contrasted to public law, not criminal law.
If contrasted to the latter body of law, the phrase would mean "all
rights or obligations enforceable at law. '32 7 Instead, by the gradual
evolution of the case law, the phrase has come to connote "private
law rights;" administrative law proceedings have been covered by
ECHR 6(1) only when found to be decisive for traditional private law
categories of legal rights, such as in tort, contract or land law.3 28
However, in two 1986 landmark decisions drawing vigorous dissents,
the European Court for the first time held that ECHR 6(1) was
triggered by statutory social welfare rights.3 29 The Court balanced
what it called the private law features of the claimed entitlements
with the public law features, and found the former to
predominate3 30 In reality, the Court strayed outside its private law
approach, and was motivated by the opportunity to provide ECHR
324 Harris, supra, note 322 at 161; van Dijk & van Hoof, supra, note 322 at 238-39.
325 Fawcett, supra, note 322 at 135.

326 Boyle, supra, note 322 at 91; Fawcett, ibid. at 134; van Dijk & van Hoof, supra, note
322 at 238.
327 Fawcett, ibicL at 135.

328 Ibid.; Harris, supra, note 322 at 199; van Dijk & van Hoof, supra, note 322 at 23839; Boyle, supra, note 322 at 91-92, 108-09.
329 FeldbruggeCase (1986), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. A, No. 99, (sub nom. Feldbruggev. The
Netherlands) 8 E.H.R.R. 425 [hereinafter Feldbrugge cited to Eur. Court H.R.]. Deumeland
Case (1986), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. A, No. 100, (sub nom. Deumeland v. Germany) 8 E.H.R.R.
448 [hereinafter Deumeland cited to Eur. Court H.R.]. For a discussion of both cases, see

A.W. Bradley, "Social Security and the Right to a Fair Hearing: The Strasbourg Perspective"
(1987) Pub. L 3. Feldbrugge dealt with a statutory sickness allowance and Deumeland with

a statutory widow's pension.
330 Feldbrugge, ibid at 13 and 16; Deumeland, ibid at 23 and 25. The rights were
treated as public law rights in their respective systems.
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protection to economic rights having a major impact on the lives of
the people in question. 3 1 The key statement in each case was that
"the right in question was a personal, economic and
individual right,
332
a factor that brought it close to the civil sphere."
ICCPR 14(1) has been invoked in relation to economic rights
in three cases.33 3 In all three, the communication was held
inadmissible but not on ratione materiae grounds.
F.G.G. v.
Netherlands and CA v. Italy left the issue open. YL v. Canada is a
complicated case that leaves the matter technically open, while at the
same time laying down some guidelines for the meaning of "suit at
law"33 4 and implying that the pension proceedings at issue do trigger
14(1).
F.G.G. v. Netherlands, it will be recalled, dealt with the
dismissal of Spanish seamen from work.33 5 One ground of complaint
was that the granting of a dismissal permit by the Government
violated F.G.G.'s "right to have full information and the opportunity
to defend himself."3 3 6 The Dutch Government argued that this claim
was incompatible ratione materiae because a right in a suit at law
was not at issue 3 37 The communication was inadmissible on grounds
ICCPR

331 This is made clear by the dissent of the minority: Feldbrugge, ibid at 21-29; and
Deumeland, ibid at 33.41.
For the minority, even though entitlement to social security benefits was of extreme
importance to many people, "the economic importance for Mrs. Feldbrugge's livelihood of the
allowance claimed is insufficient, on its own, to bring into play the applicability of Article 6
§1 and its judicial guarantees." Feldbrugge, ibid at 25; Deumeland, ibid at 37. This
constitutes a strong hint that the minority felt that the first "private law" feature, the right's
importance, constituted the real ground for the decision of the majority.
332 Feldbrugge,ibid at 15; Deumeland, ibid at 24.
333 CA. v. Italy (Communication No. 127/1982), HRC 1983 Report; YL v. Canada,
supra, note 9; F.G.G., supra, note 294.
Note that the Committee, in General Comment 13(21)d, HRC 1984 Report at 143,
did not offer any elucidation of "rights and obligations in a suit at law," but instead requested
States Parties to explain in their state reports how the concept is interpreted in relation to
their respective legal systems.
335 See supra, note 294.
3 36

FG.G., supra, note 294 at para. 3.2.

337 bid at para. 3.4.
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of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and the Committee never
addressed the compatibility question.
In CA. v. Italy, CA, who was qualified to teach "naval
mechanical engineering", was authorized by an education authority
to teach "mechanical technology" only. When an initial appeal failed,
he appealed twice by an exceptional administrative recourse
procedure to the President of Italy, who rejected the appeal by
decree each time. CA claimed that this Presidential appeal
procedure failed to conform to Article 14(1) requirements. 338 The
Committee noted that CA could have pursued his case against the
decision of the education authority before domestic courts, the
implication being that the courts would have provided a fair hearing.
The Committee found:
In these circumstances, the author cannot validly claim to have been deprived of the
right guaranteed under article 14(1) of the Covenant to have the determination of
"rights ...
in a suit at law" made by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal.
Without having to determine whether article 14(1) is at all applicable to a dispute

[t]hat the
Rights Committee therefore decides: ...
of the present nature, the Human
339
communication is inadmissible.

The Committee did not decide the case on non-exhaustion grounds.
Rather, this finding really amounts to a substantive finding that the
communication was "manifestly ill-founded", a heading of
inadmissibility found in Article 27(2) of the European Convention
but not explicitly in Article 3 of the Optional Protocol.3 40 In other
words, the case was decided on the basis that even if ICCPR 14(1)
were applicable (without deciding that it was), its requirements were
not satisfied. Assuming the legitimacy of the Committee importing
a "manifestly ill-founded" requirement into the ICCPR, it is still odd
to apply this ground of inadmissibility without existing jurisprudence
338 CA.v. Italy, supra, note 333 at para. 4.1.
339 kid at para. 6.
340 Article 27(2) of the ECHR, Basic Texts, supra, note 3, reads:

"'he Commission

shall consider inadmissible any petition submitted under article 25 which it considers
incompatible with the provisions of the present Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse
of the right of petition."
Article 3 of the Optional Protocol, supra, note 3, reads: "he Committee shall
consider inadmissible any communication under the present Protocol which is anonymous, or
which it considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant."
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on whether the particular kind of claim is compatible ratione
materiae with the ICCPR. It may have been that the Committee did
not feel prepared to address the scope of ICCPR 14(1) at that point
in time.
The majority of the Committee in XLa v. Canada followed a
similar route in finding Y.L.'s claim inadmissible. This time, however,
the majority combined the finding with some dicta on the
interpretation of ICCPR 14(1). The minority felt that the majority
had sidestepped what should have been a finding of incompatibility
ratione materiae.3 41
Y.L. had been discharged from the Canadian Armed Forces
on grounds of mental disorder. His request for a disability pension
was rejected by the Canadian Pension Commission because Y.L.'S
disability was found to neither arise out of nor have any direct
connection to his military service, as required by the 1952 Pension
Act. His final appeal to the Pension Board in 1979 failed. The
Board's decision was forwarded not to Y.L. but to his lawyer, with the
indication that it was up to the lawyer to decide whether to show
the full text to his client. In the event, Y.L. did not see the full text
until 1983. Y.L. claimed that the Board's procedure had violated
ICCPR 14(l).342

The Canadian Government objected primarily on two
grounds. First, there was a failure to exhaust local remedies because
Y.L still had a right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.
Second, the claim was incompatible ratione materiae because the
proceedings did not count as a "suit at law."343 The Committee
requested detailed information from both parties on whether, in
Canadian law, the proceedings related to public law or civil (private)

341 See Individual Opinion of Messrs Graefrath, Pocar, and Tomuschat, Appendix to YL

v. Canada,supra, note 9 at 150.
342 There were essentially four heads of claim: (1) he should have been informed of the

exact nature of the mental disease he was alleged to be suffering; (2) he was not allowed to
attend the hearings; (3) his lawyer, appointed and paid by the Government, refused to discuss
fully with Y.L. the medical aspects of his case; and (4) the Board was not independent and

impartial since it was composed of civil servants from the executive branch of government.
YL v. Canada, ibid. at para. 3.1.
343 YL v. Canada, ibid at para. 4. There is no elaboration of the Government's
argument on "suit at law" in the text of the Committee's decision.
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law. 44 Both sides responded that the facts fell under a public law
statutory regime 3 4s
The way in which the Committee majority then dealt with the
case was ambiguous, and was calculated, it would seem, to avoid
addressing the ratione materiae question head-on. The Committee's

decision proceeded in two stages. First, it only briefly looked at the
meaning of "suit at law," but managed to set some parameters for
future cases without explicitly stating whether pension proceedings
would be covered:
... In the view of the Committee the concept of a "suit at law" or its equivalent in
the other language texts is based on the nature of the right in question rather than
on the status of one of the parties (governmental, parastatal or autonomous
statutory entities), or else on the particular forum in which individual legal systems
may provide that the right in question is to be adjudicated upon, especially in
common law systems where there is no inherent difference between public law and
private law and where the courts normally exercise control over the proceedings
either at first instance or on appeal specifically provided by statute or else by way
of judicial review. In this regard, each communication must be examined in the light
of its particularfeatures... In the present communication, the right to a fair hearing
in relation to the claim for a pension by the author must be looked at globally,
irrespective of the different steps which the author had to take in order to have his
claim for a pension finally adjudicated.346

Second, the Committee immediately went on from the above passage

to find that:
In the view of the Committee ... it would appear that the Canadian legal system
does contain provisions in the Federal Court Act to ensure to the author the right
to a fair hearing in the situation. Consequently,
his basic allegations do not reveal
3 47
the possibility of any breach of the Covenant.

Some brief comments may be made. The Committee appears
to have started down the winding road travelled by the European
Convention organs, taking a case-by-case approach and avoiding a
clear definition of "rights ... in a suit at law."348 The enigmatic final
344 lbid. at para. 6.
345 bid. at paras. 6.1-6.3, 7.3.
346 Ibid, at paras. 9.2 and 9.3 [emphasis added].
347 Ibid at para. 9.5.
348 The Committee appears to treat "suit at law" as an autonomous treaty concept, but
does not explicitly say so.
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clause in the first quotation above does little to explain "the nature
of the right[s]" which will trigger ICCPR 14(1), or what the Committee
means by a "global" treatment of a pension claim, beyond indicating
the fact that the fora in which rights are to be determined are not
determinative. 349 However, the fact that the Committee avoided
going further into this question (by shifting gears to discuss what the
Canadian system does provide in relation to such claims) suggests
that it might indeed entertain future claims that social welfare rights
trigger ICCPR 14(1). The Committee based inadmissibility on the
substantive ground that the right to a fair hearing is, in fact,
protected (again, as in cA v. Italy, akin to "manifestly ill-founded");
this implies that the pension proceedings did amount to a "suit at
law." The implication is supported by the fact that the Committee
provided general guidelines on the meaning of "suit at law."
Support for this inference may also be found in the minority
decision, which strongly suggests that the minority perceived the
implications of the majority's approach. The minority felt that the
availability of an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal could not
be held against Y.L because the Board had not directly advised Y.L.
of this: "Under these circumstances, Canada is estopped from
asserting that either, procedurally, the author has failed to exhaust
local remedies or that, substantively, the requisite guarantees under
article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant have been complied
with."350
This characterization shows quite clearly that the
Committee majority may have deliberately chosen the "manifestly illfounded" approach over the non-exhaustion claim pleaded by
Canada, in order to smuggle in, so to speak, a favourable ratione
materiae determination without directly addressing the issue perhaps to give the Committee time to examine the question in
more detail or to do some internal consensus-building. The minority
opinion went on to say that the claim was incompatible ratione
materiae because Y.L.'s relationship to the Crown "differed essentially
from a labour contract under Canadian law" and because the Board
was "an administrative body ...
lacking the quality of a court." For

Supra, note 346.
35 0

Appendix to YL.v. Canada, supra, note 9 at para. 2.
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them, these two criteria "would appear to determine conjunctively
the scope" of ICCPR 14(1).351
In YL v. Canada, both the majority and the minority
apparently wanted to avoid an admissibility determination that would
prevent them from discussing to some extent the meaning of "suit at
law."352 The majority succeeded in opening the door for the indirect
protection of economic fights under ICCPR 14(1) on a case-by-case
basis in the future. The Committee could conceivably condition
their case-by-case determination on a general principle linking ICCPR
14(1)'s scope to the importance of the right in question for the
individual, as well as to the consequences for that person if the right
is denied or restricted - irrespective of whether the right is deemed
economic or political, or is found in the ICESCR or in the ICCPR.3 53
However, there is a real danger that the Committee might be
tempted to distinguish between private law and public law rights, a
distinction that is irrelevant to the purpose of human rights. The
Committee would not be well advised to adopt a distinction that the
European Court has recently strained so far as to have all but
abandoned. 3 54 To give certain social welfare rights procedural
protection because private law features somehow predominate over
public law features, instead of frankly acknowledging that it is their
fundamental importance for the individuals in question that justifies
the protection, would simply lack credibility. Given the morass of
European Convention jurisprudence, and in light of the permeability
presumption, it will be desirable for the Human Rights Committee
351 Ibid, at para. 3.
352 It should be noted that this analysis of YL v. Canada is not in accord with the only
other treatment of the case, in A. de Zayas, J. Molter & T. Opsahl, "Application of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under the Optional Protocol by the
Human Rights Committee" (1985) 28 German Y.B. Int'l L. 9. The authors state with no
supporting analysis (at 45): "[The Committee found that the guarantees of Article 14(1) did
not apply because a 'suit at law' was not involved. The Communication was declared
inadmissible." As the above treatment suggests, this would not seem to be correct.
353 For arguments that "civil rights," as well as the French counterpart, should be given
a broad interpretation because of the crucial importance of social welfare rights in the modem
state, see Harris, supra, note 322 at 185-88, 199; Boyle, supra, note 322 at 108-11; and G.
Sperduti, "Le Raccord Entre La Charte Sociale Europ~enne et la Convention Europfenne des
Droits de l'Homme" (1979) Cah. de Dr. Eur. 360-64.
354 See Feldbrugge and Deweland,supra, note 329.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[yoi- 27 No. 4

to state in the future that ICCPR 14(1) can cover public law economic
rights such as are found in the ICEsCR.
The second possible point of permeability, it will be recalled,
is that dealing with access to the courts. There are as yet no ICCPR
views on this, but again, the ECHR experience is instructive. The
Airey Case355 is one of those rare cases that threaten to open up
vast new jurisprudential frontiers. It has yet to do so in the ECHR
system but its principles are transferrable to the ICCPR context. In
Airey, the European Court stepped through the door opened in the
Golder Case356 (which held that the right of access to a court was
implied by ECHR 6(1)) to find that there had been a breach of a
right of effective access. There was a violation, on the facts of the
case, because a woman of modest means could not obtain legal aid
to cover the high costs of an application to the Irish High Court for
a judicial separation from her husband, and was thereby unable to
bring an action. 357 Under Irish law, Mrs. Airey was free to
represent herself, and thus had formal access; but such access had
little value because of the complexity of the proceedings and of the
substantive points of law.358
The Court took the view that "personal circumstances," as the
Irish Government characterized Mrs. Airey's situation, could vitiate
a right, and that hindrances to exercising a right in fact can breach
the ECHR just like a formal legal impediment. 35 9 With this
established, the Court then dealt with the argument that they could
not import economic rights, even on a case-by-case basis, into the
ECHR:
The Court is aware that the further realisation of social and economic rights is
largely dependent on the situation - notably financial - reigning in the State in
question. On the other hand, the Convention must be interpreted in the light of

(1979), Eur. Court of H.R. Ser. A, No. 32, (sub nom. Airey v. Ireland) 2 E.H.R.R.
305 [hereinafterAirey cited to Eur. Court H.R.]. See P. Thornberry, "Poverty, Litigation and
Fundamental Rights - A European Perspective" (1980) 29 I.C.L.Q. 250.
356 Golder,supra, note 31.
35 7

Airey, supra, note 355 at 12-14. The Court also found that this amounted to a breach
of the ECHR 8 right to family life.
358

Airey, ibid at 13.

359 Ibid at 14.
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present-day conditions ... and it is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and
practical way as regards those areas with which it deals.... Whilst the Convention
sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have
implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore considers, like
the Commission, that the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may
etend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor
against such an interpretation;there is no water-tight division separatingthat sphere
from the field covered by the Convention.360

The italicized words seem to constitute a negative formulation of a
permeability presumption, saying that the interpretation of ECHR
articles as permeable should not necessarily be excluded. This is
not unlike the Human Rights Committee's formulation in the triad
of ICCPR 26 cases. It is still not a positive formulation according to
which such an overlap with economic rights would count in favour
of an interpretation. However, the difference may be more apparent
than real and the Human Rights Committee could invoke the Airey
principle in its future elaboration of ICCPR 14(1).
361
C. Article 22(l): Freedom of Association

et aL v. Canada,3 62 the only case so far dealing with ICCPR
22(1), raised a permeability issue almost identical to that raised a
decade earlier by a triad of trade union cases under the European
Convention 63 The result does not favour permeability, although a
vigorous five-member minority opinion may perhaps be invoked at
LB.

360Tbia, at 14-15 [emphasis added]. This may be called "the Airey principle"
361 ICCPR 22(1) and (2), supra, note 3, read:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which
are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on
members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
362 Supra, note 9. See de Zayas, Moller & Opsahl, supra, note 352 at 578.
363 National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, supra, note 43; Swedish Engine Drivers,
supra, note 116; Schmidt and Dahlstr6m Case (1976), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. A, No. 21, (sub
nom. Schmidt and Dahlstr~m v. Sweden) 1 E.H.R.R. 632.
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some future date. 3 4 In jB., six members of the Alberta Union of
Public Employees claimed that the prohibition on striking that
applied to provincial civil servants in Alberta constituted a breach by
Canada of ICCPR 22(1). A majority of the Committee found the
communication to be incompatible rationemateriae,because the right
to strike (found in ICESCR 8(1)(d)) could "not be considered an
implicit component of the right to form and join trade unions" that
is found in ICCPR 22(1).365
The arguments of the Canadian Government were
significantly similar to the pleadings of Belgium and Sweden in the
European trade union cases, and to crucial aspects of the European
Court's judgments in those cases. According to Canada, the claim
was incompatible ratione materiae: "No mention of the right to
strike is made in article 22, paragraph 1, of the [ICCPR]. The
Government of Canada considers that this silence is of import,
especially in light of article 8, paragraph 1(d), of the [IcEScR] which
does recognise the right to strike."366 This statement conveys the
same message as Sweden conveyed to the European Court: that the
364 See Individual Opinion by Mrs. Higgins and Messrs Lallah, Mavrommatis, Opsahl and
Wako, Appendix to J.B. v. Canada,supra, note 9 at 161.
365

JB. v. Canada,ibid at paras. 6.5, 7 and 8. ICESCR 8(1) and (2) read:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his
choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the
promotion and protection pf his economic and social interests. No restrictions
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations
and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union
organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other
than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws
of the particular country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise
of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the
administration of the State.

366JB. v. Canada,ibid at para. 4.2. [emphasis added].
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presence of a right in one Covenant should detract from, and
perhaps even categorically prevent, the implication of that right into
the other Covenant.3 67 I have already disposed of this nonpermeability presumption. The Committee did not rely on this
argument, but, to the extent that it was an underlying motivation,
it should be recalled that the Committee's language in the more
recent ICCPR 26 cases rejected such an approach.
The Committee majority saw the issue as being "whether the
right to freedom of association necessarily implies the right to
strike. 368 After observing that the ICCPR has a life of its own 3 69
and referring rather ritualistically to VCLT 31(1), the majority relied
entirely on two methods of interpreting Article 22(1) that paid little

attention to the

ICCPR'S

object and purpose.

The Committee majority first relied on the drafting history
of icEscR 8(1)(d) and ICCPR 22(1). It found it significant that, prior
to the Separation Resolution, neither of the draft articles which
corresponded to what later became ICESCR 8 and ICCPR 22 contained
a right-to-strike provision.3 7" After the separation, however, what
became ICESCR 8 was amended to include a right to strike, but no
such amendment was even proposed as regards what is now ICCPR

367 Swedish Engine Drivers,supra, note 116 at 163-65.
368

jB. v. Canada,supra, note 9 at para. 6.2 [emphasis added].

369 Ibid.

This observation was by way of countering the claim by J.B. that the

Committee should rely on the findings of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
which were favourable to the implication of a right to strike. See Arts. 3 and 10 of ILO
Convention No. 87, 67 U.N.T.S. 18 (1948). For the unanimous treatment by the Freedom
of Association Committee of the prohibitions of public sector strike activity by Alberta
statutes, see Case No. 1247 (launched by the Canadian Labour Congress on behalf of the
Alberta Union of Public Employees), ILO Official Bulletin, vol. 68, Series B, No. 3, 1985, at
34-35. For the general ILO view that the right to strike forms part of freedom of association,
see Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey by the Committee of

Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (Part 4(B)),
International Labour Conference, 69th Session, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1983)
66 and see Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of
Association Committee of the GoverningBody of the ILO, 3rd ed. (Geneva: International
Labour Office, 1985). A more accessible discussion of the above can be found in the
judgment of Chief Justice Dickson in The Alberta Reference, supra, note 8 at 352-58.
370 More particularly, a motion to include a right to strike in ICCPR 22's pre-separation
versions was rejected.
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22.71 The majority then "corroborated" this travaux analysis by
examining ICESCR 8. In its opinion, because the right to form and
join trade unions and the right to strike were separate rights in
ICESCR 8, the latter could not be implied into the former in ICCPR
22(1).372

The minority of five took a diametrically opposite
interpretative approach: "We believe that the question that the
Committee is required to answer at this [admissibility] stage is
whether article 22 alone or in conjunction with other provisions of
the Covenant necessarily excludes, in the relevant circumstances, an
entitlement to strike."373 It went on to conclude that ICCPR 22 could
be interpreted to include protection of the right to strike.
The minority first disposed of the majority's travaux-based
arguments. The minority felt its textual analysis had already
established that ICCPR 22(1) guarantees a broad right to freedom of
association. While the right to form and join trade unions is one
example of that right, it would have been inappropriate to have
mentioned more specific activities like strike action. 374 On the basis
of the arguments advanced earlier in this study, the minority could
equally have pointed out that a broader, more extensive historical
analysis of the relationship between the Covenants 'vould' also
invalidate any firm conclusion drawn from the fact that a right
explicitly appears in the ICESCR but not in the ICCPR.
In contrast to the majority's inter-textual comparison, the
minority essentially relied on the ICCPR'S object and purpose to
trump an overly textual approach. The object or purpose is
"especially important in a treaty for the promotion of human rights,
where limitation of the exercise of rights, or upon the competence
of the Committee to review a prohibition by a State of a given
activity, are not readily to be presumed." 375 This approach was used
to conclude that the enumeration of the right to strike and the right
371 LB. v. Canada,supra, note 9 at para. 6.3.
372 Ibid at para. 6A.
373 Appendix to .B. v. Canada, supra, note 9 at para. 2 [emphasis added].
374 bid at para. 4.
375Ibid at para. 5.
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to form and join trade unions in separate parts of

ICESCR

8 did not

necessarily preclude the right to strike being inferred as part of the

right to form and join trade unions in

ICCPR 22.376

The minority focused on the words "for the protection of his

interests" in ICCPR 22(1) which required, in its view, that "some
measure of concerted activities be allowed," this being an "inherent
aspect" of ICCPR 22(1). 77 It placed considerable weight on two facts:
that the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association had interpreted
Article 10 of the iLo Convention No. 87 so as to incorporate the
right to strike into the right to freedom of association;3 78 and that
the ILO Committee had based its findings on the "furtherance and
defence of interests of trade-union members." 379 The minority was
not as clear as it might have been, but it apparently felt that the
right to strike should be implied in a general manner into ICCPR
22(1), and the legitimacy of any curtailment of the right must then
be determined on a case-by-case basis under ICCPR 22(2), the
limitations provision. The minority said:
Which activities are essential to the exercise of this right cannot be listed a priori
and must be examined in their social context in the light of the other paragraphs
of this article.... Whether the right to strike is a necessary element in the protection
of the interests of the authors, and if so whether it has been unduly restricted, is
a question on the merits, that is to say, whether the restrictions imposed in Canada
are or are not justifiable under article 22, paragraph 21380

3 76

Iid at para. 6. The reasoning here is not clear. The minority seems to suggest that

the right to form and join trade unions in ICCPR 22(1) is dealt with as a "set of distinctive
rights" in ICESCR 8(1)(a) to (d), but this ignores that ICESCR 8(1)(a) seems to directly
correspond to the latter part of ICCPR 22(1). For this reason, I have said that the ICCPR's
purpose trumped the text.
3 77

Ibid at para. 3.

378 Especially in view of ICCPR 22(3) which reads:
Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize [Conv. No. 87] to take legislative measures which would
prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees
provided for in that Convention.
Interestingly, ICESCR 8(3) is identical to ICCPR 22(3).
379 Appendix to LB. v. Canada, supra, note 9 at para. 7.
380 bid. at paras. 3 and 10.
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This approach parallels the approach taken by the minority in the
recent freedom-of-association cases handed down by the Supreme
Court of Canada, 381 ICCPR 22(2) and section 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms fulfilling similar functions. The
Committee minority did not indicate whether it would have upheld
Alberta's restrictions on the right to strike or found them to be
unjustified, in whole or in part, under ICCPR 22(2). The important
point here is that the minority did not see location of the right to

strike in the

ICESCR

as a bar to its incorporation into the

ICCPR.

Aided by the explicit reference to trade union members' interests in
ICCPR 22(1) itself, the minority gave what might be called an
effectivist interpretation to that article, in order to render it more
meaningful to those who rely on trade unions to better their position
in society. While the right could be cut back under ICCPR 22(2), the
onus would be placed on the state to justify any limitations, as is
3 83
the case under section 1 of the Charter,
and the standard of proof
would seem to be at least as strict as that for section 1.384
JB. v.Canada is thus a setback from the perspective of the
permeability thesis. However, more detailed consideration of the
relationship between the Covenants might lead future interpretations
of ICCPR 22 to accord more closely with the views of the minority.
For instance, the new Committee's interpretations of ICESCR 8 on
matters such as collective bargaining rights might find their way into
the ICCPR. At some point, the decision in J.B. might itself be
reversed.

381 On the right to strike, see the Alberta Reference, supra, note 8.

382 'TheSiracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR"
(June 1986) 36 ICJ Rev. 47-57. Principle 12 reads: The burden of justifying a limitation
upon a right guaranteed under the Covenant lies with the state." The Principles are not
legally binding, but, like the Limburg Principles, are the result of the collaboration of highly
respected international lawyers, including members of the Human Rights Committee.
383 On the burden of proof under section 1 of the Charter, see R.v. Oakes, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 103 at 136-37.
384 See Siracusa Principles 3 ("All limitation clauses shall be interpreted strictly and in
favour of the rights at issue") and 5 ("All limitations on a right recognized by the Covenant
shall be provided for by law and be compatible with the objects and purposes of the
Covenant"), supra, note 382.
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D. Article 6(1): The Right to Life385
Equal protection, fair hearing and trade union rights are
important means of protecting economic rights, apart from their
value as independent rights.
Yet, the ultimate test of
interdependence is the interpretation placed on the right to life in
ICCPR 6(1). Does it remain a classic negative right or is there a
more modem conception to appeal to?3 86 Can the Human Rights

Committee foster an evolution of the concept to include the right
to live with basic human dignity, as the Supreme Court of India
has?3 8 7 Can such rights as the right to health, the right to food, or
the right to shelter be interpreted into the ICCPR?

385 For the text of ICCPR 6(1), see supra, note 28.
386 For the argument that the right to life should be interpreted to include "the right to
the satisfaction of survival requirements," see Ramcharan, "The Concept and Dimensions of
the Right to Life" and F. Menghistu, "The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements" in
Ramcharan, supra, note 198 at 1 and 63, respectively; for opposing views see F. Przetacznik,
"Right to Life as a Basic Human Right" (1976) 9 Rev. du Dr. de 'Homme 585; and Y.
Dinstein, "the Right to Life, Physical Integrity and Liberty" in Henkin, ed., The International
Bill of Rights, supra, note 81 at 114.
387 See, for example, Frances CoralieMullin v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 S.C.R.
516; Olga Telis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [sub nom. Bombay Pavement Dwellers Case]
(1986) A.I.R. (SC) 180; and the Bandhua Mukti Morcha Case (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67. In Frances
Mullin, the Indian Supreme Court said (at 529): "[T]he right to life includes the right to live
with human dignity and all that goes with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter...." In the Bombay Pavement Dwellers Case, the Court
found that pavement dwellers chose sidewalk space close to their place of work and that to
evict them would consequently deprive them of their means of living. It took the view (at
194) that "it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of
the right to life." In BandhuaMukti Morcha, the Court held that the right to life includes the
right to live with basic human dignity, which included just and humane work conditions,
maternity relief, and other guarantees found in the Directive Principles portion of the Indian
Constitution; moribund laws on these matters could be ordered enforced by the judiciary on
the basis of the constitutional right to life. A complete study of permeability would
encompass the relationship between the Indian Constitution's justiciable Fundamental Rights
and non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy (see supra, note 5), which provide an
almost exact domestic law parallel to the ICCPR and ICESCR. It is significant that the
Indian Constitution was being drafted at the same time as the Covenants and that the Indian
delegation to the UN actively supported the separation: recall the quotation supra, note 73
and accompanying text. In each of the above cases, the Indian Supreme Court used the
explicitly non-justiciable Directive Principles to justify its broad interpretation of the right to
life.
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The Committee has taken some tentative but significant steps

in this direction, not in any views adopted under the Optional
Protocol but in General Comment 6(16)d.388 The next step will be
for the Committee to act on its General Comment and welcome
permeability under its Optional Protocol, taking into account, among
other things, the earlier arguments on justiciability and interCommittee linkages.
General Comment 6(16)d proclaimed that the right to life
was "the supreme right"3 89 and then went on to give the following
opinion:
[Tihe Committee has noted that the right to life has been too often narrowly
interpreted. The expression "inherent right to life" cannot properly be understood
in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt
positive measures. In this connection, the Committee considers that it would be
desirable for States parties to take all
possible measures to reduce infant mortality
and to increase life expectancy,
especially
in adopting measures to eliminate
390
malnutrition and epidemics.

A survey of the summary records of the Committee's
meetings at which this paragraph was debated reveals that the
concept of interdependence and inchoate notions of permeability lay
at its heart. Mr. Opsahl stated:
There was ...
some value in viewing the Covenant in its full context without drawing
a rigid line between the various instruments on human rights. Due weight should
be given to the view which prevailed, both in the United Nations and in scholarly
opinion that international instruments on human rights formed an indivisible system
and that the two Covenants were necessarily to some extent interactive. Matters
such as the right to life were relevant to both Covenants.... The door should be left
open for the inclusion of cross-references in general comments, since they explained
the meaning of the articles under consideration in their full context and highlighted
essential points for their application.391

388 General Comment 6(16)d, supra, note 284.
389 Ibid at para. 1. Also, in two views, the Committee has referred to the right to life
in similar terms. See Pedro Camargov. Colombia (Communication No. 45/1979 or R. 11/45),
HRC 1982 Report 114 at para. 13.1 and Kanta Baboram - Adhin et aL v. Suriname
(Communication Nos. 146/1983, 148-154/1983), HRC 1985 Report at paras. 14.3-16.
390 General Comment 6(16)d, supra, note 284 at para 5.
391 Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the 370th Meeting, CCPR/C/SR.370
(21 July 1982), at 2-3 [emphasis added].
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Mr. Graefrath took the view that:
[O]verlapping between international instruments on human rights was unavoidable
in the present day... In the case of the right to life it was impossible to complain
that in a given year three men had been arbitrarily killed by the police and at the
same time ignore the fact that in the same country during the same period 10,000
children under the age of five had died of malnutrition or lack of medical care. A
State Party which had the means to reduce infant mortality or to prevent epidemics
and which did not do so was not complying with its obligations under article 6 of
392
the Covenant.

While Mssrs Opsahl and Graefrath represented the propermeability wing in the discussions, Committee members who were
outspoken in their initial opposition to the above-cited passage
eventually modified their views. Mr. Tomuschat noted: "There had
been valid reasons for adopting the two instruments separately, but
at the same time the demarcation line between them must not be
too rigid. They did overlap, particularly in regard to protection of
the right to life."393 And Mr. Dieye took the view:
[I]n connection with the distinction to be made between the two Covenants, that
ideally there should have been only one and that exceptional circumstances had
made it necessary to have two....
In the circumstances, it was necessary to bear in
mind the interdependence of the two instruments, and he himself thought it wholly
acceptable that some of the concepts of the [ICESCR] should be reflected in the
comment on article 6 of the [ICCPR], provided the borrowing was clearly
marked.3 9 4

Thus, I conclude by observing that the Committee has taken
a major conceptual step, motivated at least in part by the
interdependence of human rights. I have sought to create a general
framework in which such theoretical interdependence can generate
392 bMd at p. 5. Mr. Movchan took a historical view of the overlapping question. He
referred to the separation of the Covenants as the result of modification of the Unity
Resolution at the behest of Western States, but the General Assembly had "clearly recognized"
the link between the Covenants. He pointed to the simultaneity of adoption and the identical
Article 1 on self-determination and concluded: "It was important to bear that historical and
legal background in mind when considering proposals to separate the Covenants completely."
Ibid at 10.
393 CCPR/CiSR.371 at 2. See Tomuschat's arguments for keeping the Covenants
separate and not "diluting"the ICCPR and "encroaching" on the ICESCR only the day before:
CCPR/C/SR.369 at 9.
394 CCPR/C/SR. 371 at 3. See Dieye's contrary view the day before: CCPR/C/SR.369
at 7.
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the practical permeability of human rights via the Optional Protocol
petition procedure. The crucial question that is raised by General
Comment 6(16)d is whether the Committee will entertain individual
communications based on its broad interpretation of the right to life
as open or organically permeable to at least some rights found in the
ICEsCR. To the extent that the Committee's interdependence-based
interpretation is sincere, this study suggests that a presumption for
permeability should operate in future ICCPR 6(1) cases with respect
to those norms in the lCESCR - for instance Articles 9, 11 and 12 that are 5justiciable or that become justiciable at some point in the
39
future.

395 Note that de Zayas, Moller & Opsahl, supra, note 352, in discussing the positive
measures referred to in General Comment 6(16)d (and General Comment 14(23)d on nuclear
weapons), take the view (at 31, note 60): "Some of these matters are not likely to be
addressed under the Optional Protocol as they are not easily 'justiciable' at the request or on
behalf of individual alleged victims...." That economic rights may not easily be justiciable does
not mean that they cannot be made justiciable, as was argued in Sec. IV. A.

